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This volume include essays originally delivered at the international workshop Italy, Europe, 
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People’s Republic of China, Western Europe and Italy  
During the Cold War Period (1949-1971)
edited by Guido Samarani, Carla Meneguzzi Rostagni and Sofia Graziani
Editors’ Introduction
Guido Samarani
(Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia)
Carla Meneguzzi Rostagni
(Università degli Studi di Padova, Italia)
Sofia Graziani
(Università degli Studi di Trento, Italia)
The birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 occurred at a time 
when the world order was being divided into two opposing geopolitical blocs. 
China’s foreign policy was thus from the very beginning heavily influenced 
by the logic of the Cold War. The Sino-Soviet alliance, formalised in February 
1950, was seen by Communist leaders (especially Mao Zedong) as a neces-
sity for the PRC given the emerging international context. The outbreak of 
the Korean War (1950-1953) further consolidated China’s position within 
the Soviet bloc, causing the majority of Western states not to recognise the 
newly established Communist government. The new Chinese government 
also proceeded to eliminate the former Western presence from the country. 
International historiography on the Cold War has for a long time been 
dominated by an emphasis on the bipolar confrontational nature of the 
Soviet-American conflict as well as by a focus on the superpowers’ poli-
tics and the role of the United States. With the end of the Cold War and 
the subsequent access to newly available archival sources from the former 
Eastern bloc, new approaches to the study of the conflict have emerged, 
giving way to a more complicated pattern of international relationships 
(see, for instance, Gaddis 1997; Westad 2007, 2017). Since the ’90s, it has 
thus been possible for historians to further investigate the experience of 
the Soviet Union from different angles as well as to assess the role of China 
in the history of the Cold War. The exhaustive studies of Chen Jian, Shen 
Zhihua and Li Danhui, among others, have been important in highlighting 
the centrality of the Chinese position and deepening the understanding of 
many important issues and events from China’s point of view (see Chen 
2001; Shen, Li 2011; for a review of the Chinese scholars’ contributions to 
the wider field of Cold War studies, see Xia 2008). 
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At the same time, the historiography on the Cold War had conventionally 
portrayed Mao-era China as sealed off from the West for almost twenty 
years, from 1949 until the early ’70s when PRC began opening to the Unit-
ed States. Recent studies have started to complicate this image, focusing 
on connections and people-to-people grassroots exchanges between China 
and Western (including European) countries (see Hooper 2016; Lovell 
2015; Romano, Zanier 2017, among the others). This book builds on and 
further develops studies recently conducted by a bulk of scholars mainly 
based at the University of Venice and the University of Padua. These stud-
ies examined the role played by non-governmental actors (political parties, 
cultural personalities, and economic actors) in promoting the opening of 
Western European countries, such as Italy, France, and West Germany to 
the PRC (Meneguzzi, Samarani 2014; Samarani, Graziani 2015). In point 
of fact, since the end of the Korean War, while stressing the fundamental 
relevance of its close alliance with Moscow and the socialist world, China 
also began looking at Western Europe, which was generally maintaining 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Such interest intertwined with the grow-
ing attention that the major European capitals were developing towards 
Communist China, despite the obligations and constraints imposed by the 
political and military alliances and by the need of avoiding offending the 
sensibility of Washington.
Focusing on Western Europe-China relations and interactions beyond 
conventional diplomatic channels, this book provides new perspectives on 
China’s foreign exchanges in the years of intense Cold War (the ’50s-’60s), 
showing that there was much more going on between Communist China and 
Western Europe that has yet been brought to the scholarly attention both in 
China and in the West. At the same time, the book shows how the approaches 
and range of interactions with China varied depending on the peculiarities 
of individual countries and their modes of dependency to the US. 
This volume consists of nine chapters, most of which are drawn from the 
papers originally delivered at the International Workshop, Italy, Europe, 
China: Economic, Political and Cultural Relations During the Cold War 
Years (1949-1971). The workshop was held at the Department of Asian and 
North African Studies of Ca’ Foscari University of Venice on 13th-14th Feb-
ruary 2014 as part of the Ca’ Foscari University Research Project on Italy, 
Europe, China. Economic, Political, and Cultural Relations in the Cold War 
Years (1954-1971), coordinated by Professor Guido Samarani. Additionally, 
the volume includes chapters by international and outstanding scholars 
who have made valuable contributions to the study of the PRC’s foreign 
policy and engagement with the Western world during the Cold War. 
The first essay illustrates the main trends in Chinese scholarship on the 
PRC’s foreign policy during the Cold War. Prominent Chinese historians 
Liang Zhi and Shen Zhihua offer a detailed review of Chinese scholars’ re-
search, with a focus on the period between 2001 and 2015. They highlight 
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the importance of historical documents made available since 2004, when 
the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC were opened to 
the public, in allowing further development of ‘The New Cold War History’ 
as a field of study. By opening up many new research questions and focus-
ing their research on high-level, external contacts as well as grassroots 
exchanges, Chinese scholars have recently contributed to a change in 
perspective, methodology and research topics in Cold War history studies 
that were previously dominated by an excessive emphasis on the role of 
the US as well as on high-level politics. 
The following four chapters address Europe-China relations and interac-
tions from different perspectives. Relying on social history sources (includ-
ing oral history), the contribution by Beverley Hooper, Emeritus Professor 
at the University of Sheffield, offers an acute analysis of the experience of 
the small non-official European community in Mao’s China (the ’50s and 
’60s). The focus is on the everyday lives of three different groups of Euro-
peans (mostly British and to a lesser extent French and Italians, as well as 
Swedes) who worked or studied within Chinese institutions at that time. 
These three groups were ‘foreign experts’, students of Chinese language 
and culture, and ‘foreign comrades’ consisting of long-term residents po-
litically and ideologically committed to the new China. What emerges is 
that all these groups, albeit with different degrees, were denied genuine 
contact with many aspects of everyday Chinese life, thus experiencing 
‘privileged segregation’ that caused frustration especially among foreign 
students. Beverley Hooper’s essay also reveals how their everyday lives 
and intra-group relationships were affected by the tumultuous politics of 
the Mao years, especially when it came to the long-term residents who 
had decided to support Chinese communism (being consequently alienated 
from their home country).
The third essay in the volume addresses the case of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany’s non-official relations with the PRC. Giovanni Bernardini 
focuses on the role played by West German economic elites in shaping 
bilateral relations and paving the way to the reopening of relations with 
the PRC, with particular attention to the complex negotiation and the 
long-term implications of the 1957 trade agreement. Through an accurate 
analysis of the interplay between economic actors and government au-
thorities largely based on German archival sources, Bernardini shows how 
the relations with China were influenced by historical experience dating 
back to the early 20th century (German companies had been among the 
most active in the Chinese market before 1949) and by purely economic 
reasons that went beyond the logic of the East-West confrontation.
Another country that could boast close ties with China was Great Britain, 
the Asian colonial power par excellence until the Second World War, which 
maintained a fundamental presence in the area through the British Colony 
of Hong Kong and controlled, through its banks, Europe-China financial 
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flows. Roberto Peruzzi’s essay addresses Sino-British economic relations 
through Hong Kong focusing on the crucial years of 1966-1967 when the 
Cultural Revolution on the one hand and the Hong Kong’s disturbances and 
riots on the other caused the temporary crisis of their mutually beneficial 
relationship. By connecting the riots involving the Hong Kong Colony to 
the British Government’s decision to implement the Sterling devaluation 
in November 1967, Peruzzi argues the existence of a linkage between 
British authorities’ official interpretation on the nature of the riots and the 
financial measures adopted. Peruzzi also suggests that the management 
of the Hong Kong emergency by the British colonial authorities marked 
the beginning of the end of British power in Hong Kong. 
Among Western European countries, the case of France is also extremely 
significant considering that in 1964, searching for an autonomous foreign 
policy – albeit within the framework of the alliances – the French govern-
ment decided under the impulse of Charles de Gaulle to recognise the PRC 
long before other partners of Western Europe did. Yet, De Gaulle’s decision 
can be understood as the culmination of a process of increasing economic 
and commercial contacts that developed in the previous decade. Thierry 
Robin’s essay addresses this issue, looking at the role played by economic 
actors in defending French economic interests in China – interests that 
predated the establishment of the Communist government in 1949 – and 
promoting the opening to the PRC. Robin’s essay reconstructs the history 
of Sino-French unofficial relations since 1949. Additionally, he identifies 
the 1956 French economic mission (led by Henri Rochereau) to China as 
the starting point of a gradual process of Franco-Chinese collaboration 
that would see a growing number of private players involved and forging 
business links with Beijing, providing the basis for 1964’s decision to es-
tablish full diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
The other three essays in the volume focus on the case of Italy’s rela-
tions with the PRC and provide new insights into the role of different Ital-
ian non-governmental actors in promoting dialogue and exchanges and 
contributing to shaping the understanding of China in Italy.
In her essay, Carla Meneguzzi Rostagni makes use of both diplomatic 
documents and personal archives and diaries of eminent Italian politi-
cians. She reconstructs in detail the Italian position vis-à-vis the People’s 
Republic of China, at a time when – similarly to other Western European 
countries – Italian official policy was compelled by membership in the At-
lantic alliance and by relations with the United States. What emerges is a 
complex interplay between economic actors like Dino Gentili and Enrico 
Mattei and politicians, such as the Socialist Pietro Nenni, who worked 
in favour of China-Italy exchanges as early as the ’50s. Then, in the ’60s 
centre-left governments accelerated the process, favouring, in 1964, the 
conclusion of the commercial agreement between Italy and China. Thanks 
to the Socialist Pietro Nenni and the Christian Democrat Aldo Moro’s 
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initiative, the PRC was recognised, two years before the more celebrated 
Nixon’s visit to Beijing.
A key political actor in the unconventional diplomacy between Italy and 
the PRC in the ’50s was the Italian Communist Party. Mainly relying on 
Italian archival sources and memories by former political leaders, Guido 
Samarani reconstructs the relationship between the Italian and Chinese 
Communist Parties from the first exchange of delegation in 1956 up until 
1963, when in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split, bilateral relations were 
interrupted. In particular, his essay sheds light on the significance and 
implications of the first high-level official Italian Communist Party del-
egation visiting China in April 1959 at a time when Sino-Soviet relations 
were deteriorating, and the Italian Communist Party leadership was torn 
between its search for autonomy and alignment with Moscow. 
If party-to-party direct contacts took place no earlier than 1956 when 
national congresses of both parties provided the occasion for the first 
exchange of delegations, then it was before that date through indirect 
channels or at the individual level that contacts were developed. Laura De 
Giorgi’s contribution delved into the personal experience of Velio Spano, 
the first Italian Communist Party representative to travel to China in Au-
tumn 1949. Making use of Spano’s personal archives, she explores his 
short-term sojourn in China against the backdrop of the complex political 
environment of that period. The focus is on his personal experience, as 
well as on his perceptions and the implications of his presence in Mao’s 
China. De Giorgi’s essay shows that Velio Spano’s journey to China was a 
significant episode in the relations between the Italian Communist Party 
and the Chinese Communist Party as well as in the history of broader 
Sino-Italian relations, as she writes: “Even a partial overview of Spano’s 
personal archives shows that the network of contacts he had had the op-
portunity to create in China during those weeks in 1949 were considered, 
at least in Italy, an important asset for the development of informal rela-
tions between the two countries”.
At the same time in the 1950s, important avenues for early encounters 
between Italian and Chinese Communists were offered by international 
‘front’ organisations. Sofia Graziani’s essay delved into this issue, examin-
ing contacts established and developed within international youth organi-
sations linked to the Soviet-sponsored peace movement at a time when the 
direct exchange between the Italian and Chinese Communist parties had 
yet to start. Relying on a large variety of primary and secondary sources, 
she provides evidence of how participation in Soviet-led international or-
ganisations made early political contacts and interactions possible, laying 
the foundation for future dialogue and exchanges. The focus in Graziani’s 
essay is on Bruno Bernini, whose personal experience in China is examined 
within the context of the World Federation of Democratic Youth’s policies 
and initiatives in the early and mid-’50s.
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Roads to Reconciliation, 9-14 
e-ISSN 2610-9042
ISSN 2610-9654 
Together, the essays in this volume offer new insights into the complex 
history of Sino-European relations in the Mao years and shed light on the 
existence of a breadth of vivid interactions and connections in the realm 
of politics, economy and culture, contributing to dismiss the long-held idea 
of Mao-era China as an isolated country.
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in the Cold War Period
Chinese Scholars’ Exploration and Thinking  
(2001-2015)
Liang Zhi 梁志 and Shen Zhihua 沈志华
(Center for Cold War International History Studies,  
East China Normal University, China)
Abstract China was a very important regional power that influenced the fundamental pattern of 
confrontation and détente between the two blocs. With the emergence of new historical documents 
and the adoption of new methods, Chinese scholars have conducted a few discussions on China’s 
foreign policy during the Cold War period since 2001. Their research activity is important for at least 
three reasons: first, thanks to the analysis of new historical material Chinese scholars have opened 
up many new research questions; second, it has constantly enlarged the field of analysis focusing 
on high level external contacts and lower strata grassroots exchange; third, a research team char-
acterised by a reasonable age distribution is being formed in China. Moreover, China has already 
created two major institutions for scientific research and documentary collection located in the 
south and the north of the country: the Centre for Cold War International History Studies at East 
China Normal University and the School of History at Capital Normal University. Certainly, there are 
still shortcomings in Chinese research on China’s foreign policy during the Cold War and Chinese 
scholars themselves are attempting to address the problems.
Summary 1 New Historical Material and New Methods. – 2 General Introduction to China’s Foreign 
Policy. – 3 China’s Policy Towards Socialist Countries. – 4 China’s Policy Towards Capitalist Countries. 
– 5 China’s Policy Towards the Third World. – 6 Review and Prospects.
Keywords China. Foreign policy. Cold war. Chinese scholars. Review article.
Leaving aside the two superpowers (the US and the USSR), the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was the regional power that most greatly influenced 
the Cold War between the East and the West, to the point that “it even oc-
cupied a central position when it comes to some nodal points and key issues 
in the development of the Cold War” (Chen 2001, 17). China has, to some 
This paper was translated from Chinese by Sofia Graziani.
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degree, influenced the fundamental pattern of confrontation and détente 
between the two blocs in at least three ways. In the first place, over time, 
it has formed an alliance with the Soviet Union, competed with the Soviet 
Union for the leadership of the Communist movement, sought Sino-American 
reconciliation, and then, wittingly or unwittingly, transformed the balance 
of power between the East and the West; furthermore, it has played its part 
in local wars (Korean and Vietnam for example), intervened in the internal 
disputes of the socialist camp (Poland and Hungary, for instance) and in Third 
World crisis (such as Laos), and participated in international meetings (such 
as Geneva and Bandung), producing changes in the region; and, finally it has 
benefitted from economic and technical aid and cultural exchanges to win 
the ‘hearts and minds of the people’ with the US or Soviet Union, influencing 
the development path of other Socialist or Third World countries.
Perhaps because of this, study and debate concerning China’s foreign 
policy for a long time has been a focus of Cold War international history 
studies, while Chinese scholarly research has aroused the interest of in-
ternational academic circles. This article investigates the results of the 
research by Chinese scholars into China’s foreign policy in the Cold War 
period between 2001 and 20151 and discusses recent progress, existing 
shortcomings and future prospects. 
1 New Historical Material and New Methods
In the last ten years, Chinese scholars have obtained original results in 
the study of China’s foreign policy during the Cold War. From a purely 
academic perspective, such progress has been made possible first of all 
thanks to the emergence of new historical documents and to the adoption 
of new methods.2 
On September 5th, 1987, the 22nd meeting of the Standing Committee 
of the Sixth National People’s Congress passed the “Archives Law of the 
People’s Republic of China”. Article 19 stipulates that: “historical records 
kept by state archives shall in general be opened to the public in less than 30 
years; archives in economic, scientific, technological and cultural fields may 
1 This paper mainly presents research studies based on original archival material pub-
lished in mainland China: it mainly considers researchers based in mainland China, but also 
includes overseas Chinese. Considering the time-limit applied to archives declassification, 
these studies focus on the period extending from the late ’40s to the early ’70s. Due to length 
limits, the authors do not intend to provide a comprehensive review of the research car-
ried out by Chinese scholars, but only present the most representative studies in the field. 
2 From a non-academic point of view, the most important driving force is provided by 
increased international academic exchanges and research funds resulting from the rapid 
development of Chinese economy and China’s increased openness to the outside world.
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be opened to the public in less than 30 years; archives involving the security 
or vital interests of the state and other archives that remain unsuitable for 
accessibility to the public upon the expiration of 30 years may be opened to 
the public after more than 30 years. The specific time limits shall be defined 
by the state administrative authority for archives and submitted to the State 
Council for approval before they become effective” (Liu Guoneng 2012, 88; 
Beijing shi dang’anju 1987, 2-6). However, in practice, for a long period of 
time access to Chinese archives, especially those relating to foreign affairs 
was by no means been all plain sailing. For, in the process of policy imple-
mentation, a great degree of freedom has been allowed regarding application 
of the restrictions stipulated in the Archives Law and great discretionary 
power left with the management offices concerning declassified documents.
At the beginning of the 21st century the situation started to change. 
Since 2004 the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC has 
opened to the public three batches of archives containing records for clear-
ly identified periods of time: 1945-1955, 1956-1960 and 1961-1965. The 
total amount exceeds 80,000 files (for details see the table below). The 
content of the declassified archives is very rich, covering the main fields 
of China’s foreign affairs, such as politics, economics, military affairs, cul-
ture, border issues, personnel exchanges and overseas Chinese matters. 
At the same time, the Foreign Ministry Archives also compiled three col-
lections on the following topics: Geneva Conference, Bandung Conference 
and diplomatic normalization issues (Lian, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
waijiaobu dang’anguan 2006, 2007; Lian et al. 2006).3 What should also be 
noted is that, with the exception of Tibet, Xinjiang and a few other provinces 
and cities, the majority of provincial and municipal archives are all open 
to the public. Among them, those with the greatest number of accessible 
records are the Shanghai Municipal Archives and the provincial archives 
of Jiangsu, Fujian, Hebei, Shanxi, Gansu, Hunan, Hubei, and Guangdong. 
These documents are also the main sources used in the study of China’s 
foreign policy during the Cold War (Yao 2015, 254-73). 
Quantity of declassified and opened archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Open batch Period Official opening 
date
Opened files Total number
First group 1949-1955 16 January 2004 More than 4,000 15,003 files
19 July 2004 More than 5000
10 January 2005 5,706
Second group 1956-1960 10 May 2006 25,651
3 It is no exaggeration to say that the opening of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the PRC was an exciting and encouraging event for the international academic 
community. 
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Third group 1961-1965 12 November 2008 41,097
Total number 81,751
Since the mid-’80s, China’s official research agencies such as the Archival 
Research Office of the CCP Central Committee (Zhonggong zhongyang 
wenxian yanjiu shi), the Academy of Military Science of the Chinese Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi kexueyuan), the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan) and 
archival departments have edited and published a number of impressive 
publications related to Chinese leaders such as biographical chronologies, 
selected works, collected works, manuscripts, biographies and official ar-
chival collections. Among them, the publications with the largest number 
of documents relating to China’s foreign diplomacy include: “Mao Zedong 
manuscripts since the founding of the State” (Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong 
wengao) (1987-1998), “Selections from archival materials on the economy 
of the People’s Republic of China (1949-1952)” (Zhongghua renmin Gong-
heguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian, 1949-1952) (1989-1996), “A Selec-
tion of Zhou Enlai’s Writings on Diplomacy” (Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan) 
(1990), “Chronology of Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975” 
(Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975) (1993), “Collected writ-
ings of Mao Zedong” (Mao Zedong wenji) (1993-1999), “A selection of Mao 
Zedong’s Writings on Diplomacy” (Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan) (1994), 
“Chronological Biography of Liu Shaoqi, 1898-1969” (Liu Shaoqi nianpu 
1898-1969) (1996), “Chronological Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1949-1976” 
(Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949-1976) (1997), “Zhou Enlai’s Biography” (Zhou 
Enlai zhuan) (1998), “Liu Shaoqi Biography” (Liu Shaoqi zhuan) (1998), 
“Selections from Archival Materials on the Economy of the People’s Repub-
lic of China, 1953-1957” (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao 
xuanbian, 1953-1957) (1998, 2000), “Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949-
1976” (Mao Zedong zhuan 1949-1976) (2003), “Liu Shaoqi manuscripts 
since the founding of the state” (Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao) (2005, 
2008), “Chronological Biography of Ye Jianying, 1897-1986” (Ye Jianying 
nianpu 1897-1986) (2007), “Zhou Enlai Manuscripts Since the Founding 
of the State” (Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao) (2008), “Chronological 
Biography of Deng Xiaoping, 1904-1974” (Deng Xiaoping nianpu 1904-
1974) (2009), “Mao Zedong Military Manuscripts Since the Founding of 
the State” (Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao) (2010), “Selections 
from Archival Materials on the Economy of the People’s Republic of China, 
1958-1965” (Zhonghua Renmin gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian 
1958-1965) (2011), “Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976” 
(Mao Zedong nianpu 1949-1976) (2013), “Chinese Communist Party Cen-
tral Committee Selected documents, October 1949-May 1966” (Zhonggong 
zhongyang wenjian xuanbian, 1949.10-1966.5) (2013), “Works of Deng 
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Xiaoping, 1949-1974” (Deng Xiaoping wenji, 1949-1974) (2014), “Deng Xi-
aoping Biography, 1904-1974” (Deng Xiaoping zhuan, 1904-1974) (2014). 
Even though these documents are generally not so detailed and exhaustive 
as are archival collections, they can nonetheless be of enormous help to 
researchers in filling the gaps in historical knowledge, and thus prove to 
be extremely precious research material.4
In a certain sense, in China the research on China’s foreign policy during 
the Cold War can be classified as contemporary Chinese history (or PRC 
history) studies. At the same time, it can also be incorporated into the field 
of Cold War history studies. Before the end of the Cold War, so-called Cold 
War history studies “almost completely took as its basis the documents of 
the US and other Western countries; as a matter of fact, this is often one 
part of US diplomatic history studies and US-Soviet relations studies, at 
most we can only say that it is an extension of the studies on the history 
of US external relations” (Chen, Yu 2003, 7). As a result, the choice of 
perspective, methodology and research subjects clearly reflects the ten-
dency to put ‘the US at the centre’, with its excessive emphasis on power 
and a focus on high-level politics. In the first half of the ’90s, prominent 
American Cold War history expert John Lewis Gaddis actively promoted 
the development of ‘The New Cold War History’ or what is also known as 
‘Cold War International History Studies’, meaning a totally new post-Cold 
War framework in which researchers could use archival material from 
many different countries, overcome the restraints of ‘US as the centre’, 
focus on the Second and Third worlds and also once more acknowledge 
the influence of ideology in the Cold War. In fact, the reason why ‘The New 
Cold War History’ could form a new academic trend is mainly owing to 
the influence of Chinese scholars, especially those living in the US (Chen, 
Yu 2003; Dai 1999). Most importantly, in recent years still more Chinese 
scholars within China, including a group of doctoral students, wittingly 
or unwittingly drawing a lesson from the historiographical notion of ‘The 
New Cold War History’, have used newly emerged Chinese archival data, 
thus developing research on such issues as, for instance, China’s position 
in the East-West Cold War, the role and function of ideology in China’s 
foreign policy during the Cold War as well as the influence of Cold War 
politics on ordinary Chinese people. 
4 Apart from archival materials in China, access to archives in US, Russia and Japan to a 
large extent has also pushed forward research by Chinese scholars on China’s foreign policy 
during the Cold War, allowing them to cross-check foreign sources against the Chinese ones.
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2 General Introduction to China’s Foreign Policy
Chinese scholars have conducted a few discussions on China’s foreign 
policy during the Cold War period based on concrete evidence. For con-
venience, this article will group the results under three main categories: 
China’s overall foreign strategy, single foreign policies and participation 
in international conferences or organisations. 
Zhang Baijia takes China’s diplomacy in the 30 years after the founding 
of the new China in its entirety. In his view throughout this period, China’s 
main goal was “to establish diplomatic relations with every country in the 
world on the basis of equality” (Zhang 2002, 11). Specifically the whole 
period can be divided into three phases: from the establishment of the PRC 
until the mid-’50s when China made great efforts to create an international 
environment conducive to its own development; from the mid-’50s to the 
end of the ’60s, China gradually took the road of confrontation with both 
the US and the Soviet Union; lastly, in the ’70s, by relaxing relations with 
the US, China extended the scope of its diplomatic activities to the en-
tire international arena (Zhang 2002). Relatively speaking, Yang Kuisong 
attaches even more importance to the continuity of China’s diplomacy. 
His research reveals that class struggle and the united front experience 
moulded Mao Zedong’s radical revolutionary diplomacy, ultimately push-
ing China into the position of having enemies on all sides in the early stages 
of the Cultural Revolution (Yang 2010a). 
Similarly, Chen Jian defines the New China as a ‘revolutionary state’ 
determined to pose an all-out challenge to the existing international order 
and norms. In his view, the ‘Bandung spirit’ that China actively initiated in 
the mid-’50s was not really a retreat from the revolutionary principle of its 
foreign policy, but instead a deepening and a redefinition of this principle. 
By pursuing the ‘Bandung spirit’, China brought decolonization into the 
discourse system of the socialist countries during the Cold War, launching 
a new challenge to the international system. Hereafter, with the rise of the 
Great Leap Forward, China’s diplomacy underwent a change: it further 
acquired a revolutionary character and opposed at the same time the two 
superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union (Chen 2008, 2010). 
Niu Jun considers China’s external policies even more closely from the 
perspective of independent diplomacy, believing that soon after the PRC 
was founded Chinese leaders regarded Asia as a ‘stopover’ and a ‘starting 
point’ even more enduring than the Sino-Soviet alliance, the main arena 
external to the two camps (US-USSR) in which to develop new strategic 
competition. For Niu Jun, the alliance with the Soviet Union and partici-
pation in the Korean war as well as the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions with the US and the launching of the counterattack in self-defence 
against Vietnam, clearly show that Beijing never allowed hostile powers, 
especially the military power of great nations, to come close to China’s 
Shen, Liang. The Research on China’s Foreign Policy in the Cold War Period 21
Roads to Reconciliation, 15-54
e-ISSN 2610-9042
ISSN 2610-9654
borders, and was determined to curb the strong and help the weak, taking 
the initiative to establish a balance of power within the region. Similarly, 
he also stresses the domestic reasons for the directions taken by China’s 
foreign policy, pointing out that the dispute and different opinions among 
policy makers regarding how to evaluate the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and 
how to react to economic recession resulted in spurring China’s diplo-
macy toward a radical leftist turn in the first half of the ’60s (Niu 2003, 
2012b, 2012c, 2014). 
A prominent geographical feature of China is that it has long borders 
along which are many neighbouring, periphery countries. Therefore, the 
proper resolution of border disputes soon became for the New China a ma-
jor question that could not be ignored. Shen Zhihua has discussed China’s 
policy of settling land boundary disputes. He believes that in the context of 
the cold war between two main camps, the motivation behind China’s set-
tlements of land boundary issues was to break the imperialist blockade and 
encirclement, thereby easing the often jittery relations with neighbouring 
countries so as to guarantee and safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty. 
The result was that, on the one hand in nearly all border-related negotia-
tions and talks China either took the initiative or was forced to compromise; 
on the other hand, initially the guiding principles for legal settlement of a 
border issue (whatever the basis: ‘peaceful coexistence’; a spirit of ‘equal 
cooperation, mutual understanding and accommodation’; ‘peace negotia-
tion’; observing the basic principle and practice of international law; rec-
ognising an existing border treaty; safeguarding the nation’s interests; or 
progressively resolving border disputes with neighbouring countries) were 
often not consistent from start to finish and in some circumstances were 
even abandoned (Shen 2014a; on the same topic see also Liu Xiaoyuan 
2011). Humanitarian aid is an important component of China’s foreign aid. 
Yin Qingfei’s research shows that between 1949 and 1965 the main purpose 
of China’s provision of foreign humanitarian aid was to develop relations 
with the countries of the Third World. So the main aim of this aid was to 
serve China’s diplomatic strategy, and gain moral superiority over the US 
and the Soviet Union. In the process of deciding the form and scope of aid, 
a proper balance was occasionally maintained among a few receiving coun-
tries and changing governments; at other times aid was used to express 
closeness with or distance from the other (Yin 2011). After the founding of 
the New China, the practice sprang up of expressing friendship to other 
countries through gifts and exchanges of animals, development of interna-
tional academic exchanges, and cooperation in the field of the protection 
of wild animals, or the so-called ‘animal diplomacy’ (dongwu waijiao). Liu 
Xiaochen demonstrates that in the Cold War period China’s ‘animal diplo-
macy’ to a large extent was a result of studying the advanced experience 
of the Soviet Union and Eastern socialist countries. Yet in the process of 
implementation, it was subject to perceptions and divisions towards the line 
22 Shen, Liang. The Research on China’s Foreign Policy in the Cold War Period
Roads to Reconciliation, 15-54
e-ISSN 2610-9042
ISSN 2610-9654
and camps in different periods. This kind of external interaction often had 
a strong ideological flavour: its success or failure largely depended on the 
success or failure of China’s external policy and changes in the patterns 
of international relations, rather than on anything directly concerning the 
animals themselves (Liu Xiaochen 2013). 
In the mid-’50s, thanks to the Geneva Conference and the Bandung 
Conference, New China started to participate in major discussions on 
international affairs acknowledged as a great nation in the area. Li Dan-
hui points out that, through the Geneva Conference, China achieved the 
strategic goal of preventing the US from forming an alliance with Laos 
and Cambodia and from establishing military bases, while guaranteeing 
Vietnam’s status as Democratic Republic. China was therefore able to 
create in the periphery a relatively stable situation, which was crucial for 
its own economic development. But issues unresolved by the Conference, 
such as the division of Vietnam as well as capitalist control over Laos and 
Cambodia after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese army, undoubtedly did 
little in the way of strengthening the power of the whole socialist camp. It 
was for this that, at the beginning of the ’60s, Mao Zedong, who was reviv-
ing revolutionary spirit, went against the ideology based on compromise 
and flexibility while working for the Indochina armistice (Li Danhui 2013). 
Liu Lei says that China actively used the Bandung Conference to expound 
its peaceful diplomatic policy, improving to a certain degree the interna-
tional political and economic environment determined by the Korean War. 
However, it should be pointed out that although the Bandung conference 
clearly promoted trade between China and Afro-Asian countries, it did not 
change the situation of China’s being dependent of the Socialist camp, in 
particular the Soviet Union, in international trade matters. China still had 
to strive to further develop economic and trade contacts with Western na-
tions (except the US) (Liu 2010).
From the second half of the ’50s to the mid-’60s, China actively partici-
pated in various kinds of Afro-Asia organisations and conferences. On this 
issue, Li Qianyu developed a series of research projects. He believes that 
China’s position regarding Afro-Asian joint meetings, economic conferences, 
economic cooperation organisations and the second Afro-Asian conference 
indicates that the focus of Beijing policy regarding African and Asian coun-
tries was already turning from allaying their suspicion and worry about the 
New China and preventing such countries joining US military bloc against 
it, to establishing an anti-imperialist united front and eliminating revision-
ism, clearly reflecting the diplomatic strategy of ‘to oppose imperialism we 
have to oppose revisionism’, ‘both sides bowed’. China’s policy concerning 
Afro-Asian countries at that time was unable to obtain the understanding 
and support of all countries; in certain situations it even became an obsta-
cle to relations between China and Asian and African countries (Li Qianyu 
2010, 2012, 2014). Since its foundation, the PRC actively sought to join the 
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United Nations in order to promote its national interests and cooperate in 
the struggle of the socialist camp against the US. The Universal Postal Union 
was the first UN agency, which New China successfully joined replacing 
the GMD, and thereby gaining a representative role. Han Changqing and 
Yao Baihui have carried out researches into this question. They believe that 
in striving to join the Universal Postal Union, China adopted suitable poli-
cies and tactics, and obtained the support of the USSR and East European 
Countries. This experience, on the one hand proves the effectiveness of the 
diplomacy of ‘leaning on the one side’ (yi bian dao) and on the other, reflects 
the diplomacy of laying equal stress on both Chinese national interests and 
international obligations (Han, Yao 2009a, 2009b). 
3 China’s Policy Towards Socialist Countries
In the minds of Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders, New China was a 
new and developing independent nation, but still more, it was a socialist 
country. Regardless of the changes taking place in the relations within the 
socialist camp, and regardless of whether one considers unity or struggle, 
in almost all the Cold War period the policy towards the socialist countries 
was in any case an important component of China’s diplomacy. For a time, 
it even became a matter of utmost importance.
With regard to China’s policy concerning socialist countries, the most 
comprehensive and systematic research by Chinese scholars regards Si-
no-Soviet relations at state level, the prime example being the research 
conducted by Shen Zhihua, Li Danhui and Niu Jun (their focus being on 
the ’50s, the ’60s-’70s and the ’80s, respectively). These three scholars 
provided new perspectives in the study of this topic. 
Shen Zhihua’s main point of view can be set out as follows: during 
negotiations for the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Chinese leaders did not consider 
the drawing up of a ‘supplementary agreement’ and the establishment 
of four Sino-Soviet joint-stock companies humiliating; instead, they were 
pleased at the outcome; both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
the Soviet Union considered the question of an alliance from the point of 
view of their respective strategic interests – ideology was not the basic 
motive but certainly represented an essential condition; the firm decision 
by Mao Zedong in 1950 to dispatch troops to Korea to resist the United 
States, ensured the Sino-Soviet treaty would not be set aside; and, ini-
tially, the Central Committee of the CCP completely approved the line 
taken by the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. In his heart 
of hearts, Mao Zedong was satisfied with the criticism of the Stalin per-
sonality cult, but he did not agree with the general idea of condemning 
it (the personality cult per se could be good or bad, it is up to us to insist 
on the correct personality cult). Moreover, Mao felt dissatisfied with the 
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fact that the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in criticis-
ing Stalin’s personality cult had not consulted the CCP and obtained its 
approval in advance. The 1957 Moscow Conference marked the peak of 
the Sino-Soviet alliance, but at the same time also raised the question of 
the leadership of the international Communist movement. Regarding the 
long wave radio station and the united fleet, Mao Zedong reacted radi-
cally, thereby setting up a psychological obstacle to further Sino-Soviet 
military cooperation, although Khrushchev was forced to surrender; the 
Chinese side in 1958 bombarded Jinmen without consulting the Soviet 
Union, and also without informing them in advance (Shen 2002, 2004a, 
2004b, 2004c 2007, 2010, 2013). 
According to Li Danhui, at the beginning of the ’60s, Mao Zedong in-
dicated that the CCP must influence the Soviet Communist Party, assist-
ing Khrushchev. In part because of this, a series of new conflicts arose 
between the CCP and the Soviet Communist Party. Facing the economic 
recession brought about by the Great Leap Forward, Mao Zedong and the 
CCP – while standing up to Soviet pressure – could not but search for a 
compromise with the Soviet Union. In 1962, following Mao’s reaffirma-
tion of the importance of class struggle, the intensification of Sino-Soviet 
divergences regarding foreign policy and the emergence of international 
leftist forces, the CCP judged Sino-Soviet contradictions as contradictions 
between ‘the enemy and us’, and Khrushchev as a mouthpiece of the capi-
talist class, beginning the dispute with USSR regarding the general line of 
the international Communist movement. In October 1964, Khrushchev’s 
fall from power did not bring new opportunities for Sino-Soviet reconcilia-
tion, as the CCP insisted on pushing the Soviet Communist party to refute 
the 20th Congress, while the Soviet Communist Party refused to negate 
itself; in the ’60s, following the worsening of Sino-Soviet Party and state 
relations, border disputes between the two countries gradually became 
politicised, and the Chinese government’s guiding principle in resolving 
Sino-Soviet border issues underwent a corresponding change, making 
known to the public that the partnership between the two countries was 
an unequal one (Li Danhui 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2009). 
In addition, Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui have put forward their own 
original view about the rupture of the Sino-Soviet Alliance – the ‘theory 
of unbalanced structure’ according to which: firstly, after changes took 
place in the leadership structure of the socialist camp, the two communist 
parties were on an equal footing, and the competition for power became 
the main way the two handled political divergences, the main goal being 
the dominance within the world Communist movement; secondly, party-
to-party relations covered and even replaced State-to-State relations. In 
substance, within this structure there was no awareness of sovereignty 
and equality. The above-mentioned structural shortcomings became the 
underlying cause of the inevitable Sino-Soviet split (Shen, Li 2012). 
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According to Niu Jun’s analysis, soon after the founding of the PRC, the 
development strategy of Chinese leaders was to adhere to the Soviet model, 
and to form an alliance with the Soviet Union. After 30 years of upheavals 
and setbacks, the Chinese government raised the concept of ‘socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’, and chose an ‘independent nonaligned and peaceful 
diplomacy’; this marks the fundamental harmonization of China’s national 
development and diplomatic strategies. Specifically, it can be seen in Sino-
Soviet relations: in the process of achieving normalisation with Moscow, 
Beijing progressively handled Sino-Soviet relations to avoid antagonism, with 
no formal alliance and thereby to ease tensions. Here, perhaps Chinese lead-
ers did not make a conscious decision when they chose to withdraw from the 
Cold War, but Sino-Soviet diplomatic normalisation itself was the outcome of 
the fact that China’s foreign policy was progressively shaking off the think-
ing pattern formed in the international Cold War climate (Niu 2008, 2011). 
Similarly, worthy of attention is the fact that Chinese scholars discussed 
China’s policy towards the USSR from the perspective of ‘lower strata, the 
grassroots’ (diceng) contacts. In the ’50s an important aspect of Soviet 
economic assistance to China was the approximately twenty thousand 
experts sent to China. Shen Zhihua’s research reveals that from the very 
beginning China considered the Soviet Union’s provision of experts and 
other aid personnel as a government action taken for granted under the 
principle of internationalism; yet, Khrushchev viewed the dispatching of 
experts as diplomatic leverage to force China to give in when it came to 
theoretical and policy divergences. The result was that Soviet experts in 
China became political victims (Shen 2015; see also Zhang Haixing 2009; 
Hu Xiaojing 2012). Similarly, after the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance 
China also sent a large number of students to the Soviet Union. You Lan 
believes that in the ’60s, the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations put Chi-
nese students in the Soviet Union – a product of Sino-Soviet friendship and 
collaboration – in an embarrassing position: since they had to continue and 
finish their studies, they had to withstand Soviet government pressure, 
while being at the forefront of domestic instruction in the struggle against 
revisionism. Essentially, personal qualities and circumstances determined 
the fact that these students were by no means suited to engagement in 
political struggles. As such, the Chinese side used these Chinese students 
in the USSR to develop, within the ‘bastion of revisionism’, anti-revisionist 
activity that, however, suffered repeated setbacks: not only could they not 
‘take struggle to promote unity’, but instead they further pushed Sino-
Soviet relations (which were already in a state of mutual hostility) toward 
antagonism (You 2014). From 1954 to 1963 China sent 2,000 workers to 
the USSR. According to Gu Jikun’s analysis, Chinese workers sent to the 
Soviet Union to help build carried out their work in a state of misunder-
standing in which both China and Soviet Union yielded with a show of 
reluctance. National sentiments in both countries were also involved at 
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that time and both sides demonstrated a regard for the other, which was 
full of speculation and questions (Gu 2013).5
Although China’s policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe de-
pended to a great extent on the policy of the Soviet Union, however in some 
specific circumstances it also had its own characteristics. Shen Zhihua 
discussed China’s reaction to Poland and Hungary’s incidents, and revealed 
the following important historical facts: on 10th October 1956 China did 
not yet know that the USSR had already planned a military intervention in 
Poland, and could not advice Moscow not to dispatch troops; at the end of 
October, Chinese leaders mediation work had an important influence on the 
resolution of the Poland issue. On 23rd October, when the Soviet Union for 
the first time decided to dispatch troops in Hungary, it had not yet solicited 
China’s opinion; at the time the USSR again took the policy decision to send 
troops in Hungary, Chinese leaders took up a position that played a subtle 
influence and a guiding function on the USSR. On this basis, Shen proves 
that rather than saying that China helped the Soviet Union resolve the 
crisis, it is better to say that Mao Zedong through dealing with the crisis 
realised his objective both to criticise Moscow great-nation chauvinism and 
preserve the unity of the socialist bloc. More importantly, the CCP in this 
way thus started to intervene in European affairs (Shen Zhihua 2005). Li 
Danhui considers that in the ’60s the Sino-Soviet alliance was beginning to 
crack and China relations with five countries of Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland) followed the ups and 
downs in the Sino-Soviet relations. In the ’60s, China’s policy towards these 
five countries was generally in line with the policy concerning the Soviet 
Union, but it also presented a different content and specific features. China 
tried to foster an anti-ruling party influence in these five countries: not 
only was it unable to achieve the goal of disintegrating Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries bloc, but rather it stirred the enhancement of 
these five countries’ hostile feelings against China (Li Danhui 2011). Niu 
Jun’s research shows that at the end of 1982, after the end of the XII CCP 
Congress, China decided the policy towards these East European countries 
on the basis of the transformation of China’s development and security 
strategy: first take the initiative to improve the relations with the five East 
European countries under a circumstance in which it was difficult to obtain 
fast progress in Sino-Soviet relations (Niu 2013).6 
Besides this, Chinese scholars also studied China’s relations with Ko-
rea, Vietnam, Mongolia and Cuba. Shen Zhihua challenged the traditional 
5 Chinese scholars who have investigated China’s policy towards the Soviet Union also 
include Yao Yu (2010a, 2010b, 2011), Wen Ting (2011), Wang Zhenyou (2014). 
6 On China’s policy towards Eastern and Central European countries see also Chen Tao 
(2012, 2013), Ge Jun (2015), Liu Yong (2011), Cheng Xiaohe (2008) and Jiang Huajie (2012). 
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wording ‘mutually dependent’ for Sino-Korean relations, believing that 
during the Korean war many contradictions emerged on questions related 
to military tactics and after the end of the war Kim Il-Sung’s purge of the 
‘Yan’an faction’ brought about a crisis in the Sino-Korean alliance. But with 
the emergence of Sino-Soviet divergences, Mao Zedong needed Korean 
support, and rather adopted a tolerant attitude toward Kim Il-Sung to im-
prove Sino-Korean relations. The Sino-Korean alliance was an extremely 
unstable ‘political marriage’, permeated with internal contradictions (Shen 
Zhihua 2009). Dong Jie pointed out that after the launching of the Cultural 
Revolution, under the influence of leftist diplomacy, Sino-Korean relations 
were at a low ebb. At the end of the ’60s, the two countries were even faced 
with increasing security issues and both sides undertook to restore good 
relations. As China started to assume the responsibility for the worsening of 
Sino-Korean relations produced by the Cultural Revolution, North Korea did 
not hesitate to approve the previously negated Cultural Revolution (Dong 
2014b). Regarding China’s policy toward North Korea at the time of Sino-
American reconciliation, Shen Zhihua argues that Sino-Korean relations 
were maintained as friendly and even advanced to a certain extent. Gener-
ally speaking, even though China provided aid to North Korea, Pyongyang 
was not satisfied. Xia Yafeng proved that China’s policy toward North Korea 
was not based on conformity in the ideology of the two countries but rather 
stemmed from considerations pertaining to national security interests and 
regional political affairs (Shen Zhihua 2014b; Xia 2013). Shen Zhihua and 
Dong Jie’s research also revealed that after the end of the Korean war, de-
spite the fact that China was beset with difficulties, it continued to provide 
aid to Korea so as to bring about economic reconstruction: the initial sum of 
money provided to Korea exceeded the combined total given by the USSR 
and East European countries (Shen, Dong 2011). 
Further discussing China’s economic aid to Korea in the first half of 
the ’60s, Dong Jie believes that stemming from political and regional 
factors, China did all it could and calculated only the political costs (not 
taking into account economic costs) (Dong 2014a). Along the same lines, 
China’s scholars also started to analyse China’s Korean policy from the 
perspective of relations at lower levels. At the beginning of the ’60s, huge 
numbers of Koreans residents were crossing the border in northeast China 
illegally. Shen Zhihua points out that the Korean government did not en-
force the Sino-Korean agreement on how to deal with those persons who 
crossed the border illegally, and the Chinese government was unwilling 
to do so in order to preserve Sino-Korean relations, thus further aggra-
vating the problem (Shen Zhihua 2011). Training Koreans was one of the 
most important matters covered under China’s economic aid program to 
Korea. Dong Jie and Liang Zhi have examined the phenomenon of Sino-
Korean relations’ dependence on party-to-party relations, by focusing on 
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Korean trainees in Beijing and in Shanghai in the ’50s and ’60s (Dong 
2011; Liang 2014). 
Since 2000, China scholars started to carry out empirical research on 
China-Vietnam relations (Li Danhui 2000). According to Niu Jun’s analysis, 
the motivations behind China’s support of Vietnamese resistance against 
France have to do not only with an intrinsic impulse to support revolu-
tionary movement in East Asia but also with fundamental considerations 
regarding the country’s security. Moreover, the policy of aid for Vietnam 
was also influenced by the Sino-Soviet alliance (Niu 2012a). Yang Kui-
song’s analysis affirms that the reason why at the Geneva conference 
Beijing advocated the ceasefire is closely linked to the fact that the foreign 
policy of the New China was changing from emphasising the ideology of 
‘leaning to one side’ to a pragmatic tendency that gave more importance 
to the country’s interests (Yang 2001). Li Danhui points out that from the 
late ’60s to the beginning of the ’70s, China promoted Sino-American rec-
onciliation by handling the Vietnam issue. She identifies three stages: the 
first stage is characterised by using the Vietnam issue to spur high-level 
Sino-American dialogue; the second stage saw China insisting on support-
ing the fundamental policy line of Vietnam, and promoting Sino-American 
reconciliation; the third stage was characterised by attempts to persuade 
Vietnam to move towards negotiations and so end the war, and fulfil the 
grand strategy of joining with the US and opposing the USSR (Li Danhui 
2002). In recent years, China’s policy regarding Vietnam has attracted the 
attention of Chinese scholars. Among them, Zhang Mianli has made a posi-
tive evaluation of China’s economic and technical aid to Vietnam during 
and after the Vietnam war against France, believing that China’s aid had 
the following characteristics: it started early, covered a broad field, had 
ample scope, lasted long and achieved notable results. Zhao Yanghui and 
Wang Shu also show the effectiveness of China’s technical aid by taking 
as their example Vietnamese students trained at the Harbin Institute of 
Military Engineering (Zhang Mianli 2010; Zhao, Wang 2010). 
You Lan and Fan Liping’s research, however, further reveals the prob-
lems encountered in the efforts to aid Vietnam. The former scholar believes 
that, from the Chinese point of view, the key issue that would determine 
the success or failure of the job of training Vietnamese trainees, was not 
just to help them acquire specialised skills but even more importantly it 
was to urge them to keep up a high level of political consciousness. Lastly, 
since there was evident divergence regarding the relations between the 
country’s interests and its ideology, frictions between China and Vietnam 
continually emerged and the political and ideological education that China 
was instilling into the Vietnamese trainees encountered difficulties. Fan 
Liping affirms that, being affected by the planned economic system and a 
low level of development of the Sino-Vietnam railroad system, as well as by 
the Vietnam war (American bombs and the ever-changing demands of the 
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war) and by political factors (Vietnamese aid demands were too high and 
the Soviet Union increased the volume of transferred goods to help Viet-
nam), Sino-Vietnam joint international railway transport failed to resolve 
the contradiction presented by the difference between the railway trans-
port project and its actual implementation (You 2012; Fan Liping 2014).
In the period of 1949-1973, regarding the incident concerning overseas 
Chinese who had travelled to Mongolia and asked to return to their country 
in the early years of the PRC, China maintained that under requests from 
the Mongolian government, more than 26,000 Chinese workers had gone 
to Mongolia to help building development. Gu Jikun discusses this issue, 
believing that from the beginning to the very end, there was divergence and 
contradiction between the leaders of both countries with regard to Chinese 
workers going to Mongolia: the Mongolian side was ever wary of Chinese 
workers; Chinese leaders, instead, refused to answer Mongolian demands 
regarding the dispatch to Mongolia of large numbers of Mongolian ethnic 
minority workers from Inner Mongolia (Gu 2015). In the first half of the 
’60s, China helped Cuba train a group of trainees. Taking Shanghai as an 
example, Ge Jun points out that because of differences in the realms of 
language, knowledge, habits, customs and traditions, many frictions and 
contradictions emerged between Chinese and Cuban workers. The Chinese 
side not only undertook the technical instruction of Cuban trainees, but also 
made greater efforts to promote propaganda related to ‘anti-imperialism, 
anti-revisionism’ and ‘three red banners’ (that is, the general line of so-
cialist construction, the Great Leap Forward and the People’s communes) 
among these people, in an attempt to influence their political stance (Ge 
2011; on China’s aid to Cuba see also Wang Yongzhong 2015).
4 China’s Policy Towards Capitalist Countries
In the early days of the Cold War, China’s policy towards the members 
of the capitalist camp was characterised to a great extent by struggle. 
However, in certain historical moments this policy did not prevent Mao 
Zedong from seeking contacts with Western countries on the basis of the 
theories of the ‘intermediate zone’ (zhongjian didai) and the ‘second inter-
mediate zone’ (di er zhongjian didai). To be more precise, disintegrating 
the enemy’s internal relations was in itself a form and tactic of struggle.
In recent years, Chinese scholars have discussed China’s US policy from 
political, economic, military and cultural perspectives. Yang Kuisong believes 
that soon after the founding of the new government Chinese leaders were 
not yet eager to eliminate US cultural influence and power from China. But 
the outbreak of the Korean war and China’s participation in it forced China 
to sweep away the ‘pro-US’ attitude, ‘worship of US’ and ‘the fear of US’ 
among the masses in the field of religion, education, radio, film (Yang 2010b). 
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The two Taiwan Strait crises in the ’50s have also received the attention 
of Chinese scholars. Yang Kuisong argues that, having taken into consid-
eration the precedents of both the Korean and Vietnam war armistices 
and the need to take advantage of the opportunity to seize Dachen island 
and other offshore islands and prevent the US and Taiwan from signing 
a military treaty, Mao Zedong decided to bombard Jinmen in 1954. At the 
end of 1957, the US downgraded Sino-American ambassadorial talks. This 
action stirred Mao Zedong’s national pride. On 23rd August 1958, China 
once more bombarded Jinmen (Yang 2003). 
Niu Jun’s research lays even greater emphasis on the military nature of 
these two Strait crises and the interrelations among them. He says that in 
1954-1955 the factors behind Chinese leaders determination to launch a 
military attack in the Taiwan Strait were mainly: US promotion of the so-
called ‘unleashing Chiang Kai-shek’ policy, and the rapid increase of Chi-
nese and Taiwanese military operations on the offshore islands; the begin-
ning of US consultations with Taiwanese authorities for a ‘mutual defence 
treaty’; the acceleration of the ‘two Chinas’ activities by the US and other 
allied countries; and the shooting down of two Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army planes by US military forces on 26th July 1954. The 1958 bombard-
ment of Jinmen, despite having a certain political significance, was, in the 
first place, a military action, a part of China’s military plan (formulated in 
1954) to seize the islands along the southeast coast occupied by Chiang 
Kai-shek and also a continuation of the military operations commenced in 
spring 1954 in a peculiar internal and external situation (Niu 2004, 2009, 
2012b, 350-77; on China’s role in Taiwan Strait crises, see also Dai 2003).7
Regarding the US position behind the 1962 Chinese policy decision on 
the Taiwan Strait, Wang Dong affirms that in this case what concerned Bei-
jing in the first place was how effectively they could eliminate the threat of 
a GMD military counterattack against the mainland. Only after they came 
to know – through informal talks – that the US had no intention to support 
Chiang Kai-shek, did Beijing let out a sigh of relief. We must say that both 
China and the US found a common interest in preserving the ‘status quo’ 
on the Taiwan issue (Wang Dong 2010). Wang Dong also addresses the 
question of why China and the US did not reach reconciliation despite the 
fact that at the second Geneva conference they were both willing to seek 
a compromise. On China’s part, their leaders clearly realised the strate-
gic effectiveness of maintaining an anti-American stance, believing that 
the goal of becoming a great nation could be achieved by strengthening 
the country’s leading position within the socialist camp and by initiating 
national liberation movements in the Third World (Wang Dong 2009; on 
7 Studies on Sino-American relations in the ’50s also include Li Bingkui, Feng Xiaoli (2008) 
and Li Bingkui (2008). 
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Sino-American relations in the ’60s, see also Chen Jimin 2010). The devel-
opment of China’s nuclear weapon received extremely close US attention; 
Zhan Xin’s research on US nuclear strategy regarding China in the ’60s 
shows that following the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations, the US policy 
of nuclear containment concerning China also changed, the nuclear factor 
becoming the catalyst that accelerated the change (Zhan 2011). Before 
Sino-American rapprochement, Sino-American ambassadorial talks rep-
resented the most important channel of communication between the two 
countries. Xia Yafeng’s research indicates that, as did American leaders, 
Chinese leaders also attached equal importance to the Warsaw channel, 
believing that its existence was helpful in managing fragile, nervous Sino-
American relations. Because of this, even though it was during the most 
radical period of the Cultural Revolution, Beijing had not yet nullified Sino-
American ambassadorial talks (Xia 2007). Zhang Shuguang has discussed 
the plan and implementation of US policy in relaxing Sino-American rela-
tions, including the previously neglected issue of communication strategy 
and technique between the leaders of the two countries at the time of Nix-
on’s visit (Zhang Shuguang 2008). In addition, Ouyang Xiang and He Hui 
shed light on the positive effects of Sino-American reconciliation in terms 
of trade, by taking as an example the China export trade fair (since these 
meetings were held in Guangzhou, the abbreviated name is Guangjiaohui-
Guangzhou Export Commodities Fair) (Ouyang 2012; He 2008). 
Britain was the first great Western nation to recognise the PRC. Mao 
Zedong and other leaders attached extreme importance to relations with 
Britain. Xu Youzhen argues that in 1950-1954 the history of Sino-British 
diplomatic negotiations indicates that from the beginning to the end China 
occupied a leading position, dominating the rhythm and direction of the 
negotiations. Here, Beijing’s attitude and position changed from a cau-
tious and procrastinating approach to a proactive and flexible one. This 
reflects the change of China’s diplomatic strategy from a ‘revolution diplo-
macy’ (geming waijiao) giving prominence to national security and regime 
stability to a ‘peaceful diplomacy’ (heping waijiao) striving for a peace-
ful environment and peaceful coexistence with countries with a different 
ideology and different values (Xu Youzhen 2013). Zhou Hong has studied 
communication with Britain in the early PRC, focusing on the China–Brit-
ain National Day Reception. She believes that the Chinese side fully used 
this to combine together struggle and cooperation, properly replying to 
some concrete issues related to Sino-British relations, while sticking to 
their principles (Zhou Hong 2013). Moreover, Shi Shantao discusses the 
1954 China-Britain aeroplane incident, proving from different perspectives 
that the incident was really not intentionally caused by China as Great 
Britain officially suspected, but a mistake. The reason why the incident 
could successfully be resolved has to do with the adoption by the Chinese 
government of a flexible and pragmatic policy response, particularly with 
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China actively providing Great Britain with compensation (Shi 2010; on 
Sino-British relations see also Zhang Minjun 2013). 
Regarding China’s policy toward France, Chinese scholars have focused 
the attention on Sino-French normalisation, termed by the media ‘a nu-
clear explosion in diplomacy’ (waijiao hebaozha). Zhai Qiang believes that 
in the history of PRC external relations, the normalisation of diplomatic 
relations between China and France in 1964 is a peculiar case because 
it was the first time and also the only time that Chinese leaders agreed 
to establish diplomatic relations with a country that had not first broken 
off ties with Taiwan. Sino-French diplomatic normalisation was the first 
great diplomatic breakthrough sought for by the Chinese government under 
Mao’s principle of the ‘two intermediate zones’ (liang ge zhongjian didai); 
it was an important event that finally brought China into the international 
community (Zhai 2012). Yao Baihui’s research reveals important histori-
cal facts that the French government and French scholars alike tend to 
neglect: first of all, “The main points of Premier Zhou Enlai’s talks” (Zhou 
Enlai zongli tanhua yaodian), reflecting the importance the Chinese side 
attached to the question of Sino-French normalisation, is not a unilateral 
document, but the result of Sino-French consultation on the basis of equal-
ity. Moreover, France’s establishment of diplomatic relations with China 
was not at all unconditional. France promised to recognise the PRC as the 
only legitimate government representing the Chinese people, to support the 
right of representation of the New China within the UN and to not continue 
French-Taiwanese diplomatic relations. Although the Chinese side did not 
yet request that France break off relations with Chiang Kai-shek, the above-
mentioned commitments made by the French former prime minister Faure 
had already made breaking off France’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan 
inevitable (Yao Baihui 2012, 2014). 
Apart from policy concerning the US, Britain and France, Chinese schol-
ars have also attempted to address the question of China’s relations with 
West Germany, Italy, Denmark and Japan (Ge 2013; Wang Ruoqian 2012; 
Yin, Wang 2013; Qi Jianmin 2014). 
5 China’s Policy Towards the Third World
Granted that for a quite long time after the founding of the New China 
Beijing’s diplomacy had a clear ‘revolutionary nature’, the most important 
arena of this revolutionary diplomacy can be said to be the vast area of the 
Third World. The concrete patterns of this diplomacy include: providing 
the countries of the Third World with economic, technological and mili-
tary aid; supporting the national liberation movements of those countries; 
encouraging their acceptance of anti-imperialist thought; and preventing 
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them from falling into the US camp through international negotiations.8
Regarding Southeast Asia, the topmost priority among Chinese scholars 
is the evolution of China’s policy regarding Burma. Of these, Fan Hong-
wei’s research is the most systematic (Fan 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 
2009, 2010a, 2012). What we need to point out in particular is that the 
Sino-Burma border issue aroused widespread interest among Chinese 
scholars. Fan Hongwei believes that successful negotiation of the ‘Sino-
Burma border treaty’ was brought about mainly because China accepted 
substantial compromise (Fan 2010b). Relatively speaking, Qi Pengfei and 
Zhang Mingxia stress even further the positive aspect of the Chinese policy 
decision and in a very detailed way outline the history of the resolution of 
the Sino-Burma border issue (Qi, Zhang 2012). Guan Peifeng points out 
that the border negotiations succeeded on the one hand because both 
countries were in good faith and determined to reach a peaceful resolution 
of the issue, and, on the other, because during negotiations China took the 
interests of the other side into great consideration (Guan 2014).9
Sino-Indonesia relations is another topic on which Chinese scholarly 
research is rather thorough. Zhang Xiaoxin’s research shows that from the 
start, China’s Indonesia policy received close attention from Mao Zedong, 
Liu Shaoqi and other prominent CCP leaders. In the early ’60s, the CCP 
Central Committee regarded the task of supporting national democratic 
revolutionary movements just as important as the task of moving interna-
tional socialist revolutionary movements forward, and thus embarked on 
a policy of vigorous support for Indonesia’s struggle against imperialism 
and colonialism (Zhang Xiaoxin 2011, 2013). 
According to Li Yiping and Zeng Yuleng’s analysis, from 1958 to 1965 
China’s aid to Indonesia was by no means perfectly coordinated with the 
development of Sino-Indonesia friendly relations, the main reason being 
that China took ‘revolution’ as the most important priority in its Indonesian 
aid policy (Li, Zeng 2012).
Zhou Taomo discusses the contradictions in China’s Indonesia policy from 
the late ’50s until the early ’60s: the widening of Sino-Soviet divergence on 
the one hand made China happy to see that USSR interference in Indonesia 
provided checks and balances on the US; on the other, it was an indicator 
of possible future conflicting interests between China and the USSR in In-
donesia. At the same time, within the international Communist movement, 
the Indonesia Communist Party’s abandonment of the philosophy of armed 
struggle did not prevent the CCP from approaching the Indonesia Commu-
8 Empirical research on the relations between China and Latin American countries by Chi-
nese scholars is very scarce, Sun Hongbo’s study being among a handful of studies published 
so far (Sun 2013). For this reason, in this chapter the authors only present the main results 
in the study of Chinese policy concerning Afro-Asian countries.
9 For a detailed study on the history of Sino-Burma border issue resolution see Feng Yue 2014.
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nist party with the intention of establishing an anti-USSR coalition. In the 
handling of overseas Chinese issues and party-to-party relations between 
the CCP and the Indonesia Communist Party, Chinese diplomacy clearly 
favoured pragmatism compared with loud propaganda (Zhou 2010). 
As regards Sino-Cambodian relations after the Geneva conference, Zhai 
Qiang affirms that China’s main policy consideration was how to win Sihan-
oukville’s good opinion of China and to strive for his cooperation to prevent 
Cambodia from joining the anti-China encirclement of US organisations, 
and to spread – via Cambodia – Chinese influence in neutral Afro-Asian 
states (Zhai 2013; see also Zhang 2014; on China’s policy concerning 
Thailand and Laos see, Wang 2011; Pan 2014; Feng Yiming 2014).
With regard to China’s policy towards South Asia,10 Chinese scholars 
have mainly focused on Sino-Indian relations. Among them, Dai Chaowu’s 
research is the most representative. His analysis of the reform of the Ti-
betan currency system, Indian trade control and embargo on Tibet and 
India’s occupation of the south of the ‘McMahon demarcation line’, reveals 
the asymmetric nature of Sino-Indian relations: in the case of external re-
lations, the New China depended greatly on India; in consolidating stabil-
ity in Tibet it also needed Indian support. As such, relations between the 
two countries were clearly asymmetric. Following the changes in Chinese 
foreign policy strategy in the mid- and late ’50s, especially because of the 
ever-widening divergence between the Chinese and the Soviet Communist 
parties on a series of significant international strategic questions, the CCP 
leaders, especially Mao Zedong, started to reconsider the nature and func-
tions of this kind of ‘nationalist country’ under Nehru’s leadership, consid-
ering India’s to be ‘reactionary nationalism’. Sino-Indian asymmetric politi-
cal relations thus no longer existed. Yet, the inauguration in December 1954 
and October 1957 of the Sichuan-Tibet highway, the Qinghai-Tibet highway 
and the Xinjiang-Tibet line to a great extent resolved the transportation 
problems Tibet had with inland areas and significantly changed unbal-
anced Sino-Indian economic relations (Dai 2012, 2013a, 2015). Moreover, 
Dai Chaowu also discusses the question of the 1962 Sino-Indian border 
war and China’s handling of Indian prisoners, clarifying Indian censure on 
a series of important related questions and also pointing out the inappro-
priateness of China’s related policies (Dai 2013b; on Sino-Indian relations 
see also Gao, Gao 2011; Zhu 2012). Chinese scholars have also considered 
Sino-Pakistan relations. According to Cheng Xiaohe’s analysis, the hostility 
between China and India in the first half of the ’60s caused China to gradu-
ally abandon the bias of its ideology and form an alliance with Pakistan. 
In 1965 during the Indo-Pakistani war, China gave full aid and support to 
10 Chinese scholars have also paid attention to the relations between China and Afghani-
stan (Zhou, Qi 2011; Zhang An 2012, 2015, among others). 
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Pakistan in accordance with the agreement. But the space barrier between 
the two countries and the deficiencies in the mechanism of military co-
operation as well as China’s diplomatic isolation and its limited strength, 
limited the effects of Chinese aid. Consequently, after the end of the war, 
Pakistan changed its previous international attitude of ‘being close to China 
and estranging the US’ (qin Zhong shu Mei), and adopted a policy of equal 
distance between China, the US and the Soviet Union (Cheng Xiaohe 2009, 
2012; on Sino-Pakistan border issue see Han 2011).11
In recent years, Chinese scholars have focused their attention on China’s 
Africa aid policy, most prominent among the studies being the research 
by Jiang Huajie. Considering many instances such as Chinese training of 
Zambian armed forces, its aid in building the Tazara railway, China’s re-
placement of Taiwan in African agricultural aid, training African students 
and providing aid to African medical teams, Jiang studied China’s aid policy 
towards African countries from 1960 to 1978 and reached the following 
conclusions: Chinese aid action in Africa is very different from develop-
ment aid as generally defined. This action was not only a policy tool to build 
a united international front against imperialism and revisionism, but it also 
reflected the Cold War policy of exporting its own economic development 
model. Finally, China’s own experience in social, political and economic 
development was not accepted and put into practice by African countries, 
the underlying reason being complex: both political and international rela-
tions issues obstructed implementation as did social, ethnic and cultural 
differences (Jiang 2013, 2014; Shen Xipeng 2009; Hu 2013; Xu 2010). 
6 Review and Prospects
In the past 15 years, Chinese scholarship on China’s foreign policy in the 
Cold War era has made notable progress in at least three aspects: first, 
thanks to the analysis of new historical material it has opened up many new 
research questions (such as China’s resolution of border issues), revealed 
a wealth of previously neglected historical facts and to a certain extent laid 
a solid foundation for future analysis of the history of the foreign affairs of 
the PRC. Secondly, it has constantly enlarged the field of analysis focus-
ing on high level external contacts and lower strata grass roots exchange 
(such as in the case of Soviet experts helping China, the training of foreign 
experts, students studying abroad and aid workers), while discussing the 
role and function of ideology in China’s foreign policy action from different 
perspectives. Moreover, it has also provided a new understanding of some 
11 Chinese scholars have also focused on Sino-Nepal relations (Mu 2012, 2013a, 2013b; 
Qi 2011).
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major theoretical questions (such as Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui’s research 
on Sino-Soviet relations, for instance, aimed at refining the theory of ‘un-
balanced structure’ when it comes to relations between Socialist countries; 
Dong Jie, Liang Zhi and Gu Jikun’s related research verifying how applicable 
this theory is). And, finally, at the turn of the 21st century Chinese scholars 
involved in the study of China’s foreign policy in the Cold War were born 
in the ’50s, as for instance, Shen Zhihua, Li Danhui, Niu Jun and Yang Kui-
song.12 At present, these scholars are still at the forefront of research work, 
while emerging scholars born in the ’60s and especially in the ’70s and ’80s 
are joining the group. A research team characterised by a reasonable age 
distribution is being formed. Most importantly, as regards China’s foreign 
policy during the Cold War, China has already created two major structures 
for scientific research and documentary collection located in the south and 
the north of the country. These are the Centre for Cold War International 
History Studies at East China Normal University and the School of History 
at Capital Normal University, the former being engaged in researching on 
and collecting a large quantity of archival documents related to China’s rela-
tions with Socialist and periphery countries while the latter focuses on the 
relations between China and capitalist countries as well as on the situation 
of archival sources on Cold War history in every country and collects a large 
amount of archival documents on Western countries’ relations with China. 
Without doubt, at present, Chinese scholars’ research on Sino-Soviet re-
lations, Sino-Korean relations and Sino-Indian relations is at the forefront 
of world research. But, we cannot deny that, generally speaking, there are 
still obvious shortcomings in Chinese research on China’s foreign policy 
during the Cold War: apart from researchers engaged in Sino-Soviet rela-
tions, Sino-American relations, Sino-British relations and Sino-Indian rela-
tions, other Chinese scholars are still using only Chinese archival materials 
to conduct research on China’s foreign policy. On some major questions, 
research is done but is of a somewhat cursory nature, when addressing 
the changes in China’s attitude and stance towards the question of the 
return to the UN for instance, or, Sino-Mongolian relations, Sino-Cuban 
relations and China’s relations with countries of Latin America. A part of 
young scholars’ research is even more limited to restoring historical facts, 
the field of vision being rather narrow and lacking the necessary aware-
ness of the issues and theoretical concern, demonstrating a scarce critical 
understanding of China’s foreign policy. 
Of course, on these issues Chinese scholars themselves have already 
gained some understanding and are attempting to resolve the problems. In 
2013, the Centre for Cold War International History Studies at East China 
12 Their books have already been translated in several languages (English, Russian, Japa-
nese, Korean, and European languages), circulating among the international academic 
community.
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Normal University started a large research project on “The Relations Be-
tween China and Periphery Countries and Frontier Issues During the Cold 
War” and in 2015 was awarded financial aid from National Planning Office 
of Philosophy and Social Science. The members of this research project 
are divided into four research sub-groups covering Central Asia, North 
Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. These are involved 
in gathering, arranging and translating archives pertaining to periphery 
countries’ relations with China, and also in re-discussing China’s foreign 
policy during the Cold War on the basis of bilateral and even multilateral 
archival research. To date, the project groups have already visited archives 
in Russia, Australia, Japan, Mongolia, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 
Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia among others, conducting 
documentary investigation and collection.13 
In order to coordinate the research work, the Center for Contemporary 
Documentation and Historical Materials of Oriental History Studies Founda-
tion, East China Normal University was established on 10th October 2014. 
This center is mainly devoted to Cold War archives in every country (includ-
ing China) relating to Chinese domestic and external affairs, especially to 
arranging, classifying and creating a database of materials related to pe-
riphery country relations with China. Similarly, what deserves attention is 
the fact that in the last two or three years the North East Normal University, 
Xinjiang Normal University, the Sun Yat-sen University, the South China 
Normal University and Ji’nan University, one after another, have established 
academic centres dedicated to Cold War history. These academic centers 
are located in provinces in the border area of China and their research is 
mainly related to the relations of periphery countries with China as well as 
to border issues. Moreover, in recent years the Centre for the Study of PRC 
History and the Centre for Cold War International History Studies at East 
China Normal University have sponsored a series of scientific activities for 
doctoral students and young scholars with the idea of strengthening the 
young researchers’ competence in deciphering documentary material.14
We believe that through perseverance and hard work, in the near future 
Chinese research on China’s foreign policy in the Cold War period, a field that 
has not yet been completely explored, will bear even more substantial fruit.
13 Since 2013, the archives of the PRC Ministry of foreign affairs are closed “due to 
technical reasons” and access to local archives have also been restricted. As such, the use 
of foreign archives has become especially necessary for the study of China’s foreign policy 
during the Cold War.
14 For instance, on 17-27 July 2015, an advanced course on “Contemporary History: Docu-
ments and Methods”, sponsored by the Oriental history research foundation, has been 
organised by the Institute of Culture and History at South China Normal University. It 
was attended by nearly 30 students, selected through a national examination, and saw the 
participation of ten professors from East China Normal University, Beijing University and 
other colleges and universities.
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Roads to Reconciliation
People’s Republic of China, Western Europe and Italy  
During the Cold War Period (1949-1971)
edited by Guido Samarani, Carla Meneguzzi Rostagni and Sofia Graziani
Living in Mao’s China
The European Experience 1949-1969
Beverley Hooper
(The University of Sheffield, UK)
Abstract During the Mao era a small number of Europeans lived in the PRC – most of them for two 
or three years, a few for the whole period. This article focuses on those who, unlike diplomats and 
a handful of foreign correspondents, worked or studied in Chinese institutions: ‘foreign comrades’ 
(both long-term residents and sojourners), ‘foreign experts’ and students. The article shows how the 
everyday lives of these Europeans were strongly influenced both by Mao era’s ‘politics in command’ 
environment and by PRC policies that utilised them for political and pragmatic purposes while at the 
same time marginalising them from everyday Chinese life. It also illustrates the divisive impact of 
Maoist politics on each group. The Cultural Revolution brought a temporary halt to both the foreign 
expert and student presences in China, as well as being a traumatic period for the foreign comrades.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 ‘Foreign Experts’. – 3 Students. – 4 ‘Foreign Comrades’: the Long-Term 
Residents. – 5 Conclusion.
Keywords China. Mao Era. Foreign experts. European students. European residents.
1 Introduction
The lives of European residents in China from the Opium Wars to the com-
munist revolution have been researched by a number of historians (for 
example Bickers 1999; Wood 2000; Goodman, Goodman 2012), while the 
growth of a foreign, including a European, expatriate community since 
the 1980s has featured in media discourse in recent decades. In contrast, 
the Mao years have usually been seen as a period when the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was closed to Europeans – and more broadly to 
Westerners – in a Cold War environment where China’s ‘bamboo curtain’ 
was even more of a barrier than the Soviet Union’s ‘iron curtain’. Even 
before the PRC’s tentative reopening to the West from the early 1970s, 
though, Mao’s China was not only open to visiting ‘friends of China’ and 
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a range of delegations but had a small resident European community – or 
more accurately communities.1 
While the new Chinese government was eliminating the former Eu-
ropean presence (Thompson 1979; Hooper 1986; Howlett 2016), which 
it denounced as representing a century of imperialist aggression, it im-
plemented its own policy towards accepting foreigners in China. Highly 
restrictive, this combined an ideological stance that only foreigners who 
were ‘friendly disposed’ to the PRC would be admitted,2 with a slightly 
more pragmatic one in accordance with the principle of yang wei Zhong 
yong (using foreign things to serve China). The new non-official European 
presence was very different from the previous one, which revolved around 
businesspeople and Christian missionaries, and consisted basically of three 
categories of people. Two were short-term sojourners: ‘foreign experts’ 
recruited as polishers of foreign language texts and as foreign language 
teachers, and students who studied Chinese language and/or history, lit-
erature and a few other subjects. The third, a tiny group of ‘foreign com-
rades’ with an ongoing commitment to ‘new China’, lived in the PRC for 
all or a large part of the Mao era.3 These three groups were distinctive in 
that, unlike diplomats of the few countries that recognised the PRC and a 
handful of foreign correspondents,4 they worked or studied within Chinese 
institutions and were responsible to the PRC authorities, not to a European 
government or news organisation.5 
Within the broader but still very small Western community, Europeans 
dominated the foreign expert and student groups, which also included a 
few Canadians and Australasians, and constituted a substantial propor-
tion of the foreign comrades (the other major group was American). The 
1 This article is about Western Europeans. It does not include foreign experts or students 
from the Soviet bloc whose experiences in the PRC during the Cold War years were of a 
different political nature. 
2 Zhou Enlai enunciated the policy in some detail in discussions with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Anastas Mikoyan on 1 July 1949. Translated in ‘Memorandum of Conversation 
between Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai, 1 January 1949’, Cold War International History 
Project. Bulletin 16, 138. 
3 I have put the terms ‘foreign experts’ and ‘foreign comrades’, both translations of Chi-
nese expressions, in quotation marks only the first time I use them and in headings.
4 The only European countries with diplomatic representation in China before the 1970s 
were Britain, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries (which all recog-
nised the PRC soon after the Communist victory) and France which established diplomatic 
relations in 1964. Reuters and AFP each had a representative in Peking from 1956 and the 
German news agency DPA (Deutsche Presse Agentur) from 1964. Communist correspond-
ents during the period included representatives of the Italian newpaper L’Unità and the 
British Daily Worker. 
5 All of these groups are discussed in detail in Hooper (2016) which deals more broadly 
with Western residents in the PRC during the whole of the Mao era. 
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national makeup of the European foreign expert community was mostly 
British and to a lesser extent French and Italian, and that of the foreign 
comrade community largely British. The students included Swedes and 
Italians in the early years, with French students dominant from 1964. Up 
to 1963-64, the total number of people was tiny: probably less than 100 
(including families) at any one time. The establishment of the student ex-
change with France and the recruitment of some foreign experts, both of 
which were done for pragmatic rather than political reasons, increased the 
size of the total community, but it was still very small even compared with 
the early to mid-1970s when China began opening tentatively to the West. 
This article examines the nature of the community and argues that its 
members were partially isolated and insulated from everyday Chinese life 
in accordance with an official policy of ‘privileged segregation’. At the 
same time, their working or studying lives were influenced by the Mao 
era’s ‘politics in command’ environment which in some cases compro-
mised their raison d’être for being in China. Relations within individual 
groups were also influenced by the highly politicised environment, while 
the Cultural Revolution brought a temporary halt to the foreign expert 
and student presences as well as proving traumatic for the long-term 
residents. Individual sections of the article focus on the factors that were 
most pertinent to each group, while revealing the qualitative differences 
between being a short-term sojourner and a long-term resident for whom 
living in Mao’s China involved an ongoing process of identity negotiation. 
This article is part of a broader project on the Western (including the 
European) experience in China for the whole of the Mao era, published 
as Foreigners Under Mao: Western Lives in China 1949-1976 (Hooper 
2016). Like that project, the focus in this article is on everyday experi-
ences, interactions and identities, not on the formulation and implementa-
tion of communist policy towards Europeans (or more broadly foreigners) 
which was examined by political scientist Anne-Marie Brady in Making 
the Foreign Serve China (2003). Utilising familiar social history sources, 
the article draws mainly on memoirs, letters, and personal interviews and 
communications.
2 ‘Foreign experts’ 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the PRC Government recruited a small num-
ber of Europeans as ‘foreign experts’ (waiguo zhuanjia) to help fill its need 
for foreign language expertise.6 This section focuses on their recruitment, 
6 Although most of the long-term residents were also classified as ‘foreign experts’ in 
terms of their working roles and salaries, they essentially fell into that category rather 
than being recruited to it. 
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how their experience was characterised by privilege and segregation, the 
impact of Maoist politics on their teaching and text-polishing work, politi-
cal divisions within the community, and their targeting during the Cultural 
Revolution. 
The foreign experts, mostly from Britain and to a more limited extent 
France and Italy, started as a trickle of people in the 1950s. They were 
assigned to the PRC by their respective Communist parties in response to 
requests from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for assistance with its 
‘foreign propaganda work’ (duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo) to supplement the 
foreign comrades who were already living in China. While appointees usu-
ally spent three or four years in the PRC, the British party encouraged them 
to stay longer because it had difficulty persuading members to go there.
In 1963-64, the demand for foreign experts increased when, with the Si-
no-Soviet split, English and French replaced Russian as the PRC’s major for-
eign languages. China was also expanding – and attempting to improve – its 
foreign language teaching following Zhou Enlai’s dissatisfaction with his 
interpreters during a visit to French-speaking Algeria. But this was hap-
pening at a time when the European Communist parties (which eventually 
supported the Soviet Union) were decreasing their contacts with the PRC.
It was in this context that the Chinese government implemented a new 
policy for the broader recruitment of foreign experts, mostly on two-year 
contracts. With pragmatism outweighing politics, its appointees were the 
first European sojourners admitted to the PRC for whom a declared al-
legiance to ‘new China’ was not essential. “All we ask of you is that you’re 
not an enemy of the Chinese people and that you do your work well”, 
Frenchman Maurice Ciantar was told (1969, i-ii). The positions were pub-
licised, mostly by word of mouth, through China friendship associations 
and the PRC diplomatic missions in London and Paris.7 By early 1965 an 
estimated fifteen British teachers had already gone to China, according to 
the scholarly journal China Quarterly (Note, 1965, 25, 207). Most of the 
appointees travelled to the PRC individually or as couples, but the first 
twelve French teachers were escorted as a group by a Chinese diplomat. 
While the early foreign experts had been communist party members, 
those recruited in the mid-1960s were among the most diverse of all the 
European residents and fell into three categories. The first saw ‘new China’ 
as the bright new hope for socialism after becoming disillusioned with the 
Soviet Union. They included British journalist Eric Gordon and his wife 
Marie who had first met at a Communist Youth League meeting. Political 
idealists Monica and Peter Seltman had fallen out with the Communist 
Party of Great Britain (CPGB) during the Sino-Soviet split, joined an ‘anti-
revisionist’ group, and hoped that the PRC would give them “the opportu-
7 The PRC and France established diplomatic relations in January 1964. 
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nity to learn valuable political lessons” and to “make some small contribu-
tion to building socialism and opposing imperialism” (Seltman 2014, 101). 
The second category, some of whose members were also sympathetic 
to ‘new China’, were Chinese language graduates for whom the foreign 
expert route presented a rare opportunity to spend a few years in the coun-
try they had been studying for many years. Most were single, like French 
graduate Marianne Bastid, while a few were accompanied, including Brit-
ish graduates Bill Jenner (with his wife Delia) and Andrew Watson (with 
his wife Maggie). The third, more disparate, category of foreign experts 
included language teachers who had previously worked in international 
schools (some of the French had taught in Algeria before its independence) 
and others who were simply interested in China, like fifty-year-old Parisian 
writer and adventurer Maurice Ciantar. Altogether, the foreign experts 
were a mixed bunch, thrown into – and often thrown together in – a high-
politicised and restrictive society. 
One of the most striking features of the foreign experts’ experience in 
the PRC was privilege and segregation, the combination of which isolated 
and insulated them from much of everyday Chinese life. This was in line 
with the Government’s aim to project its official version of ‘new China’ to 
foreigners and to prevent Chinese people from potentially becoming con-
taminated by ‘incorrect’ ideas. The foreign experts received free accom-
modation, medical expenses, and a foreign expert salary (depending on 
experience) of around 400-500 yuan a month, five or more times that paid 
to a senior Chinese professor.8 In Peking, where the great majority worked, 
they were housed at the Friendship Hotel (Youyi Binguan), a huge walled 
complex on the city’s north-western outskirts which had been the focus of 
the Soviet expert presence before the Russians were suddenly withdrawn 
in July 1960.9 The Youyi, as it was commonly known, was a self-contained 
and segregated community; its facilities included dining rooms, club, bank, 
chemist, shops, hairdresser, gymnasium, outdoor swimming pool and ten-
nis courts. When Maurice Ciantar arrived in 1965, it housed some 600 for-
eign experts – a catchall term including not just those specially recruited 
to serve China’s foreign expert needs but a range of political exiles and 
would-be revolutionaries from regions including South America and Asia. 
The foreign experts were driven to and from their place of work – and even 
back to the Youyi for lunch – by car or special coach, and were kept busy 
in their free time with officially supervised visits and excursions. 
8 For details of the foreign experts’ salaries and conditions, see Guowuyuan waiguo zhuan-
jia ju ji zhongyang youguan bumen guanyu waiguo zhuanjia wenti de wenjian 国务院外国专家
局及中央有关部门关于外国专家问题的文件 [Documents of the Foreign Experts Bureau of the State 
Council and relevant departments of the central government on foreign expert issues]. 
9 I am using ‘Peking’ rather than ‘Beijing’ when writing about the Mao era as it was the 
term used by my interviewees and also in the English-language documents of the period.
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While the government insisted, probably with some justification, that 
Europeans (along with other foreigners) needed ‘special consideration’ 
(youdai) because they were not accustomed to China’s poor living condi-
tions, not all of the foreign experts wanted to lead a segregated, expatriate 
style life. Their efforts to break down the barriers, though, brought them 
up against a stubborn bureaucracy. Bill and Delia Jenner’s perseverance 
did eventually pay off when they finally received approval, two-thirds of 
the way through their two-year China sojourn, to move from the Friendship 
Hotel to the living accommodation attached to Delia’s workplace (Jenner 
1967, 76). Others were less successful in gaining access to regular Chinese 
institutions. Italian Communists Marisa Musu and her husband Aldo Poeta, 
for example, tried in vain to get permission for their children to attend 
Chinese schools (De Giorgi 2014, 11). 
Despite their segregated lifestyle, foreign experts shared with Chinese 
colleagues the experience of working in the ‘politics in command’ envi-
ronment of the Mao era. The text polishers corrected English, French or 
other translations of official releases about domestic and international 
developments for publication in the Peking Review or Pékin Information, 
before/since ‘liberation’ stories about the economy, culture, women and 
children for China Reconstructs or China Pictorial, and short stories about 
Communist heroes and Guomindang enemies for the Foreign Language 
Press. Morris Ciantar could be outspoken about the politicised content of 
Pékin Information and on one occasion refused outright to polish an article, 
proclaiming that he refused “to serve up rubbish” (1969, 362). 
Even some dedicated socialists became frustrated that the quality of 
their work was being stymied by the stilted political discourse. Working 
at China Reconstructs in the late 1950s, British Communist Nan Green 
wondered whether the ceaseless before/after Liberation formula might 
bore and antagonise readers, only to be told: “It is what we want to say, 
comrade” (2004, 180). At Foreign Languages Press in the mid-1960s, Eric 
Gordon complained to his Chinese colleagues about not being allowed to 
rewrite the “jargonised, constipated language” which he had assumed 
would be his job as a professional journalist (1972, 53-4). 
Foreign experts teaching language had the advantage of close everyday 
contact with young Chinese people, though their efforts to produce effec-
tive foreign language speakers were affected by the politicised language 
as well as the PRC’s foreign language teaching methodology. Vocabulary 
was essentially restricted to Maoist discourse, with beginners’ texts using 
examples of happy peasants labouring in the people’s communes, earnest 
factory workers striving to build ‘new China’, and conscientious students 
reading the works of Chairman Mao. For more advanced classes, where 
written materials were selected and approved by a committee that in-
cluded a Party official, the most contentious issue was whether ‘authentic 
texts’, i.e. those published in the country of the target language, should be 
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used given their ‘undesirable’ (bourgeois, capitalist, imperialist) content. 
By the mid-1960s, materials produced in the PRC were dominant, with 
Western texts largely restricted to a few approved writers like Charles 
Dickens and Mark Twain. Of even greater concern to some teachers was 
the fact that the materials had usually been translated from Chinese, not 
written in the target language; some had already been published in Pe-
king Review, its French equivalent Pékin Information, or another foreign 
language magazine.
“The foreign teacher is faced with teaching a bastardised version of his 
own language”, British teacher Diana Lainson, who taught at the Second 
Foreign Languages Institute in 1964-65, complained in an article following 
her return to Britain. 
It is hardly good English to talk about ‘going to the countryside to take 
an active part in physical labour, going all out faster, better and more 
economically than ever before to realise the aims of the three red ban-
ners and to adhere closely to the thinking of our great and glorious 
leader’. Yet thousands of sentences like this are produced every day in 
Peking. (1965, 1)
Even away from the working environment, Maoist politics pervaded every-
day life. New arrivals sometimes found themselves targeted by one or more 
of the long-term residents to participate in political study sessions, though 
not always with positive results as Bill Jenner recalled over fifty years 
later: “I think I was written off as a hopeless case within a few months’”.10 
Although Mao’s China was difficult to avoid as a topic of conversation, 
the foreign experts’ political diversity often inhibited rational discussion. 
Those criticising the PRC found themselves being denounced by some as 
‘anti-China’, while those praising it were labelled as ‘pro-China’ or even 
“100 percenters”. “There are quite violent quarrels all the time between 
the anti-Chinese and those who see China in a more realistic light”, PRC 
enthusiast Sofia Knight wrote to her mother in September 1965 (1967, 50). 
 Tensions only increased following the launch of the Cultural Revolution 
in mid-1966. When the Government eventually endorsed the participation 
of foreigners in the movement in January 1967, some of the enthusiasts 
(including Eric Gordon and his wife Marie) initially became involved with 
a group calling itself the Bethune-Yan’an Revolutionary Regiment which 
supported the political rebels among the Friendship Hotel’s Chinese staff. 
They were mostly side-lined, though, when the group was taken over by 
a few ‘radical’ long-term residents (Milton, Milton 1976, 256-7). Over the 
1967 summer, the atmosphere at the Youyi degenerated into name-calling 
10 Communication with Bill Jenner, 17 August 2015.
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and mud-slinging, with rivals posting up dazibao denouncing one another 
in vituperative language (Gordon 1972, 101).11 
Nor were the foreign experts, whatever their political persuasion, im-
mune from becoming targets of the Cultural Revolution itself as the move-
ment became increasingly xenophobic during 1967. Even the process of 
leaving China when two-year contracts expired was fraught with anxiety, 
with aggressive customs officers searching every piece of luggage and con-
fiscating anything that looked ‘official’ or suspicious. When Eric Gordon 
and his family were leaving Peking in November, Eric tried to hide some 
130 pages of typewritten notes (he intended writing a book on the early 
stages of the Cultural Revolution) in three picture-frames behind photos 
of Chairman Mao. The outcome was his detention, along with Marie and 
the couple’s ten-year-old son Kim, for twenty-three months at the Xinqiao 
Hotel. Although the family’s experience was not as uncomfortable as that 
of some of the imprisoned long-term residents, they were confined to one 
room and Eric faced constant pressure to confess that he was an ‘imperi-
alist spy’ (Gordon 1971, passim). By the time the Gordons were released 
in October 1969, virtually all of the European foreign experts had already 
left China and, with the country in turmoil, no replacements were being 
recruited.
3 Students
To the envy of some of their fellow students or graduates, a tiny minority 
of people learning Chinese in Europe had the opportunity to study in China 
in the first two decades of the PRC. After examining the nature and dimen-
sions of the small European student presence, this section focuses on offi-
cial efforts to keep the students apart from Chinese students, the influence 
of Maoist politics on their everyday lives and studies, and how – despite 
the limitations imposed on their contacts – they were personal witnesses 
to the political campaigns of the era. 
The admission of European students to the PRC, like that of foreign 
experts, was subject to political criteria until the mid-1960s. Most ar-
rived in China through arrangements made by friendship or other asso-
ciations which had national communist party and/or PRC links. In 1957 
three Italian graduates (Edoarda Masi, Renata Pisu and Filippo Coccia) 
were awarded scholarships to study in Peking by the Centro Cina which 
was connected with the Italian Communist Party. In 1958 the France-China 
Friendship Association sponsored two graduates (Jacques Pimpaneau and 
Michel Cartier), and in 1959 Per-Olow Leijon, the son of a journalist on 
11 See also Yang to Jenners, 10 September 1967, Gladys Yang Papers.
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the Swedish Communist newspaper Ny Dag, was awarded a scholarship 
through the Swedish association. Two other Swedes, Cecilia and Sven 
Lindqvist, were highly unusual in that, after a lengthy struggle, they man-
aged to get visas to study in China as self-funded ‘private’ students.
The breakthrough for those without political connections, though, came 
in 1964 when, following France’s recognition of the PRC, the French gov-
ernment negotiated an exchange scheme with China which was keen to 
send its own language students to France. Under this scheme, twenty 
students arrived in Peking to study for two years: the forerunner of ex-
changes in the mid-1970s. A second group arrived in 1965, only to have 
their sojourn cut short by the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. 
Before the Sino-Soviet split, the European and other Western students 
were vastly outnumbered by those from the Soviet bloc. In 1958 there were 
reportedly only fifteen Western students (mostly Europeans but including 
at least two Australians) in Peking – but more than two hundred Soviet 
and East European students, plus some from Vietnam, Indonesia, India 
and Arab countries (Goldman 1965, 135). The European students were 
still in the minority after the withdrawal of Soviet bloc students as China 
cultivated a number of African and Southeast Asian countries, as well as 
maintaining good relations with North Korea, Albania and Romania.
Until the early 1960s, the students lived and studied at Peking University 
(Beijing daxue, often known as Beida), China’s most prestigious tertiary 
institution. From 1962 most were at the nearby Peking Language Institute 
(Beijing yuyan xueyuan), established to cater mainly for the new wave 
of African and Asian students. Although the European and other foreign 
students were less privileged and segregated than the foreign experts, 
neither factor was absent from their lives. Swedish student Sven Lindqvist 
might have described his living conditions at Peking University as ‘grim’, 
but foreign students still had superior accommodation to Chinese students: 
usually two to a room (instead of eight or more) on a separate floor of a 
dormitory building and with periodic access to hot water (1963, 23). They 
were also allocated their own dining facilities, with tables and chairs in-
stead of low stools and better food than the Chinese students’ canteen. 
Physical segregation was compounded by official pressure on Chinese 
students not to mix informally with foreigners, fearing they may be con-
taminated by non-socialist influences and ‘bourgeois’ behaviour. European 
students’ personal contacts were restricted compared with those of stu-
dents in the Soviet Union who, despite the intense Cold War environment, 
were able to make friends and even have personal relationships with Rus-
sian students (Fitzpatrick 2013, passim; Walden 1999, 3-24). The barriers 
were an ongoing frustration, not least because a student’s basic raison 
d’être for being in China was to improve his or her language skills and to 
learn more about the country. They were only partly ameliorated by the 
official provision of what Italian Edoarda Masi called an ‘artificial friend’ 
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whose role was to keep a student up-to-date with the latest developments 
in ‘new China’ (1998, 7). Renata Pisu was unimpressed when, having asked 
for a ‘friend’ who could help her read classical Chinese, the duly allocated 
student told her that she knew only modern Chinese and that they would 
read Chairman Mao’s works instead (2004, 73-4).
Living as well as studying in a Chinese institution meant that students 
were exposed to Maoist politics on a daily basis. The day started with 
the 6.30 am morning political broadcast relayed over loudspeakers. There 
were regular encounters with the educational bureaucracy in the form of 
the Foreign Students Office (liuxuesheng bangongshe), often shortened to 
liuban, which was responsible for virtually all aspects of the students’ eve-
ryday lives: from room and class allocation to issuing meal tickets, ensuring 
that the rules were obeyed (for example, class attendance and obtaining 
a medical certificate for any absence), and dealing with complaints. Even 
fifty years later, Swedish student Per-Olow Leijon had vivid memories of his 
encounters – and conflicts – with the liuban at Beida.12 According to Polish 
student René Goldman, who was friendly with some of the Italian students, 
liuban officials “were unable to understand the problems we faced, the 
habits, values and feelings of young people of such diverse backgrounds, 
resulting in the relationship being tense and characterised by mistrust and 
repeated frictions” (1965, 139). From the other side, the liuban officials, 
who were always vulnerable to political criticism as ‘bourgeois intellectu-
als’, did not have an easy time coping with European students who even in 
the 1950s were used to more independence than were Chinese students. 
Like the foreign experts, students spend their days immersed in the 
language of Maoism. “Political and linguistic progress should go hand in 
hand”, Sven Lindqvist commented on his classes (1963, 20). Chinese texts 
paralleled the English texts being used by foreign language teachers, with 
a heavy focus on the achievements of ‘new China’. Students who already 
had a degree in Chinese from a European university moved on to courses, 
most often in history or literature, taught from the perspective of Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. Like foreign students from other countries, 
they experienced what René Goldman called the “thorough indoctrination 
and extreme politicisation of the teaching” (1961, 111). The set expressions 
of Maoist discourse, together with the controls on personal contact, meant 
that they got rather less out of their PRC sojourn than they might have done.
Despite official efforts to segregate the students as far as possible, living 
on a university campus enabled them to have first-hand experience – and in 
some cases feel the impact – of the Mao era’s political campaigns. Beida, in 
particular, was a major centre of political activism throughout the period. 
When the first three Italian students arrived in September 1957, the uni-
12 Interview with Per-Olow Leijon, Paris, 27 March 2008.
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versity was in the midst of the anti-Rightist Movement which had put an 
abrupt end to the Hundred Flowers Campaign. Teachers and students who 
had responded to Mao’s call to express their views about the Communist 
Party were now being denounced as rightists. “Our teacher Wang has been 
suspended on charges of being a youpai” (rightist), Renata Pisu wrote in 
her diary not long after she started classes. “We tried to get in touch with 
him by going to his house, but his wife told us it would be better not to try 
to contact him” (2004, 17). According to one report, the authorities partly 
attributed the high number of ‘rightist students’ uncovered at Beida to 
the presence of foreign students from capitalist countries, as well from as 
Poland and Yugoslavia (Goldman 1961, 110). 
Following their arrival in Peking in early 1961, Swedes Cecilia and Sven 
Lindqvist soon became aware of the drastic food shortages (the ‘three hun-
gry years’) which followed the Great Leap Forward, even in the nation’s 
capital. “When spring came strange things happened”, Cecilia recalled13 
almost fifty years later.
There were students all over the shrubbery, up the trees, out on the 
branches, as they ripped and tore like goats at the fresh leaves. I com-
plained to my teacher. “They damage the trees”, I said. “You must un-
derstand”, she answered quietly. “They haven´t had any fresh greens 
all winter... none of us has”.
Even though foreign students received special treatment – their dining 
hall still had some meat and vegetables – Cecilia’s hair started falling 
out. “The doctor said I had a grave lack of protein and sent me to the old 
Rockefeller Hospital [Capital Hospital] east of Wangfujing to get protein 
injections once a week” (2008 Communication).
By the time the first cohort of French exchange students arrived in late 
1964, the Socialist Education Movement was under way, bringing more 
tensions and culminating in the launching of the Cultural Revolution in 
May 1966. Once again, Beida – where French student Marianne Bastid 
was doing postgraduate research – was a major focus of activity, with 
the denunciation and dismissal of President Lu Ping, classes giving way 
to revolutionary activism, and scholars coming under assault for alleged 
bourgeois behaviour and connections. Within weeks, Marianne’s research 
supervisor, Professor Shao Xunzheng, apologised that he could no longer 
have contact with her, even though they had developed quite close schol-
arly relations.14 
13 Communication with Cecilia Lindqvist, 3 July 2008.
14 Marianne Bastid had spent her first year in China teaching French as a foreign expert, 
but obtained one of two research places on the French student exchange in 1965. Interview 
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Unlike foreign experts living in China at the time, the European and 
other foreign students witnessed only the first few weeks of the Cultural 
Revolution. With university campuses already descending into chaos, all 
foreign students were informed they had to leave China by 8 July.15 The 
first cohort of twenty French exchange students had been able to complete 
their two years in China but the second group had their studies cut short by 
a year. And those who were already planning to go to China in September 
1966 would have to wait seven years before there was another opportunity 
to study in the PRC on a government exchange scheme.
4 ‘Foreign Comrades’: the Long-term Residents
In contrast to the PRC’s short-term sojourners, the European ‘foreign 
comrades’ (waiguo tongzhi) or ‘international friends’ (guoji youren) lived 
in China for all or a large part of the Mao era. Along with a few Americans, 
they were a tiny group of no more than a score or so people, compared 
with the thousands of Americans and Europeans who moved to the Soviet 
Union following the 1917 revolution (Tzouliadis 2008).
 The foreign comrades’ identities vis-à-vis Mao’s China were qualitatively 
different from those of the foreign experts and language students. For the 
two latter groups, the PRC sojourn was usually limited to around two years, 
something of an adventure which might or might not be important to their 
careers or political activities back home. For the long-term residents, Mao’s 
China was home: the country in which they brought up families and to which 
they were committed in the face of political alienation from their former 
countries which were denounced as lackeys of American imperialism. At the 
same time, the long-term residents were still ‘foreigners’ and regarded as 
such by the Chinese, entailing an ongoing process of identity negotiation. 
The major themes of this article – privilege/segregation, experience of the 
extreme ‘politics in command environment’, and political differences and 
impacts – each had their distinctive features for the long-term residents. 
Labelled as ‘Reds’ or ‘Commos’ in their home countries – and denigrated 
by diplomats in Peking as ‘the twilight brigade’, ‘the misfits’ or ‘the miscre-
ants’ – the long-term residents were actually diverse in their makeup and rea-
sons for being in the PRC. A few, who became known as the ‘old-timers’, had 
ventured into Communist-held territory before the CCP victory and stayed 
on after the establishment of the PRC. They included medics Hans Műller 
and Richard Frey, both Jewish refugees from Nazism, who arrived at Yan’an 
in 1939 and 1941 respectively, British couple David and Isabel Crook (Isabel 
with Marianne Bastid-Brugiere, Paris, 1 April 2008.
15 Communication with René Flipo, 24 January 2011.
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had dual British-Canadian citizenship) who went to a liberated village near 
Shijiazhuang in 1947 to research land reform, and Alan Winnington who ar-
rived in Harbin in 1948 to work with the fledging New China News Agency 
(Xinhua). Others went to the PRC after the Communist victory. They included 
Michael Shapiro and Dr Joshua Horn who, like the Crooks and Winnington, 
were members of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). 
A distinctive group in this community – though sometimes on its mar-
gins – was a handful of European women who had married Chinese men 
studying in Europe during the 1930s or 1940s. Some, like Gladys Yang, 
were already back in China when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
came to power and decided to stay on. Others, like Dutchwoman Selma Vos 
and Frenchwoman Denise Lebreton, moved to China with their husbands 
when the CCP urged patriotic intellectuals living abroad to contribute to 
the development of ‘new China’ (Peterson 2012). Lebreton later wrote 
that she had been keen “to help in the building of socialism … I felt that 
life was just beginning and I would be sustained by the eager belief in the 
future of justice and progress” (1982, 96). 
As foreigners, the long-term residents had similar privileges to those 
of the foreign experts. There was actually a hierarchy of privilege, based 
largely on when they first had personal links with the CCP. For example, 
Hans Műller, Richard Frey and Alan Winnington, who had all lived and 
worked in Communist-held territory before the establishment of the PRC, 
were allocated their own substantial houses. Most others lived in com-
plexes attached to their workplace, for example the Foreign Languages 
Press or the Foreign Languages Institute, though often in accommodation 
of the type allocated to senior officials rather than to their Chinese col-
leagues. While only a few lived at the Friendship Hotel, most often when 
they became ill or elderly, all had access to its superior facilities. Comment-
ing on his family’s life during the food shortages following the Great Leap 
Forward, David Crook (2004, chapter 11) wrote: “We ‘foreign comrades’ 
were given special treatment and spared the effects of the shortages from 
which the Chinese suffered […] For we could supplement our diet with 
food bought at the special shop at the Friendship Hotel”. A further marker 
of their distinctiveness as privileged ‘foreigners’ was their high income 
(relatively speaking). Following the establishment of the Foreign Experts 
Bureau in 1955, they were placed on the ‘foreign experts scale’ and had 
similar salaries to the foreign expert sojourners.16
The foreign comrades’ privileges implied a degree a separation, if not 
segregation, although their long-term residence in the PRC facilitated 
closer relations with Chinese colleagues than the short-term sojourners 
16 Before the establishment of the Bureau, they were remunerated by way of the ‘al-
lowance system’ which provided basic necessities for everyday life and a small amount of 
pocket money. 
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normally enjoyed. This did not extend to being included in all of their 
colleagues’ activities. A dazibao (big character poster) written by four 
American residents in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution revealed 
dissatisfaction at not being allowed to participate in Maoist-style activities 
including physical labour, contact with workers and peasants, and class 
struggle (Chou 2009, 341-3).17
At the same time, the everyday lives of the long-term residents were 
pervaded by Maoist politics even more than those of foreign experts and 
students. They had not just decided to support Chinese communism rather 
than their former countries in the Cold War; as foreign comrades they 
were expected to keep demonstrating their commitment, both publicly and 
internationally. Some became an integral part of the PRC’s ‘foreign propa-
ganda work’ (duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo) which aimed to win ‘friends’ 
abroad and further the cause of world revolution (Xi 2010, 55-8). Individu-
als helped to present the PRC’s ‘smiling face to the world’, as Lazarick 
(2005) described it, writing stories about everyday life in China for foreign 
language magazines: happy peasants, enthusiastic workers and liberated 
women. Second and more controversially, they publicly supported the 
Communist government’s rhetoric and actions against their own former 
countries, from the Korean War to Vietnam, which provoked denunciation 
as ‘Reds’ and even as traitors to the ‘free world’. In individual articles 
and signed petitions, they denounced American imperialism and its allies. 
Alan Winnington and Michael Shapiro, who reported the Korean War from 
the Communist side and had contact with British POWs in prison camps 
near the Chinese border, were accused in Britain of treason and had their 
passports withdrawn.
The long-term residents’ native language skills in a foreign language 
(rather than the professional skills some had in law, economics or an-
thropology) were also utilised by the PRC Government in developing its 
foreign propaganda network, which ranged from radio broadcasts and 
news releases to general magazines.18 They provided the major expertise 
throughout the period (supplemented at times by short-term foreign ex-
perts) for polishing material that had already been translated into Eng-
lish, French or another language. Michael Shapiro and Alan Winnington 
polished news releases for the New China News Agency (Xinhua). Some 
others, including Briton Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley (together with her hus-
band Israel Epstein, the English-educated son of Russian refugees) worked 
at China Reconstructs. Gladys Yang and Denise Lebreton polished short 
17 Dao-yuan Chou included an English-language version of the dazibao in her biography 
of two of the signatories, American long-term residents Joan Hinton and Sid Engst. 
18 The main exception was medical practitioners, who were in short supply in the PRC, 
including surgeon Joshua Horn, Hans Műller and Richard Frey. 
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stories and novels in the English and French sections of Foreign Language 
Press. A few (including some of the wives of Chinese men) taught English, 
most notably David and Isabel Crook who spent their entire PRC careers 
at the Foreign Languages Institute, the premier tertiary institution for 
training China’s future diplomats and others involved in foreign relations. 
While they were publicly professing their loyalty to Mao’s China and its 
policies, as foreigners the long-term residents were also negotiating their 
personal identities vis-à-vis the PRC. This was strikingly illustrated in the 
experiences of the British Communists who formed their own Party group 
(or cell) and whose members met regularly for political study sessions. 
David Crook, Alan Winnington and Michael Shapiro, who had all been in 
China since before or just after the Communist victory, disagreed on the 
question of their basic identity in relation to Chinese communism and even 
to China itself. David Crook later wrote:
The root of the differences was: how much of the Thought of Mao Zedong 
applied to Britain and how far should we go, for instance, in practising 
criticism and self-criticism and ideological remoulding (which Alan Win-
nington said reminded him more of Moral Rearmament than Marxism); 
how much should we try and merge with Chinese society and how much 
should we retain of our British identity. The chief representative of the 
“True Born Englishman” was Winnington; the hundred per cent pro-
Chinese spokesman was Michael Shapiro. Isabel and I found Winnington 
intelligent, amusing and professionally accomplished, as a journalist; but 
politically and ideologically we supported Shapiro. (2004, ch. 11) 
One basic identity issue was that of citizenship. Should one become a Chi-
nese citizen or retain the citizenship of a country that the PRC regarded 
as a bitter enemy in the Cold War confrontation? (Dual citizenship was 
not an option.) In practice, virtually the only Europeans – indeed the only 
Westerners – who became Chinese citizens were those who were previ-
ously stateless and/or had already undergone a partial identity shift by 
marrying Chinese people, for example Richard Frey, Hans Műller and Ruth 
Weiss.19 Even after living in China for more than forty years, David Crook 
admitted that his emotional and cultural attachments were still divided be-
tween China, Britain and the United States (where he had studied). “I have 
never wanted to give up my British citizenship” (2004, ch. 11). Others, like 
Briton Pat Adler (who was married to American ‘defector’ Solomon Adler), 
considered their lack of ability to read Chinese and to speak it reasonably 
fluently – even after living in China for many years – was a major inhibitor 
19 American long-term residents, George Hatem, Sidney Shapiro and Grace Liu, who be-
came Chinese citizens, were also married to Chinese but not previously stateless.
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to assuming any sort of ‘Chinese’ identity.20 And Gladys Yang, who did read 
and speak Chinese, was not the only one for whom practical considera-
tions played a role: most notably the advantage of having a British or other 
European passport for the occasional visit to relatives outside China (and 
possibly as a safety net ‘just in case’). 
It was the issue of political identity, though, that came to the fore when the 
PRC’s relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated from the late 1950s 
and developed into an open rift in the early 1960s, undermining the inter-
national Communist movement. “It was terrible. We were basically split in 
two”, Isabel Crook told me.21 “When the British party eventually supported 
the Soviet Union against China, it put everyone here in a very difficult 
situation”. Alan Winnington, the ‘true born Englishman’, was already disil-
lusioned with China and the CPGB arranged for his transfer to East Berlin 
(Winnington 1986, 251). When Nan Green, who was considering staying on 
in China indefinitely, was asked about her political loyalties, she replied that 
she “was a member of the British Party and adhered to its ‘Line’”. Under 
pressure from some colleagues in China to commit to the PRC, she wrote to 
the British party asking that it send for her (Green 2004, 211-2). 
In contrast Michael Shapiro, the ‘hundred per cent Chinese spokesman’, 
fell out completely with the CPGB. His correspondence with its general 
secretary Willie Gallacher became increasingly tense as he continued to 
defend the CCP. By July 1963 the relationship had reached breaking point, 
with Shapiro responding to Gallacher’s criticisms in vitriolic language. 
No, Willie, there’s nothing rotten at this end… You don’t have to guess 
what has happened to me. I’ll tell you in a nutshell. I’ve stuck to Com-
munist principles… [I] have been deeply impressed by the rich store of 
experience in the Chinese Party which I am convinced could be put to 
good use in Britain, too, in a hundred and one ways.
He concluded his letter: “With concern as to what has happened to you, 
one-time disciple of Lenin and comrade-in-arms of Stalin, since the 20th 
Congress”.22
If the Sino-Soviet split was difficult for the long-term residents, the Cul-
tural Revolution proved traumatic when their status as foreigners came to 
dominate that of comrades. Initially they were overwhelmingly enthusias-
tic in supporting what Denise Lebreton called an ‘historical opportunity’ 
20 Interview with Patricia Adler, Beijing, 25 May 2009.
21 Interview with Isabel Crook, Beijing, 29 May 2009.
22 Shapiro to Gallacher, 31 July 1963, Communist Party of Great Britain Archives, CP/
IND/GALL/01/06. 
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and wanted to be involved (1982, 118).23 In January 1967, when foreigners 
were finally given the green light to participate, some were in the forefront 
of forming the Bethune-Yan’an Revolutionary Regiment which supported a 
range of rebel groups. They were subsequently its most active members, 
particularly when the leadership was taken over by ’radical elements’ who 
included Michael Shapiro. And they were disappointed when, in January 
1968, foreigners were officially informed that they were no longer allowed 
to participate in the Cultural Revolution.24 
With the political movement becoming increasingly xenophobic, the 
earlier distinction between ‘foreign comrades’ (and thus friends of the 
Chinese people) and ‘imperialist spies’ (and thus enemies of the Chinese 
people) was eroded. Despite their proclaimed loyalty, several of the activ-
ists (including David Crook, Michael Shapiro and Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley, 
as well as her husband Israel Epstein) were arrested in late 1967-early 
1968 and spent four years or more in prison (Crook 2004; Epstein 2005, 
299-319). Isabel Crook protested her husband’s innocence but was herself 
detained for three years in a room on the Foreign Languages Institute 
campus (2009 Interview). Even Gladys Yang, who had steered clear of 
political involvement as far as possible, was detained.
Although the Cultural Revolution was a chastening experience for those 
who had committed themselves to Communist China during the Cold War 
confrontation, it did not usually shake their basic political faith. Like the 
Chinese Communist Party itself, they could rationalise the incarceration of 
foreigners – and a multitude of other ‘ultra-left’ and ‘ultra-right’ actions – 
as an aberration. “It was not ‘the Chinese’ but Chinese enemies of China”, 
David Crook responded when friends asked him why he did not leave China 
after his release from five years’ imprisonment (Crook, 2004, ch. 13). 
5 Conclusion
Living in Mao’s China and working or studying in a Chinese institution 
gave a small number of Europeans a level of personal experience of the 
PRC in the 1950s and 1960s that was shared neither by other European 
residents (notably diplomats and correspondents) nor by short-term visi-
tors who were hosted by the PRC as part of its programme of ‘cultural 
diplomacy’. Their experience was characterised by ‘privileged segregation’ 
23 American George Hatem and New Zealander Rewi Alley, both long-time China resi-
dents, disagreed with the majority of the foreign comrades and urged them not to partici-
pate. 
24 The activities of ‘foreign comrades’ in the Cultural Revolution are discussed in detail by 
Milton and Milton (1976, 212-302), two American foreign experts who personally observed 
the developments. See also Brady (1996).
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and immersion in the ‘politics in command’ environment which in some 
cases compromised the effectiveness of their work or studies, as well as 
affecting intra-group relationships. 
Although the three groups examined in this article shared these experi-
ences to varying degrees, there were also differences. Foreign experts and 
students were always conscious that their sojourn in Mao’s China was an 
interlude of a few years, a sometimes frustrating if highly novel experience 
at a time when very few Europeans or other Westerners had the opportu-
nity to live in the People’s Republic. While the personal identities of these 
groups were still linked to their home countries, those of the long-term 
residents involved ongoing negotiation between being a ‘comrade’ and at 
the same time a ‘foreigner’, albeit one who was politically alienated from 
his or her home country. Within the sojourner community, the students’ 
more difficult material conditions were to some extent compensated by 
their greater incentive to benefit from the experience in terms of their 
language skills and academic interests, while at the same time they were 
the most frustrated at being denied contact with many aspects of everyday 
Chinese life.25 
The first two decades of the PRC, which have been the focus of this 
article, can be seen as the first of two phases of the European (and more 
broadly the Western) experience in Mao’s China. Although the final few 
years of the Mao era are considered part of the ‘Cultural Revolution dec-
ade’, they were marked by a slightly increased openness to the West. The 
recruitment of foreign experts was revived and then increased. In 1973 
student exchanges were established with most European and other West-
ern countries, with the first intake including thirty French students and 
more than ten Italians, Germans and Britons. This was all a precursor to 
the ‘open door’ from the late 1970s when the number of foreign experts 
and students increased exponentially, along with the gradual growth of a 
new business-oriented expatriate community which completely dwarfed 
what remained of the Mao era’s ‘foreign comrade’ community.
25 In this respect the Chinese language graduates employed as ‘foreign experts’ were 
more akin to the students.
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Abstract This article deals with the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
People’s Republic of China during the early Cold War decades. The traditional historiographical para-
digm of the East-West confrontation assumes that any form of cooperation was impossible between 
the two countries. However, a shift of focus from the political sphere to the economic one reveals how 
pattern of conduct predating 1949, as well as purely economic reasons, brought actors from both 
sides to agree on a set of rules for bilateral exchange, and to improve the trade performance despite 
the highs and lows of the political climate and the bloc allegiance of both countries.
Keywords Federal Republic of Germany. People’s Republic of China. East-West Trade. Cold War. 
German business. COCOM. Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft. Chinese Committee for the 
Promotion of International Trade. China National Import & Export Corporation. 
This essay explores the interplay between the economic elites and the 
government authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany in relation 
with the reopening of relations with the People’s Republic of China dur-
ing the early decades after World War II. At that time, the ideological and 
geopolitical divide produced by the new Cold War paradigm seemed to 
inhibit any form of cooperation between the two new-born states, despite 
the long and intense tradition of exchanges and interaction between their 
predecessors. Nevertheless, the shift of focus from the political to the 
civil and economic sphere reveals how such traditional interpretation, 
promoted mainly by the US historiography, falls short of reality. Basing 
on an institutional approach encompassing both the West German govern-
ments and the economic networks, the essay will prove how the relations 
with China were influenced from patterns of conduct dating back to the 
interwar years, and from purely economic reasons which diverted largely 
from the ideological precepts of the East-West confrontation. Concern-
ing the latter point, a vast range of sources available from the German 
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private and public archives shows how the relations between the Western 
European states and post-revolutionary China witnessed a high degree of 
dissociation between the economic and the political spheres. The Federal 
Republic of Germany was a special case in point, since the adamant op-
position of the government authorities to establish official relations with 
Beijing, in compliance with Washington’s will, conflicted with the lively 
interest of the economic actors to profit from the appealing opportunities 
offered by the far Eastern giant regardless of its new political orientation. 
On one hand, West German interest in the People’s Republic of China was 
destined to merge into the broader economic Ostpolitik, which anticipated 
and in some cases hastened the course of the political one. On the other 
hand, a mix of traditional reasons and historical processes, which will be 
analysed later, impressed a peculiar and specific character to the economic 
relations between West Germany and China in comparison with the other 
countries of the Socialist bloc. A quantitatively accurate analysis of West-
German bilateral trade, as well as a comparison with Chinese bilateral 
relations with other Western states, falls out of the scope of this contribu-
tion. Furthermore, a look at the figures of West German foreign exchange 
(both as a whole and for each commercial sector) shows how trade with 
the People’s Republic of China until the ’80s remained relatively under-
sized and marginal even in comparison with West German trade with other 
countries of the Socialist bloc. Nevertheless, the essay will prove how 
qualitatively crucial the West German economic elites estimated the reo-
pening of business with China since 1949, both from the present and from 
the long-term perspective, and how they were able to systematically force 
the Bonn governments to endorse, or at least not to hinder, their strategy.
Although the Deutsches Reich was a latecomer in the age of the ‘second’ 
European imperialism, its commitment to expand its military and economic 
penetration overseas became manifest shortly after its birth in 1871. China 
was one of the main targets of this strategy, as Berlin authorities aimed at 
filling the gap with the European competitors (especially Great Britain and 
France), which had increased their presence and influence since after the 
First Opium War of the 1840s. At that time the volume of trade between 
the German states and China was still at an embryonic stage; furthermore, 
despite the presence of commercial branches of German firms in Canton 
(such as Siemens and Carlowitz), British patronage and protection over 
the exchanges was necessary (Eberstein 1988, 49-60; Leutner, Mühlhahn 
2001, 21-2). Significantly, it was the joint pressures from Paris and London 
which ‘persuaded’ the Chinese authorities to grant the recognition of an 
official status and of trade privileges to the German states in 1861, after 
an earlier attempt by Prussia had been dismissed by the Middle Kingdom. 
Less than a decade later, Chancellor Bismark received a delegation from 
the Qing court to Berlin, at the time when the German business-military 
groups were increasing their pressure for a more proactive penetration 
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of the Chinese market under the flag of the governmental promotion. Al-
though the Reich remained a smaller player in terms of trade volume, its 
influence in qualitative terms was increasing at the time when the foreign 
presence started reshaping the cultural and economic landscape of the 
Chinese cities (Westad 2012, 45 ff.). However, it was only after Germany 
established itself as a leader of the so-called second industrial revolution 
during the last quarter of the 19th century that the country became a 
model of inspiration for China in its search for its own industrialization. 
Siemens’ export of the first pointer telegraphs in the Asian country (Sun, 
Lancaster 2013, 81) and the invasion of BASF synthetic dyes in the tex-
tile industry (Abelhauser et al. 2004, 95 ff.) were two powerful examples, 
while the more silent penetration of Krupp and of the German shipbuilding 
industry were part of the Chinese plans for the modernisation of the na-
tional defence. The Chinese authorities hired German military and custom 
advisers with the consent of the Berlin’s government; in turn, the latter 
encouraged the foundation of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank to emancipate 
German business from the British protection, to finance German-Chinese 
projects of railway development and to gain access to the local bond mar-
ket (Plumpe 2004, 40 ff.; Peruzzi 2015, 100 ff.).1 The Chinese authorities 
played an active role in such remarkable progresses, since Germany ap-
peared not only as an example of late but successful industrialization, but 
also as a power different from its European competitors due to its alleged 
lack of territorial claims.
The scenario changed rapidly at the end of the century, when the Kai-
ser decided to follow the British and French example and to obtain two 
concessions in Hankou and Tianjin: the third one and the more promising 
in economic terms, in the Kiaochow Bay (1898), was the result of a mili-
tary occupation in retaliation for the murder of two German missionar-
ies. The new concessions under the German navy administration proved 
counterproductive in political and economic terms. On the one hand, due 
to its imperialistic homologation, the Reich had lost most of its appeal 
toward the Chinese authorities, which grew cool to the advances of Ger-
man industry they had previously welcomed (Kirby 1984, 12). On the other 
hand, the plans of expansion toward the whole Shandong province were 
abandoned for a series of domestic and international reasons, particularly 
after the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, when the German presence became one of 
the targets of the anti-Western insurgence at the point that Clemens von 
Kettler, the German minister to the Qing court, was murdered during the 
siege of the foreign legations in Beijing. Harsh retaliation followed when 
General Marshal Graf von Waldersee was appointed as head of the West-
1 Most of the major German banks took part in the consortium that gave birth to the 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in 1889, while the state authorities exerted a more active role 
than in the case of the French and Russian competitors in the area. 
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ern occupation force in the Chinese capital; moreover, Germany played 
an active role along with the other imperialist powers in paraphrasing 
the humiliating conditions of the Boxing Protocol of 1901 (Cho, Crowe 
2014, 3-4). In economic terms, the results of Germany’s alignment with a 
more traditional interpretation of its imperialistic mission in China were 
mixed: as aforementioned, the new adventures seem to have undercut the 
efforts of the German industry to increase its direct presence in China 
and to deal directly with Chinese authorities in the fields of military and 
industrial development. The situation worsened further with the transition 
from Empire to Republic in 1912, as the new leadership was especially 
disturbed by the massive foreign presence in the country and one of its 
main goals, which ultimately led to the country’s involvement in World 
War I, was to regain control over the concessions extorted to the late 
Qing dynasty (Tanner 2010, 133). On the other hand, of the 122 German 
firms present in China in 1901 – they were 7 in 1855 – most were import-
export houses: at that time the German trading and shipping complex to 
and from China was second only to the British, and the most important 
firms among them, mainly based on the Hanseatic ports, improved their 
position after they founded the Ostasiatischer Verein in 1900, a network 
for the promotion of German exchange and interaction with Southeast 
Asia which is still operating today (Eberstein 2000). As a result, in 1913 
German firms carried 19% of foreign imports in China, with less than 8% 
of German origin (Kirby 1984, 13).
The outbreak of World War I impressed the first major break to the devel-
opment of bilateral relations. Even before the end of the conflict, German 
physical presence in China was annihilated: Japanese forces took over the 
Reich’s concessions in Tsintao and Kiaochow, while the German holdings 
in the British and French concessions were taken over by the allied pow-
ers. Finally, China declared war to Germany in August 1917 and rapidly 
took over the German concessions in Tientsin and Hankow and seized the 
relative properties with only a small compensation after the war. Of the 
almost 300 German firms active in China before the conflict, only 2 were 
operative in 1919; German investments in the country, which amounted to 
263.5 million $ in 194, were reduced to 40 million after the war.
Officially the reopening of the relations between the two countries 
was favoured by the Chinese refusal to sign the Versailles Treaty, since it 
granted the Japanese government control over the formerly German con-
cession in Shandong. A separate bilateral agreement was reached in 1921 
to settle the old disputes and to restore peaceful relations between China 
and the new German Republic; Berlin formally renounced its rights and 
privileges (including those included in the Boxer Protocol) while avoiding 
any recognition of the Japanese pretensions, and diplomatic and trade 
relations between the two countries were restored. As in the case of the 
more famous Rapallo agreement between Germany and Soviet Russia, the 
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agreement paved the road to an increased cooperation in the economic 
and military field in order to circumvent the limits established by the 
Versailles Treaty.
It is not a paradox to argue that the forced renounce to territorial pre-
tences became a valuable asset for Germany, as it recovered its pre-war 
share of the Chinese market within six years with comparatively better 
prospects for further progress. Part of the Republican leadership expressed 
its bias for a stronger partnership with Berlin since its loss of its extrater-
ritorial rights had put the German economic actors in a ‘superior position’ 
compared with the other imperialist powers, and potentially on a foot of 
equality with China (Xu 2005, 280). Also the German side appreciated that 
the forced abandonment of “the time-worn methods of British imperialism” 
could give an advantage to the national economy right at the time when it 
was badly in need of new opportunities (Kirby 1984, 24). In their search 
for escape from the cage of the Versailles Treaty, the new leaders of the 
Weimar Republic foresaw exciting prospective in China, also because the 
rampaging civil war made of the country the world’s greatest arms mar-
ket. By 1927 the German companies involved in business with and directly 
represented in China outnumbered those of the pre-war years; along with 
the traditional promoters of German-Chinese trade such as Siemens and 
Krupp, new big groups such as IG Farben and Stahlunion were seeking for 
new beginnings in Asia, far from the ruinous inflation which affected their 
home country (Ching 2006, 17). Finally, the private-public cooperation 
was propelled by the urgent need of new markets and raw materials: ap-
parently China could provide both. The foundations were laid for a golden 
age of bilateral relations, corresponding roughly to the so-called Nanking 
Decade (1927-1937). At that time the Guomindang leadership displayed a 
renewed admiration for Germany as a model for the modernisation of the 
domestic military-industrial complex. As business and industrial experts 
followed the German investments, the government decided to accommo-
date the request of the Chinese authorities and to dispatch some German 
so-called military advisers to Nanking in 1928; although the revelation of 
the initiative raised international criticisms, the other ‘imperialist’ coun-
tries were neither willing nor able to counter it effectively (Leitz 2004, 
124; Martin 1981, 238).
The identification between the attractive features of European moder-
nity and the German economic-technological power was a constant of the 
Nanjing decade, which remained unaffected by the transition from the 
Weimar Republic to the Nazi regime during the early ’30s (Leitz 2004, 128-
9). It would be misleading to conclude that the renewed cooperation took 
place mainly for ideological rather than pragmatic reasons; nevertheless, 
part of the Chinese nationalist leadership estimated that the Nazi experi-
ment embodied a combination of conservatism and modernism consistent 
with its plans for China. The result was the further increase of the German 
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influence in the Chinese economy: during the mid-’30s the German share 
of foreign trade in China rouse to 17%, not far from the US leadership 
in the field. On the other hand, China became the third trade partner for 
Germany worldwide, and the third recipient country of its foreign direct 
investments. The quantitative progress encouraged the German industry 
to follow the example of the trade companies at the turn of the century 
and to undertake the road of coordination and centralization. In this case 
the sensible nature of the business initiatives (mainly dealing with the 
production of armaments) led to the creation of shadow firms discretely 
but strongly supported by the state and the army, thus following the suc-
cessful example of German-Bolshevik and German-Turkish cooperation 
during the early ’20s (Kirby 1984, 20 ff.).
The end of the decade witnessed a sudden decline of the bilateral ex-
change. This occurred again when political-strategic considerations took 
the upper hand, namely the preference of the Hitler regime for a tighter 
alliance with Japan, which in turn was on war with China at least since 
1937. The following year the authorities in Berlin commanded to interrupt 
the trade of weapons and armaments toward China and ordered the advis-
ers to leave the country immediately, despite Chiang Kai Shek’s appeal to 
the neutrality of the German Reich in the Sino-Japanese conflict. The final 
decision from Berlin to officially recognise the puppet regime established 
in Nanjing by the Japanese occupation forces in Summer 1941 signed the 
point of no return and paved the road to the war declaration by the Chiang 
government against Germany. Nevertheless, most of the German economic 
actors operating in the Far East were not enthusiastic about the orders 
from Berlin. A quick comparison between the economic opportunities of-
fered by China and Japan in terms of potential markets and raw materials 
led to the widespread conclusion that the severance of relations with the 
first could prove a terrible mistake, not only in times of peace but also 
for the total war inscribed in the projects of the Nazi regime (Leitz 2004, 
130). Although the noncompliance with Hitler’s order was first out of ques-
tion and later impossible due to the increasing role of state authorities in 
managing the economy, trade relations between the two countries never 
came to a complete stop. Even when the German authorities imposed an 
increase in the interchange with the puppet regimes in Nanjing and in 
Manzhouguo, major groups such as Siemens, Otto Wolff and IG Farben 
were able to keep the traditional contacts open until the course of the war 
and the German defeat led to a new geopolitical scenario.
The end of the war did not translate into a new and stable condition for 
both countries, and the later emergence of the new East-West confronta-
tion, on which China and Germany would play both an important role, 
reduced further the room for recover of the former economic cooperation. 
The outbreak of the rivalry between the nationalist and the Communist 
factions plunged China back into civil war; the final defeat of Chiang 
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forces, which were forced to repair in Taiwan, led to the proclamation 
of the People’s Republic in mainland China in October 1949 under the 
leadership of Mao Tze Dong and the political monopoly of the Communist 
Party. As a consequence, a fast although not unproblematic development of 
Chinese-Soviet relations brought the Asian giant into what was perceived 
from the West as a cohesive geopolitical block under Moscow’s leadership. 
Meanwhile, Germany had ceased to exist as a political entity and its terri-
tory was divided into four occupation zones among the victorious powers. 
The rapid deterioration of the Allied coalition made a common solution for 
Germany impossible and resulted in the permanent division in two new 
states: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG from now on), which was 
military and politically linked to the West, and the German Democratic Re-
public (GDR from now on), which adopted the socialist system under tight 
Soviet tutelage. Thus, the emergence of the new ideological confrontation 
around the Soviet Union and the United States of America and its geopo-
litical declination in Europe and in Asia involved both China and Germany 
in a process of radical redefinition of their identities and of their place in 
world politics. The ideological proximity between Beijing and Moscow on 
one hand, and between the FRG and the United States on the other hand, 
meant that the two countries found themselves entangled in rival political 
system since their act of birth. The reopening of the traditional links to 
China proved especially hard for the FRG, whose freedom in international 
politics was strongly restricted by the occupation status that lasted until 
1955. Before and after that date, the interest of the governments in the 
Far East was further limited by their focus on the management of the new 
German Question and on the political, economic and military integration 
of their country in the Euro-Atlantic space. Hardly any room was left for 
creative diplomacy, especially when it could probably hurt the US sensi-
tiveness about dealing with the new enemies in the East. Furthermore, 
the adhesion of the PRC to the Soviet field led Beijing to recognise the 
existence of the GDR as a legitimate state right at the time when the FRG 
authorities committed themselves to the integral respect of the so-called 
Hallstein Doctrine: only one German government (in the West) was the 
product of free elections and thus was entitled to represent the whole 
German people; the recognition of another German government by a third 
country would compel the FRG to end its relations with it (Gray 2003). 
The only exception admitted during the ’50s was the Soviet Union, due 
to its relevance as the occupier power of the Eastern part of Germany. A 
second reason for West Germany’s neutralist stance lied in the condition of 
China after the end of the civil war, when two governments, one in Beijing 
and the other in Taipei, competed for the title of the sole representative 
of the whole Chinese people and territory. Bonn had hardly any reason 
for being dragged into the legislative and political struggle around this 
point, especially since the tensions between Beijing and Taipei (strongly 
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supported by Washington) constantly seemed on the verge to escalate 
into a military conflict. Moreover, Adenauer and his ministers feared that 
the Cold War logic could turn the Chinese division into a permanent fait 
accompli, thus legitimising a two-state solution that could be extended by 
analogy to the German case.
The decision of the German government to avoid the official recognition 
of Taiwan was welcomed by those German economic actors who supported 
the reopening of the traditional exchanges with mainland China despite 
the victory of the Communists (Rudolph 2004, 156). However, the course 
of the immediate post-war years revealed how this convergence was a 
mere accident. The economic sphere did not escape the totalizing nature 
of the bipolar confrontation both inside the countries and on a global 
level, and it became a factor of prime importance in the architecture of 
the containment of the Soviet bloc promoted by the United States. If the 
generosity of the US support and the intensification of the interaction 
within the Atlantic sphere was fundamental to the quick recovery of West-
ern Europe, the price that the latter had to pay was the severance of its 
traditional economic links to the Eastern side of the continent and more 
generally with all the countries falling within the Soviet sphere of influ-
ence. According to the new US doctrine, the so-called free world should 
refrain from trading strategic goods with the enemy. The first unambigu-
ous step was undertaken when the US Congress passed an amendment to 
the Economic Cooperation Act (which established the operative framework 
for the Marshall Plan) barring “any country receiving US aid if it exported 
any product to a non-participating European country which might contain 
a US-supplied commodity that would ordinarily be refused a US export 
license in the interest of national security” (Cain 2007, 5). A few months 
later Washington exhorted the recipient countries of its help to follow the 
embargo measures already in force in the US. Although the European part-
ner reserved an unenthusiastic reception to this request, they had hardly 
any option but to comply and to take part in the birth of the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (best known as COCOM). The 
new multilateral body was wrapped in secrecy and established in Paris 
with the goal of monitoring East-West trade on the base of lists of strategic 
goods mostly redacted following US recommendations.
In comparative terms, the reduction of trade with the East due to an 
overextended definition of ‘strategic goods’ had a more severe impact on 
Western Europe than on the US, whose economic interest in the Soviet 
Union and in its new satellites had always been marginal. The Federal 
Republic of Germany was a special case in point, due to the high level 
that the German-Russian (and more generally German-Easter European) 
business relations had reached during the interwar period and despite the 
regime changes. Although the West German economic firms could appreci-
ate the opportunities offered by the integration into the new Transatlantic 
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economic area, which proved essential for their quick rehabilitation after 
the collusions with the Nazi regime and the war destructions, most of them 
recommended a fast recovery of the old positions in the East grounding on 
their long experience and their detailed knowledge of the area (Spauld-
ing 1996, 115). Such aspirations were frustrated by the persistence of 
FRG’s status of limited sovereignty on its foreign affairs before and after 
its official birth in 1949. Until that year the Joint Import-Export Agency 
supported the Allied High Commission on Occupied Germany (HICOG) in 
supervising West German exports; thereafter the physical presence of the 
Allies – and above all of US military authorities – in the country imposed 
the most rigorous application of the embargo policy, to which the govern-
ments in Bonn offered their support to prove their unconditional devotion 
to the Western cause (Braun 1990, 109). As far as the private sector was 
concerned, its compliance with the new rules was neither full-hearted 
nor immediate. According to the black list redacted by the US authorities 
in 1952, allegations of illegal trade practices with the East were raised 
against more than 80 German firms; some of them even incurred in the 
suspension of the Marshall Plan helps when their violations were proven. 
Due to the sensitiveness of the US public opinion for trade with the enemy, 
both the Truman and the Eisenhower administration complained with the 
West German authorities; State Secretary John F. Dulles even hinted the 
possibility of the “cancellation of all foreign aid” if the internal control was 
not able to prevent the violations and to sanction them (Neebe 1996, 117). 
Despite the official position of the German governments, the support to the 
economic circles came from part of the political spectrum. As an example 
Ludwig Erhard, the powerful Minister for Economy and later Chancellor, 
although a staunch advocate of Transatlantic solidarity, estimated that the 
sacrifice of a liberal trade policy would be a too high price to pay (Neebe 
1996, 115). A meaningful progress was achieved in May 1952 when the 
Bundestag resolved unanimously that “the remaining limits on German 
freedom of action in the control of merchandise trade and in the conclu-
sion of trade treaties with East bloc countries must be eliminated as soon 
as possible”. It was not by coincidence that the resolution was approved 
during the same days when the Western victorious powers signed the so-
called “Bonn Paris conventions”, which put an end to the occupation status 
of West Germany and restored the full sovereignty of the FRG. Although 
the final ratification would take place only three years later, the Bunde-
stag resolution was a clear exhortation to the government to play a more 
active role in promoting German trade with the East (Spaulding 1996, 
132). During the same months came the decision by representatives of the 
German leading chemical, iron and steel groups, as well as from broker-
age houses and banks to give birth to the Eastern Committee of German 
Economy (Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft, OADW from now on). 
The first motivation behind this choice laid in the prospect of dealing with 
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Soviet-like economies characterised by state monopoly and a high degree 
of centralization. In doing so, the German economic actors were building 
on their experience of the interwar years, when the creation of the Rus-
sian Committee of the German Economy in 1928 had produced outstand-
ing results in levelling all the technical-procedural problems affecting 
German-Soviet trade (Braun 1990, 127-9). The choice of a permanent 
coordinating forum seemed to fit also the needs of the new times, when a 
plurality of German economic actors confronted state monopoly of foreign 
trade in the new socialist countries in Europe and beyond, with the risk 
of declining profits and internal competition. According to its statute, the 
new Committee aimed at advising the German governmental authorities 
when economic relations with the East were at stake; at promoting more 
fruitful and forward-looking relations with the East; and at signing trade 
agreements in absence of official recognition between the FRG and each 
Socialist country (Jüngerkes 2012, 28 ff.; Spaulding 1996, 131). Although 
the mythology surrounding the early steps of the Committee highlights the 
conflicting relations with the German government concerning the preroga-
tives of the newborn organisation, in 1952 the Ministry for Economy in 
Bonn recognised the Committee as “the sole representative of the whole 
German Economy for its range of duty” and pledged cooperation “in all 
relevant matters” (Jüngerkes 2012, 42). More generally, the Committee en-
joyed a cross-party support ranging from national-conservative and liberal 
circles which promoted a more autonomous promotion of FRG’s interests, 
to the Social Democratic opposition in its search for political credit among 
the entrepreneurs. Although the original target of the Committee was the 
Soviet-controlled space in Europe, a China Work Group was created since 
the early months. The continuity with the tradition of the German interests 
in China was represented by the participation of representatives from the 
major firms which had operated in that country before the war. The inclu-
sion of China in the range of competencies of the Committee was seen as 
the consequence of the rapid socialization – when not simple sovietisa-
tion – of the Chinese economy. Nevertheless, the outbreak of the Korean 
War and the ensuing tightening of the US-led embargo made even more 
necessary a coordinate and proactive attitude by the German economy.
Until then, the US administration had shown understanding for the 
efforts of the German economy to reestablish the traditional links with 
mainland China. Even after the victory of the Communist revolution, the 
internal debate in Washington in 1949-1950 showed a higher degree of tol-
erance towards the PRC in comparison with the rest of the Soviet bloc, due 
to Beijing’s alleged military irrelevance (Cain 2007, 42). Since the postwar 
recovery of the FRG’s economy was deemed necessary for the cohesion 
and the wellbeing of the anti-Soviet alliance, Bonn’s room for manoeuvre 
in international trade had to be increased even when the targets, such as 
the PRC, were included in the embargo list. The result was a short-lived 
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boom of West German-Chinese trade which amounted to a remarkable 
284 million Deutsche Mark during the first nine months of 1951 (with an 
increase of 2,000% compared to 1948): as Bonn established itself as the 
first trade partner in the West for the PRC, Beijing became the most im-
portant market for the FRG within the Soviet bloc. During this window of 
opportunity, most of the German firms seem to have harbored the illusion 
that the new geopolitical conditions would not affect the plains for new 
business opportunities. As evidenced by the case of Otto Wolff A.G., one 
of the leading firms in China before the war, the end of the “unlucky inter-
ruption caused by the war” was characterised by the attempt to recover 
the old personal contacts and even to revive the contracts signed by the 
Chinese nationalist authorities and not yet repealed by the new rulers.2 
The need for a fast and dynamic strategy toward Beijing was not motivated 
only by the search for profits in the short run. In strategic terms an integral 
application of the embargo policies to Beijing was bound to push the PRC 
further into the arms of the Soviet Union and to hasten the homogenisa-
tion of its economy according to Soviet-like standards. The first business 
reports coming from relevant areas such as Manchuria proved that a high 
degree of centralization and planning would suit perfectly the need of 
the new authorities to retake full control of the economy and to increase 
the production as quickly as possible. As a consequence, the presence of 
several Soviet ‘advisors’ at work was signaled even before the signing of 
the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship in February 1950. These evidence, 
coupled with the inexorable nationalization of all economic activities, ex-
horted the German economic actors to improve their coordination in order 
to increase both their negotiating power vis-à-vis the new state-owned 
corporations in China and their ability to avoid Beijing’s full dependence 
from Moscow. The price of failure would be the permanent exclusion of 
Western (and therefore German) enterprises from one of the most promis-
ing world markets, and the blame was clearly on Washington’s policy of 
recognition of Taiwan and on the inclusion of the PRC in the embargo list. 
As long as the internal authorities and the international conditions allowed, 
the German firms assumed the mission to avoid any political conditioning 
and to profit from free trade with China on the base of the superiority of 
German products.3
The Truman Administration profited from The Korea War to impose the 
reinterpretation of the bipolar confrontation in Asia in military terms. The 
intervention of Chinese troops in the conflict after October 1950 pushed 
2 Letter from Otto Wolff von Amerongen to Chang Shi Kang, China Automotive Ltd., 
Shanghai, 5 December 1949, RWWA, Abt. 72, 389-1.
3 Letter from David L.F. Sung, Managing Director of United Eingineering Corporation 
Ltd., Hong Kong, to Otto Wolff von Amerongen, 25 March 1950, RWWA, Abt. 72, 389-1. 
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Washington to immediately declare the strictest embargo on trade to and 
from China and the freeze of all financial assets linked to the Chinese au-
thorities (Cain 2007, 43). The decision had further consequences also on 
a multilateral level. A special section of COCOM, soon named CHINCOM 
(CHINa COMmittee) was created in September 1952 to supervise the 
Western trade of strategic goods with mainland China; due to the de facto 
state of war between the US and the PRC, the controls were stricter than 
with the other socialist countries, and the figure of goods included in the 
CHINCOM list was almost double than that of COCOM (the so-called China 
differential) (Mitcham 2005, 6). The Panmunjom armistice did not change 
Washington’s attitude in this respect: while Moscow enjoyed a softening 
of the original embargo measures during the ’50s, hardly any change was 
introduced toward Beijing.
Although grudgingly, the US allies had to comply with Washington’s 
desire to give a multilateral mantel to such strategy; the need of Wash-
ington’s security and economic support and by the apparent sensitiveness 
of the US public opinion on this subject proved enough to silence the dis-
senting opinions. The government in Bonn could be hardly an exception, 
due to its particular reliance on Washington and to its status of limited 
sovereignty. Although some attempts were made until 1953 to introduce 
exceptions for the most concerned sectors of German economy, such as the 
iron and steel industry, the full compliance with the CHINCOM rules was 
assured and consequently the short-lived boom of West German-Chinese 
trade came to an abrupt end.4 The event was interpreted in Beijing as a 
deliberate act of discrimination, since the non-compliance with contracts 
sealed with the PRC came at the same time of an encouraging improve-
ment of FRG’s trade with other socialist countries. Consequently, in late 
1952 the authorities of the PRC issued an Instruction Letter to all Chinese 
representatives abroad containing such discriminatory measures for West 
German exporters which made trade between the two countries virtually 
impossible (Jüngerkes 2012, 142). These evolutions persuaded the OADW 
to improve internal cooperation without delay, in order to reopen the chan-
nels with Beijing and to persuade the authorities in Bonn to promote the 
lift of the Chinese differential.
As far as the first point was concerned, the OADW engaged immedi-
ately in a diplomatic effort to contain the effects of the Instruction let-
ter and to establish direct links with the representatives of the Chinese 
economy abroad. The choice fell on the China National Import and Export 
Corporation (CNIEC from now on), which had established its European 
headquarter in East Berlin. Although the first contacts in 1952 met a cold 
reception from the Chinese side, the signing of the Panmunjom armistice 
4 Letter from Otto Wolff to Fu Sze in Tientsin, 23 February 1951, RWWA, Abt. 72, 389-1.
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the following year contributed to improving the atmosphere. In May 1953 a 
delegation of the OADW visited East Berlin in order to persuade the CNIEC 
interlocutors to lift the restrictions introduced by the Instruction Letter 
and to negotiate a standardisation of West-German trade procedures. The 
CNIEC representatives recognised the OADW as the official partner in 
negotiations and proved to be open to work out imaginative solution to 
overcome the current problems; nevertheless, they requested that the 
whole matter concerning shipping and payment would be included in a 
comprehensive bilateral trade agreement (Jüngerkes 2012, 143). Although 
the West German government had finally withdrawn its objections to the 
East Berlin meeting, and the Economic Ministries had expressed their un-
derstanding for the goals pursued by the OADW,5 the Chinese request was 
at odds with the strict policy of non-recognition prevailing officially in the 
FRG. This evidence however did not bring the negotiations to a halt, since 
the OADW benefited from its ambiguous nature of private association of 
public interest. A further although mostly symbolic step was made during 
the Conference summoned in Geneva in 1954 by the major world powers 
to find a solution for the aftermath of the Korean War and for the end of 
the French presence in Indochina. The conference saw the participation of 
the PRC, although not recognised by some of the participants; for its first 
appearance in such an important multilateral meeting, Beijing dispatched 
to Europe a high level delegation including economic representatives. Otto 
Wolff von Amerongen, Chairman of the Otto Wolff group and later leader 
of the OADW, was in the Swiss city during the very same days in order to 
take part in a meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission when 
he was reached by the invitation to meet informally Hsu Hsue Han, the 
Director of CNIEC and a high ranking official of the Chinese economy.6 
Having obtained the authorisation of the West German Economic Ministry 
to speak as a ‘private citizen’, Wolff von Amerongen met Hsu on 6th May 
1954 to discover the positive attitude reserved by the new rulers in Beijing 
to the past history of his family group in China, despite its cooperation with 
the “criminal Guomindang regime” (Wolff von Amerongen 1992, 243). The 
discussion tackled the problems left unsolved by the East Berlin negotia-
tions, namely the need for an agreement on the procedures for shipping, 
payment and arbitration in case of conflicts. In the latter case, the Chi-
nese suggestion to opt for East Berlin as the location for arbitration was 
immediately declined for obvious political reasons. More generally, the 
meeting did not produce any conclusion but left the impression, transmit-
ted by Wolff von Amerongen to his German interlocutors, that the PRC 
5 Proceedings of the Arbeitskreis China meeting, 13 March 1953, RWWA, Abt. 72, 459-1.
6 Memorandum from Otto Wolff von Amerongen on the meetings held in Geneva, 6 May 
1954, RWWA, Abt. 72, 389-1.
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was interested in expanding its trade with the West because of the higher 
quality of its products and in order to avoid an exclusive dependence on 
the Soviet Union.7
The meeting impressed a new impetus to the negotiations in East Berlin. 
The presence of some high representatives Chinese in the East German 
capital on their way back from Geneva allowed a substantial progress 
and even a tentative drafted was circulated in August (Ching 2006, 205). 
The principle of the agreement was the exchange of the goods included 
in two exhaustive lists; barter transactions were admitted as preferential 
and more generally the imports should be equal to the exports in overall 
value for both sides. More important from the German point of view were 
the compromises reached on almost all the technical details which had 
burdened the bilateral exchanges so far. 
Although the government in Bonn approved the text as it did not violate 
any political condition, a last request from the Chinese government was 
turned down after short evaluation: the invitation to the representatives of 
the OADW to visit Beijing for an official signing ceremony. This was inter-
preted by the German authorities as part of a diplomatic offensive launched 
by the PRC to force the Western governments to recognise the new regime; 
the evidence was the request of the CNIEC representatives to leave some 
aspects which involved the governmental level (such as the involvement 
of the Chinese and German central banks) for a last round of talks to be 
held in Beijing (Jüngerkes 2012, 142). Under government imperative, the 
OADW was forced to decline the invitation, causing a sharp reaction from 
the Chinese side which seemed to jeopardise all the results reached until 
then. During the previous months the bilateral trade had experienced a 
new upswing and Beijing expressed clear signals of willingness to increase 
its economic exchange with the West (Mitcham 2005, 15). However, the 
OADW was not willing to abandon the idea of a comprehensive trade agree-
ment due to the lack of clear conditions that seemed to affect especially 
such sectors as iron and steel and the chemical industry; and to the condi-
tion of structural inequality of negotiations between German firms and the 
centralised Chinese authorities, which reduced dramatically the profit rate 
of the former (Ching 2006, 214). Moreover, the West German economic 
performance with China was worsening in comparative terms with most 
Western competitors. At least since 1953 the Chinese authorities seemed 
to favour clearly those foreign firms whose government were entertain-
ing official relations with Beijing. This was the case of Great Britain and 
Switzerland, which had recognised the new Communist regime; but other 
Western countries seemed ready to dispatch political-economic delegations 
7 Memorandum from Otto Wolff von Amerongen on the meetings held in Geneva, 6 May 
1954, RWWA, Abt. 72, 389-1.
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to China in order to improve their chances (Ching 2006, 212).8 Thus, as 
Western solidarity to the embargo started crumbling during the mid-’50s, 
the OADW grew disappointed with Bonn’s adamant loyalty to the US that 
seemed to jeopardise the results achieved so far during the negotiations 
with the CNIEC.9 While the German government promoted the formal re-
vision of CHINCOM, a process that would take months or years to be ac-
complished, other countries such as Great Britain and France simply an-
nounced their will to remove China’s differential unilaterally before 1957; 
at the same time, Japan requested and obtained by CHINCOM a long list 
of derogations to the common rules on the base of the relevance of trade 
with China for the recovery of the Japanese economy.10 Apparently the 
OADW did not have any option but to keep the negotiations with the CNIEC 
alive: all details of the text were revised and agreed during 1955, so that a 
new invitation to Beijing was issued by the Chinese representatives. Once 
again the time seemed to work against the cause of the OADW: during all 
1955 the West German government was absorbed by the hard negotiations 
for the mutual recognition between the FRG and the Soviet Union, which 
involved sensitive issues such as the repatriation of German war prisoners 
(Jüngerkes 2012, 144).
The following year the growing Chinese uneasiness with German dila-
tory tactics, coupled with a further worsening of West German economic 
performance with China in relative terms, led to widespread criticisms of 
the German government’s attitude. While five new Western delegations 
(from Italy and France among others) reached Beijing to sign promising 
bilateral contracts, the OADW was still engaged in the controversy to gain 
the authorisation by the government in Bonn. A last baffling compromise 
was suggested by the West German Foreign Ministry during the first half of 
1956: the OADW should invite the CNIEC to sign the agreement in a city of 
the Western hemisphere, with Beijing as a second-best option only in case of 
a Chinese refusal.11 The OADW declined the suggestion since it would have 
further damaged the credibility of the German interlocutors. The Committee 
restated that its goal had always been to improve the technical conditions 
of German-Chinese business relations and not to replace the government 
in its prerogatives; rather, it was time for the political sphere to realise that 
8 Letter from the President of the Arbeitskreis China Heinrick Köhler to the General Di-
rector of the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie Hans-Wilhelm Beutler, 3 May 1955, 
RWWA, Abt. 175, 4-1.
9 Letter from Otto Wolff to Heinrick Köhler, 18 September 1956, RWWA, Abt. 175, 4-1.
10 Letter from Drossel to Otto Wolff von Amerongen, 23 December 1955, RWWA, Abt. 
72, 389-1.
11 Letter from Beutler to van Scherpenberg of Foreign Ministry, 24 May 1956, RWWA, 
Abt. 175, 4-1.
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its interference in business was producing a dramatic waste of opportuni-
ties to the advantage of the international competitors.12 The controversy 
became public at the end of the year, when the opposition at the Bundestag 
raised two official questions to the government: the Liberal Party (FDP, 
traditionally close to business circles) provocatively proposed the opening 
of a German trade mission in China, while the SPD simply asked the gov-
ernment to give its final permission for the signing of the long-negotiated 
trade agreements with CNIEC (Ching 2006, 216). The details mentioned 
in both questions raised suspicion of an active role by the OADW. Although 
difficult to gauge, this would not be inconsistent with the more aggressive 
attitude displayed by the Committee after the election of the new President 
Otto Wolff von Amerongen in 1955. The result was the commitment taken 
by the government in front of the Bundestag to allow new significant steps 
towards the signing of the trade agreement, since a further postponement 
of the visit to Beijing “would lead to unpleasant public debates” shortly 
before the federal elections of September 1957.13 Moreover, the German 
government was encouraged by the alleged softer attitude of the Eisen-
hower administration on the embargo issue: when France and Great Britain 
officially declared the end of China’s differential in Summer 1957, they did 
not incur in any retaliatory measure from Washington.14
In late August 1957 the nine members of the OADW delegation were 
allowed to travel to mainland China via Hong Kong. Most of them came 
from the Workgroup China: together with Otto Wolff, representatives from 
Bayer AG, Mannesmann and Deutsche Bank among others reached Beijing 
on 8th September. Their new interlocutors were the leaders of the China 
Committee for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), a higher-
ranking body than the CNIEC which symbolised the value attached by the 
Chinese hierarchy to the conclusion of the agreement. It took twenty days 
of “the hardest negotiations” (according to Otto Wolff) to iron out all the 
questions left open by the previous talks.15 The delay was due to the last 
Chinese attempts to entail the two governments in the implementation of 
the agreement, so as to introduce a de facto recognition between the FRG 
and the PRC. The most heated point of discussion was the request of an 
12 Speech by Otto Wolff von Amerongen to the Cologne Chamber of Commerce, 17 May 
1956, RWWA, Abt 72, 381-2.
13 Memorandum of van Scherpenberg of the Foreign Ministry, Ein- und Ausfuhrvereinba-
rung zwischen den Ostausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft und dem China-Committee for 
the Promotion of International Trade, 26 July 1957, PA-AA, Bestand 63, Band 139.
14 Memorandum from Zahn-Stranik of the Foreign Office, Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 
der BRD zur VR China nach Aufhebung des China-Differentials, 4 July 1957, PA-AA, Bestand 
63, Band 136.
15 Letter from Otto Wolff von Amerongen to the Director of the Ostasiatischer Verein 
Hans Stoltenberg-Lerche, 7 October 1957, RWWA, Abt. 72, 381-2.
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agreement between the two central banks as a guarantee of import-export 
transactions. The institutional framework of the Federal Republic offered 
the German delegation an escape route. Since the statute of the ‘Bank 
Deutscher Länder’ (later Bundesbank) made it an institution autonomous 
from the government, the financial responsibility for trade relied on the 
Ministry of Economics (which incidentally was constantly updated during 
the negotiations). The compromise came with an official letter committing 
the Ministry to acknowledge the agreement and to do its utmost for its 
fulfilment.16 Concerning the problem of arbitration, soon after the Chinese 
side had abandoned its preference for East Berlin, an easier compromise 
was reached in favour of Zurich, since official relations existed between 
Switzerland and the PRC (Leutner 1995, 73). A success for the OADW was 
the quite unproblematic inclusion of West Berlin in the area subject to the 
agreement; on the contrary, no progress was made in the delicate field of 
trademark registrations, since the CCPIT delegates refused to discuss a 
matter that could only be dealt with by the governments.17 More generally, 
the OADW claimed to have avoided all major risks and to have reached 
more than 80% of its goals especially in defining the technical terms for 
trade and financial transactions, whose uncertainty had dogged economic 
relations so far.18 Also the government in Bonn expressed its satisfaction 
for the agreement signed on 27th September in Beijing, since the limits 
of the OADW mandate in terms of political disengagement had been re-
spected.19 However, a last symbolic dispute occurred to remind the limits 
imposed by the Cold War environment. The Committee requested the pub-
lication of the text of the agreement by the official bulletin of the German 
Ministry for Economics, since the CNIEC had posed this condition during 
the negotiations. The opening formula referring to “friendly negotiations” 
was politically unpalatable to the government in Bonn, and it took a further 
round of talks between the parts to approve an amended version of the 
text.20 This last episode reveals once again how closely wedged had been 
the mediation of the OADW between Beijing’s attempts to broaden the 
scope of the agreement, and Bonn’s uncompromising stance about non-
16 Proceedings of the first negotiating session, 10 September 1957, RWWA, Abt. 175, 5-1.
17 Proceedings of the fifth plenary session, 18 September 1957, RWWA, Abt. 175, 5-1.
18 Letter from Otto Wolff to the President of the CCPIT Nan Han-Cheng, 27 September 
1957, RWWA, Abt. 175, 5-1.
19 Memorandum from the German Consulate in Hong Kong to the Foreign Ministry, Di-
rektgeschäft mit der Volksrepublik China; Ergebnis der Verhandlungen der Delegation des 
Ostausschusses der Deutschen Wirtschaf in Peking, 17 October 1957, PA-AA, Bestand 63, 
Band 139.
20 Record of the meeting between the German delegation to Beijing and Reinhard of the 
Foreign Ministry, 11 November 1957, RWWA, Abt. 175, 5-1.
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recognition policy. From the economic point of view, the agreement was an 
unconditional success. A global trade volume of 230 million Deutsche Mark 
was foreseen for both import and export: the result in 1958 was three times 
higher. Besides, as a result of the common definition of trade customs and 
rules, the share of direct trade between the FRG and the PRC increased 
from a mere 35% in 1957 to 86% one year later (Ching 2006, 218). At that 
time, however, the Chinese authorities refused to open the negotiations 
for an extension of the agreement due to lack of progress on the political 
scale. Beijing’s goal to translate the new relations at the governmental 
level had been frustrated both by OADW’s lack of interest and by Bonn’s 
refusal to get involved. Despite the anxiety expressed by the Committee, 
the absence of a new binding agreement did not influence negatively the 
volume and the quality of the exchange. On the contrary, it seemed that 
the authorities of the PRC estimated that the bilateral economic relations 
had developed too favourably to be conditioned by political instability. 
Quite on the contrary, West German-Chinese trade benefited from other 
international tensions: the unofficial trade agreement between the PRC 
and Japan was abruptly suspended in 1958 when a Japanese nationalist 
group insulted the Chinese flag at a fair taking place in Nagasaki. Until 
then Japan was PRC’s first economic partner: the freeze of bilateral trade 
imposed by the Chinese leadership opened new opportunities for FRG 
business to increase its share of the Chinese market (Hsiao 1977, 41-50). 
On the other hand, the declining performance of West-German-Chinese 
trade during the first half of the ’60s was neither a consequence of the lack 
of a new bilateral agreement nor the result of the strict non-recognition 
policy carried by Bonn: according to a widespread interpretation, the more 
general reduction of PRC’s exchanges with the Western world was due to 
the disastrous results of the Great Leap Forward.
The evaluation of the 1957 trade agreement and of its long-term con-
sequences seems to suggest that the coordination and the pragmatic at-
titude displayed by the German economy, coupled with the low-profiled 
and discrete involvement of the governmental actors, has been a constant 
guarantee of success in improving German-Chinese economic relations. 
This was even more so in the framework of the unfavourable environment 
produced by the Cold War during the early ’50s. Both the gyrations of East-
West relations and the emerging Sino-Soviet split seem to have exerted 
a scant influence on bilateral exchange as long as it proved profitable 
for both sides, provided that most of the technical issues were resolved 
bilaterally and the basic rules of security were respected by the two geo-
political blocs. In this respect, the agreement signed in 1957 was not the 
mere stage-setting for the later official recognition between the FRG and 
the PRC, which occurred only in 1972; on the contrary, it deserves a care-
ful consideration for its long-term influence over the course of German-
Chinese relations to the present day.
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Abstract The years 1966 and 1967 are crucial for British Crown’s Colony of Hong Kong and for 
United Kingdom’s economic relation with the People’s Republic of China. Few studies on the subject 
addressed this reality only partially, whereas a thorough vision remains to be achieved. The 1967 
left-wing riots marked a point of no return in UK’s perception of the Hong Kong issue from a political 
standpoint as the events showed the British the exact measurement of their weakness in the area. 
But while agreeing that UK’s decolonization strategy might have an earlier start, we have to point 
out that the years 1966 and 1967 need to be studied as crucial dates, which marks the acquisition of 
a new consciousness by the Hong Kong financial and industrial milieus: from then on, the economic 
future of the colony will look towards the Mainland and not anymore towards the United Kingdom, 
thus acknowledging the strong, though not problem-free, links built over the years by the Hong Kong 
capitalists with the People’s Republic of China establishment.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 A Close Connection. – 3 The 1966 Protests and Riots or ‘the Comedy 
of Ambiguities’. – 4 Waiting for the Storm? 1967 Hong Kong’s Riots. – 5 The Sterling Devaluation. – 
6 Conclusions.
Keywords Hong Kong. Riots. Sterling. Devaluation. 
1 Introduction
The Hong Kong riots in 1966 and 1967 represented a crucial moment both 
for the history of the former British Colony and for the relations between 
People’s Republic of China and United Kingdom.1 From the half of the 
’50s to the eve of the Cultural Revolution, the growth of Chinese trade 
and financial relations through Hong Kong was in many ways astonishing. 
That is true especially taking into consideration the current mainstream 
historiography that consider Communist China as an isolated country and 
1 This article is part of a wider research elaborated by Roberto Peruzzi (Ca’ Foscari Uni-
versity of Venice) and Valeria Zanier (LSE) to whom goes my greetings for her cooperation.
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economy until the reappraisal of her diplomatic relations with the United 
States. Recent researches showed clearly that this was not the case regard-
ing the Chinese economic relations with almost all the Western European 
countries (Romano, Zanier 2017; Meneguzzi, Samarani 2014). The devel-
opment of the China-United Kingdom economic relations used the British 
Colony as a pivotal centre and a sort of ‘financial and logistic hub’ for the 
Chinese economy. Mainly two facts were the very bases of this situation. 
Firstly, the symbiotic connection between Hong Kong and Mainland Chi-
na: a special relationship which permitted the fast growth of the Colony’s 
economy through the ’50s and the ’60s as well as the maintenance of an 
open door for Communist China’s economy to bypass the United States’ 
embargo. The other decisive fact was the fundamental role maintained by 
the British sterling for the People’s Republic of China’s international trade 
and financial relations until the second half of the ’60s (Peruzzi 2017).2
While the biennium 1965/1966 represented the peak of Sino-British 
trade relations in the first two decades of existence of the People’s Repub-
lic of China,3 the Cultural Revolution on one hand and the Hong Kong’s 
disturbances and riots of 1966/1967 on the other one, were the main 
reasons of the temporary crisis of their mutually beneficial relationship.
Until today Hong Kong protests of 1966 and 1967 were often considered 
as separated events. In the case of 1966 disturbances historiography con-
sidered them as a local, limited and not political issue, without any con-
nection with 1967 riots, which were described as originated by economic 
and ideological instances of leftist protesters mainly backed by Commu-
nists, and for some historians even as a sort of plot led by the Chinese 
Government. As a matter of fact, until today the official reconstruction of 
the events and the mainstream interpretation left unsolved many obscure 
aspects of what really happened in those months of 1966 and 1967. Not 
to mention the official and unofficial documents we could study in the ar-
chives, which we have to consider at least as extremely contradictory and 
often conflicting with the usual historiographical interpretation. 
The ‘Emergency Act’ introduced in July 1967 by the British administra-
tion legally permitted a harsh repression of any kind of social protest in 
Hong Kong, but also introduced a series of important regulatory acts not 
directly connected with the disturbances which reinforced the London 
Government control on the Colony. For the first time till 1941,4 the Act 
2 The decisive role of sterling for the People’s Republic of China’s economy in the ’60s 
has been generally ignored by the historians, but it is well known by economists as Susan 
Strange, Chatherine Schenk and Leo Goodstadt. 
3 The volume of trade achieved for this period was reached again only around 1970.
4 During the Summer of 1941 a first ‘Emergency Regulatory Act’ was introduced by the 
British colonial administration in view of a possible conflict with Japan, including measures 
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permitted a direct control of the Bank of England on the local financial 
system, a necessary premise to the planned sterling devaluation.
This is not yet a reappraisal but an introduction to the enucleation of 
unsolved contradictions and doubts on the current reconstruction of what 
happened in the Crown Colony of Hong Kong in these crucial years.5
2 A Close Connection 
British direct export to Mainland China doubled between 1962 and 1965. 
Trade missions intensified and important firms from Britain, as well as 
from Hong Kong, were always present at the semi-annual Canton fair. Only 
in 1964, the Sino-British Trade Council, created by the UK Government in 
1954, promoted three specialized trade expositions in Beijing, participated 
by more than one hundred British companies. While between January and 
September 1965, not less than twenty-three Mainland China’s trade mis-
sions visited the United Kingdom. Definitely, 1965 was the year in which 
we see the speeding up of economic relation’s growth between Britain and 
the People’s Republic of China (Laurens 1966, 75-6; Peruzzi 2014, 272-
3). Nevertheless, if consistent British Government efforts to promote the 
growing of direct trade relations with China achieved a high qualitative 
level in industrial relations, they never reached the relevance and value 
of Hong Kong import-export and financial relations with Mainland China.
After the end of the Chinese civil war and the proclamation of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, the British Crown’s Colony6 of Hong Kong became 
the main scenario of Sino-British economic relations. After 1949 ‘shock’, 
the British attitude toward Communist China was clear: “trade should de-
termine British policy”, as stated by the British Minister in China, Sir Ralph 
Stevenson in Summer 1949.7 With trade, and ‘for’ trade, the vital priority 
was the prospect to maintain the British control on the Hong Kong Colony 
as an ‘open door’ to Chinese economy, but also as a mean to preserve a 
to guarantee the financial control of the Bank of England on the local banking institutions. 
Of course, after December 1941 and the Japanese invasion, the Act was no more effective.
5 A wider exposition by the author and Valeria Zanier (London School of Economics) was 
presented on May 7th 2015 in the LSE IDEAS Workshop: Economic Encounters in the Age 
of Ideology. Exploring the Business Dimension of Political Confrontation in China, Russia, 
Europe (1945-1991). 
6 Hong Kong was a ‘Crown Colony’ and this special status implied the fact that instead 
of the other members of the Commonwealth, in case of necessity the British Government 
could act without any consideration of local powers or needs, imposing the UK priorities 
and decisions to the Colony.
7 Stevenson to Bevin, 29 August 1949, F12884/1023/10, Stevenson to Bevin, 1 September 
I949, F13102/1023/10, F.O. 371/75814.
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British role in Asia (Ovendale 1983). Realistically excluding any prospect 
of a military stand to defend the Colony against the triumphant Chinese 
Communists (Fischer 1968, 323-4), the alternative was yet envisaged by 
the Far East experts of the Foreign Office in London before the end of the 
Civil War. Being traditionally linked with the Mainland in entrepôte trade, 
the British Colony of Hong Kong had played a crucial role at the end of 
19th century and in the early part of the 20th century, as a necessary hub of 
services to China’s trading and investing partners (US, Japan, and Western 
European countries). It was essential to show to the new Chinese Govern-
ment the advantageous opportunity to use Hong Kong as a sort of ‘hub’ 
of financial and logistic services to support Mainland China’s economic 
reconstruction (Shai 1984, 150-1; Peruzzi 2014, 249-53).8
As a matter of fact, this is what effectively happened between the second 
half of the ’50s and the first half of the ’60s. While Hong Kong played a very 
peculiar role in Cold War politics, being an outpost of a Western power just 
at the border of Communist China, the Colonial administration professed 
complete political neutrality in order to preserve Hong Kong’s economic 
laissez-faire, which meant for everybody the possibility to prosper. During 
the ’50s the bases for Hong Kong’s ‘economic miracle’ as well as for a real 
symbiotic relation between the British Colony and the People’s Republic 
of China’s economies were created.
It has not yet been pointed out clearly how Hong Kong miracle was de-
pendent on Mainland China. Continuing the tradition in entrepôte trade, 
in the early ’50s China became the most important food provider to poorly 
endowed Hong Kong: rice, livestock, fresh vegetables and drinkable water9 
fed the increasingly populated and industrialised Colony’s islands, while 
Hong Kong offered in return an easy access to free market, banking and 
logistic services (Peruzzi 2014, 265-7).10 Not only were Hong Kong people 
fed with Chinese food and Chinese water, but Hong Kong factories lived on 
the frequent waves of migrants who provided low-wage workers who were 
essential to keep the local manufacturing sector competitive. Wages could 
be kept low because of the cheap food, textiles and other light products 
coming from the Mainland, thus creating a delicate economic depend-
ence based on a tacit partnership across the two sides of the Hong Kong 
bay. This circumstance is crucial to understand what was at the core of 
the tense social situation that had formed in the Colony in the first half 
8 PRO FO 371 46232 F 1331/409/10. PRO CAB 129/31, CP (48) 299, December 1948. 
9 Its should be rememberedx that until 1969 Hong Kong was completely dependent on 
Mainland China for drinkable water supplies.
10 For example the shipment companies registered in Hong Kong, formally British but 
often under Mainland China’s control which permitted to bypass the embargo under the 
British flag. 
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of the ’60s. The number of inhabitants had far exceeded the capability of 
the city, and many lived in deplorable conditions, while both workers and 
businessmen had reason to fear for any inflationary movement that could 
push prices up. 
The Colony was administered in a very conservative way, with very little 
contribution from the locals, no constitutional reforms were scheduled, 
and the least developed monetary system of all British colonies. While hav-
ing a currency, the Hong Kong dollar, the Colony did not have any central 
bank. The control lied within an Exchange Fund in London, which was 
controlled by private commercial banks (Hong Kong Shanghai Banking 
Corporation, or HSBC, Mercantile Bank, Chartered Bank). HSBC was re-
sponsible for issuing Hong Kong notes and holding the Colony’s balances. 
But HSBC was also the financial institute with the closest ties with Main-
land China interests and with the ‘Communist’ Banks operating in Hong 
Kong (Schenk 2012, 47-8),11 contributing to strengthen the economic link 
between local and Communist China’s interests (Peruzzi 2014, 253-65).
In 1966-1967, British sterling was still the main foreign currency em-
ployed by the People’s Republic for international trade and finance opera-
tions. In the same period, Hong Kong was the main international British 
sterling market outside Britain and the most important source of foreign 
currency for China (Schenk 2012, 58; Peruzzi 2014, 275).12
3 The 1966 Protests and Riots or ‘the Comedy of Ambiguities’
As reported in the vivid words of a witness, “in the mid-Sixties, Hong Kong 
was not exactly swinging if you were poor” (Mullone 1996, 161). During 
1965 British trade and financial relations with the People’s Republic of 
China flourished and reached their maximum level since the end of Chi-
nese Civil War. The symbiotic link between Hong Kong and the Mainland 
China economies was stronger than ever. But 1965 was not a good year 
for the British Colony. “A stock market crisis in 1965 had caused a run in 
the banks. Some of them had folded and many people saw their savings 
wiped out” (Mullone 1996, 161). Economic and social anxiety was growing 
also among the new Chinese middle class of the Colony. “Factory owners 
were looking for ways to cut costs, and soon tapped into the hordes of new 
immigrants from the mainland willing to work for a pittance. Layoffs were 
11 Between 1961 and 1970, thirteen Mainland China controlled banks were operating 
in Hong Kong, with a total of fifty-five open branches in the Colony. If the Bank of China 
was without a doubt the most politically influential Chinese owned bank in Hong Kong, the 
Nanyang Commercial Bank was the largest for deposits and advances. 
12 Flanked on a minor scale by Singapore and Kuwait City. Particularly the last one had a 
certain relevance as a foreign currency source for the People’s Republic of China.
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commonplace for longtime residents” (161). The feeling of an unrestrain-
able transformation was commonly shared by the people, but the faith in 
growing opportunities and richness knew a sudden stop that year. 
In the countryside, new towns and industrial estates were eating up 
the landscapes. Villages not swallowed by the sprawl were emptying of 
people, leaving the old to die in their cabbage patches and the livestock 
to wander aimless and ownerless. Buffaloes tumbled into the new catch-
waters which were built to channel every drop of water to the cities, 
and their carcasses choked up the nullahs of Tsuen Wan and Choi Hung. 
(Mullone 1996, 161)
While often the reconstruction of the 1966’s riots described them as un-
foreseeable events, the origins of which were groundless if searched in the 
Colony social and economic situations Liam Mullone’s words well describe 
the growing uncertainties and tensions that characterised the common 
people of Hong Kong’s feelings in the months before the disturbances.
Tensions and riots were not something new to the Colony. Early in 1956 
serious and violent incidents and demonstrations were organized in Kow-
loon by Chinese nationalist militants, led by Guomindang controlled Trade 
Unions, while Communist trade unionists opposed them. Even in the early 
‘60s many groups, associations or unions linked both to the Guomindang 
or to the Communists organized protests, strikes and demonstrations.13
On 4th April, a young man called So Sau Chung began a hunger strike 
in front of the Kowloon Star Ferry’s entrance hall denouncing the rise of 
living costs and the announced rise of the Ferry fares. If the proposed 
fare rise involved only first class tickets, it was clear that this was just the 
first step to which also the second class will eventually follow as part of a 
program of general prices increase involving all the transports system of 
the Colony as denounced by the urban councillor Elsie Elliot. So’s protest 
was intended to support Miss Elliot’s action in the urban council, and she 
was present that day in front of the Star Ferry Hall trying to convince So 
to suspend the protest before the intervention of the police. In those days 
Elsie Elliot and Brook Bernacchi, both well-known activists of the Reform 
Club, presented a report denouncing colonial police wide corruption and 
its involvement in drugs smuggling. Particularly they denounced the chiefs 
of the Mongkok police station, the police officers Lui Lok, Peter Godber 
and Nam Kong, which covered in their jurisdiction the Kowloon Star Ferry 
offices. The next day, 5th April, another young man, Lo Kei, joined So in 
13 Also other groups were socially and politically active in Hong Kong. For example, the 
Triad organisations took a certain role in the 1956 disturbances. But also democratics, 
labourists, Trozkysts, anarchists and pro-soviet Communists associations or groups were 
present in the Colony.
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the hunger strike, but in the afternoon the Mongkok’s police arrived to 
disperse the crowd gathered around. They arrested So Sau Chung, while 
a small group of young people began to protest against police violence 
leading a demonstration in Nathan Road. The same day Elsie Elliot was 
denounced by the police and the colonial administration as the responsible 
for the organisation of the protests and as an anti-British troublemaker, 
and on 6th April morning So Sau Chung was sentenced to three months 
for obstruction of a passageway (Mullone 1996, 162).
Throughout that day and the following night, the protest grew and be-
came an extended riot involving the territory of Kowloon. While most of 
the protest were located around the Mongkok Police station, pillages and 
devastations extended in many parts of the district and the initial protest 
against the police became a chaotic outbreak (Mullone 1996, 161).14
The British colonial administration, the police and the official media 
immediately denounced that the only reason of the riots was the pro-
test against the ferry fare rise underlining their absurdity with the fact 
that fares rises would have involved only first class tickets, excluding any 
other possible reason as the origin of the riots. On the other side, when 
interviewed, quite all the people involved in the riots recognised police 
corruption and violence as the main reason of their involvement in the 
demonstrations. Police’s repression of the protests was extremely violent 
involving not only looters and pillagers but also peaceful demonstrators: 
a young man was killed by the police, 1,800 persons were arrested, more 
than 450 were sentenced and hundreds were injured. If the riots of April 
1966 were essentially located about this event, a strong and widespread 
“undercurrent of resentment surely remains” (Mullone 1996, 162).15
In February 1967, the British Parliament enquiry commission estab-
lished and declared in a long official report that the riots of 1966 had no 
political, social or economic reasons pointing out the Kowloon Star Ferry’s 
fares rises as the only reason of the disturbances. A paradoxical conclu-
sion, considering the fact that the same report recognised the growing 
social anxiety of the lower and middle classes of the Colony caused by the 
increasing cost of living, the lowering conditions of life, diffuse wage level 
reductions, a widespread perception of general worsening in economic 
14 It has to be pointed out that no protest was directed against the Kowloon Star Ferry 
offices, in front of which they began, nor any damage was registered to the Star Ferry build-
ings and properties. In the words of Liam Mullone: “This seemed to beg the question: did 
the ‘Star Ferry Riots’ really have anything to do with the pricing policy of the Star Ferry?” 
(Mullone 1996, 161). FCO 40/39/ Kowloon Riots 1966/ Report of Commission of Inquiry, 1-167. 
15 CO 1030/1747/Confidential/Trench to Carter (C.O.)/26 May 1966, (included in), Memo-
randum of Reference for Use by Counsel Representing the Government/25.5.66/Confidential, 
1030/1746/Secret/From the Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colo-
nies/Kowloon Riots/15 April 1966. FCO 40/39/ Kowloon Riots 1966/ Report of Commission 
of Inquiry, 1-167.
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conditions. Elsie Elliot, So Sau Chung and the democratic media, associa-
tions and militants denounced the report of the enquiry commission. But 
officially, the riots of 1966 had no reasons.16
4 Waiting for the Storm? 1967 Hong Kong’s Riots 
In 1967, China witnessed some of the most violent and disorderly deeds 
of the Cultural Revolution. In Hong Kong, the same year is notorious for 
the riots, maybe inspired17 by the Mainland, surely largely caused by harsh 
living conditions of the working class. As to Britain, 1967 is the year when, 
eventually, the insufficient economic growth and the inherent risk of infla-
tion spiral made prime Minister Harold Wilson devalue the pound.
On February 1967, in Macao students’ protest against Portuguese co-
lonialism were harshly repressed by the Salazar regime police killing and 
injuring many of them. The Chinese population of the Portuguese colony 
reacted with a fierce mobilisation for a general boycott of the colonial ad-
ministration and economy. The protest was directly supported by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, which organised an embargo and a sort of naval 
blockade of the Portuguese controlled territory. In March 1967, a month 
later, the Lisbon Government had to surrender to the protesters accept-
ing all theirs claims and paying compensations to the family of the killed 
and injured by the colonial police. The Macao facts became immediately a 
stunning example for nationalists and communist militants in Hong Kong.
The chance to follow the Macao’s example soon arrived at the end of 
April 1967 and in the early days of May. An artificial flowers factory, prop-
erty of an American company, in San Po Kong was acting a massive dis-
missal initiative without any respect of the Colony’s labour regulatory laws 
and refusing any dialogue with the local trade unions. After some days of 
peaceful protests and pickets, on 10th May violent disturbances spread 
out with the police, which arrested twenty-one workers and trade unions’ 
activists. From 11th May, protesters began to run the Kowloon streets with 
leftist, and often Maoist, slogans and banners against the colonial police 
and administration. on 12th May, for the first time Beijing’s official papers 
directly incited the people of Hong Kong to support the demonstrations 
against British imperialism and colonial regime following the example of 
16 It could appear absurd in many way, but until today this interpretation of 1966’s riots 
has been commonly repeated. For example see: URL http://hongwrong.com/1967-hk-riots/ 
(2018-02-27). FCO 40/39/ Kowloon Riots 1966/ Report of Commission of Inquiry/ Conclu-
sion, 150-67.
17 Or even directed by the Chinese Government as happened in Macao in February 1967. 
As a matter of fact, still today there is not a definitive proof of Beijing’s involvement, while 
many documents could give way to unsolved questions and doubts on this prospect. 
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Macao’s people. Responding to what seemed a call to arms from the Chi-
nese Communist Government, Mainland China controlled companies, insti-
tutions and newspapers began to directly support the demonstrations and 
the claims of the protesters. Strikes, demonstrations, barricades, violent 
clashes, assaults to the police stations and to the colonial administration’s 
offices characterised Hong Kong scenario until August 1967. On 8th July 
a clash at the border with the Mainland, causing the death of five Hong 
Kong policemen, spread a fear that a Chinese invasion might take place. 
London provided military assistance by sending land reinforcements and, 
later on, a detachment of R.A.F. helicopters.18
In the Summer of 1967, London supported the decision of the Hong 
Kong Governor to enact the Defence Regulation Acts (also, Emergency 
Act), a series of temporary control measures, which allowed some extraor-
dinary powers to local authorities, including the restraint of some basic 
personal freedoms. The emergency measures enforced in Hong Kong in 
1967 includes: opening and closing of premises; obligation to provide a 
name and address when approached by disciplinary forces; regulation of 
assemblies; sanctions against the dissemination of inflammatory materials 
and speeches; trial without public proceedings; right to deport and detain 
(Ray Yep 2012, 1007-32; Sinclair 2009, 89-104). In the correspondence 
between the Foreign Office and the Hong Kong Colonial Government, this 
decision is linked to the consideration that Beijing was to be held highly 
responsible for the Hong Kong riots of Spring-Summer 1967. There is no 
direct evidence that this was the case.
As a matter of fact, the authors who have highlighted Beijing’s strong in-
volvement have based their arguments on the evidence provided by Hong 
Kong and Beijing newspapers, mostly by quoting slogans and political 
jargon supportive of the highly ideological turn that had been inaugurated 
by 1966’s Red Guards movement. On the other hand, those scholars who 
have studied the correspondence among the three subjects involved (the 
Hong Kong Colonial Government, the Foreign Office, the British embassy 
in Beijing) have highlighted that the British diplomats in China denied 
Beijing directly supporting the riots, as this would have meant acting 
18 In late August the Colonial Government asked additional help from Defense to build a 
new border fence. An obstacle of about 30 feet wide, consisting of coils and barbed wire “to 
stop land incursions of all kinds” The Colonial administration proposed to use civilian labour 
force for the erection of such obstacle under the direction of military personnel, expressly 
asking London to provide financial help: “Our present view is that they are defensive ar-
rangements designed to meet an external threat and that therefore the charge should be 
one which this Government should not have to meet”. As there was no military invasion, 
in Autumn, when the situation resumed to normal, the Colonial Government was asked to 
pay for all the interventions of the military. FCO 40/99/ Hong Kong Telegram no. 1320 to 
Commonwealth Office, 29 August 1967. FCO 40/99/ Report of the Ministry of Defence to 
Commonwealth Office, 17 October 1967.
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against their own interests. Donald Hopson, British Chargé d’Affaires in 
Beijing, advised London Government not to use harsh measures in Hong 
Kong in order not to provoke a real Chinese reaction (Ray Yep 2012; Ray 
Yep 2008, 122-39). Actually, it is a fact that the most violent actions by 
the Chinese, as the burning of the British embassy in August 1967, or the 
killing of policemen on the border of the Colony, did not provoke any harsh 
reaction nor by the colonial authorities in Hong Kong nor by the British 
Government in London. Nor did the emergency measures in Hong Kong 
provoke other reactions in Beijing.
The reports by the Hong Kong police clearly state that the riots in May 
and in the Summer of 1967 were motivated by social unrest due to the fear 
of food price rising and the general worsening of living conditions in the 
island. The correspondence between the Governor and London in the first 
month after the strikes in April at the Kowloon’s flower factory also shows 
this interpretation of the origins of ’67’s disturbances. Only afterwards a 
strong Beijing role was reported and without any clear evidence on the 
existence of the linkage, except for the slogans and articles published on 
Beijing’s newspapers.19
As a matter of fact, the London Government and the Hong Kong colo-
nial governor David Trench firmly stated that Beijing was directing the 
riots, even before there were any certainty of it. The evidences in the 
British archives show that such statements did not have any basis, as no 
research was ever conducted on the facts, while the reports underwrit-
ten by the Colonial governor, the Foreign Office, the press, the military 
and the different intelligence agencies, confirmed the local origins of the 
disturbances of 1967. The prompt ‘communist’ explanation of strikes and 
riots was homogeneous, both in London and in Hong Kong long time in 
advance. In order to sustain the Communist hypothesis, the authorities 
founded their views on two ‘scientific’ elements: one was the report by the 
Davis Foundation (an institution based in London, dealing with the pacific 
resolution of conflicts), which confirmed the involvement of the People’s 
Republic of China and the influence of the Cultural Revolution, but did 
not provide any examination ‘on field’ nor involved any China/Hong Kong 
expert. The main sources used by the Davis Foundation were, as a matter 
of fact, articles from the British press and from a selection of Hong Kong 
and Mainland China press (only from newspapers in English). The second 
‘scientific’ element was a report written by a research group within the 
London School of Economy, composed of experts on international crises. 
This report makes use of the same sources as the Davis Foundation, with-
out any ‘on-site’ examination. Moreover, the London School’s report did 
19 FCO 40/54, HK Police Report, July 1967. Similar views were shared by the Intelligence. 
FCO 40/101, Ref. TS 2/57 III-L.I.C. Monthly internal intelligence report: March (doc. no. 
15-14), April (doc. no. 18-17), May (doc. no. 21-20), June (doc. no. 25-24), July (doc. no. 27-26).
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not take into account any internal/local variable, but only considered in-
ternational relations.20 Both reports will be used time and again in London 
by the Foreign Office, the military, Treasury, and Bank of England, and in 
Hong Kong by the Colonial Governor, the Administrative Council, and the 
press in order to prove and confirm the role of the Communists, of the 
Chinese Communist Party and the Cultural Revolution in influencing the 
Hong Kong protests.21
‘Interpreting’ the 1967 riots is quite tricky because the monthly reports 
by the Hong Kong local Intelligence, as well as the police reports written 
in Summer and in Autumn, show a quite divergent view. Many examples 
based on official document could be carried out. An official report of the 
beginning of July 1967 concluded that there was no evidence of the ex-
istence of ‘terrorist’ organisations or organised violent groups, and the 
eventual choice of the Communist Party and organisations for the use of 
violence was a hypothetical possibility for the future as a consequence of 
the successful police repression of the disturbances, but in July 1967 is 
not a fact.22 Another official communication of the Hong Kong Police De-
partment to the governor Trench reported on the arrest of fifteen people 
reputed among the main ring leaders of the riots concluding there were 
no evidence of connections between them and the Communist Party.23 The 
official papers, especially the Police and Intelligence ones, definitely show 
a much slighter role of Hong Kong Communist organisations and permit 
to doubt about a strong involvement of China’s leadership.24
This ‘reading’ of the riots finds support in the analysis carried out by 
Ray Yep, where he demonstrates that Governor David Trench was himself 
convinced of the local origin of the riots as an outburst of rage for the 
worsening social situation. In May he wrote: “there is every indication that 
this [original industrial dispute] was a spontaneous incident”, although 
20 FCO 40/39/The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. Case study 
of Disturbances in Hong Kong 1967.
21 As a matter of fact, among dozens of intelligence and military reports, there is but one 
‘on-site’ report written by the Military Commander and responsible for Hong Kong security 
on the China border (he was new to Hong Kong, and he had been awarded with this role 
for very little time). He systematically denounced the Communist manoeuvres, their plots 
and infiltrations by Red Guards.
22 FCO 40/54/Tel. no. 1013/From Hong Kong (O.A.G.) to the Commonwealth Office/12 
July 1967.
23 FCO 40/54/Tel. no. 1425/From Hong Kong (O.A.G.) to the Commonwealth Office/18 
July 1967. 
24 From the Autumn 1967 and with more intensity in the beginning of 1968 Hong Kong 
local communists and their trade unions organised a campaign called ‘Return to work’ 
aimed at cooling down the protests and contrasting new waves of strikes. FCO 40/101, Ref. 
GEN/14/368/56, April 18, 1968. The Communist Campaign ‘Return to Work’ Policy.
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publicly he was already denouncing a strong involvement of the Commu-
nists.25 In his articles, Yep points out that Trench was eagerly pushing for 
a firm action and he succeeded in convincing the British Government to 
enact emergency measures by exploiting London’s uncertainty over the 
future of China and its lack of viable options in defending British interests 
(Bickers, Ray Yep 2009, 4-5, 21-36).
As far as the disorders towards Hong Kong and the British are con-
cerned, the Colony’s Intelligence and Police’s reports show that in the 
beginning of the Summer ’67 the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was in 
control and pushed back the most violent groups from the frontier. In June, 
the Guangdong authorities prohibited the posting of dazibao attacking 
British administration in Hong Kong, inviting Guangdong residents to dis-
regard such state-to-state relations, which undergo Beijing’s responsibil-
ity. The only violent fact, so far, remains the clash which happened on 8th 
July. Whereas the situation was still chaotic in many parts of Guangdong 
province, especially in rural areas, from July 1967 the central leadership 
and the PLA devoted a special attention to the frontier and actively inter-
vened to avoid new Red Guards’ demonstrations as confirmed by British 
border Intelligence reports.26
Finally, an important document of the British Treasury in August 1967 
maintained that Hong Kong was ‘the’ problem for British Government in 
1967. The document contains a further study on the potential consequenc-
es that a Chinese invasion of Hong Kong would bring about. The situation 
in Hong Kong was entirely dependent on the state of United Kingdom-
China relations: if they were reciprocally advantageous, there cannot be 
any real threat for Hong Kong. Considering that China obtained enormous 
benefits from exporting to Hong Kong and on the financial/monetary side, 
it would be highly unlikely that she would consciously ruin her interests 
by provoking a crisis/invasion. Of course, those observations were related 
to the official position, not to the actions carried out by ‘extremists’. The 
document negated that the riots could happen independently from Bei-
jing’s will. However, exactly for this reason, it concluded that there was 
no real threat, as any such action would heavily damage the Mainland 
economic interests.27
25 FO 40/45, Hong Kong to the Commonwealth Office, 7/5/1967, telegram no. 947.
26 FCO 40/101, Ref. TS 2/57 III-L.I.C. Monthly internal intelligence report: March (doc. no. 
15-14), April (doc. no. 18-17), May (doc. no. 21-20), June (doc. no. 25-24), July (doc. no. 26-27).
27 TNA, 317-902/Confidential/n°26/'Relations with China'/Annex2/F(E)Department/August 
1967.
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5 The Sterling Devaluation
When on 19 November 1967 at 1:30 a.m., London announced the decision 
to devaluate28 the sterling without any previous consultation or considera-
tion for the interests involved in Hong Kong, and the main worries in the 
Colony were related to the evident consequences on prices for the export, 
and for imports from Mainland China. The risk of inflation involved politi-
cal considerations: after 1966 and Spring ’67’s riots and strikes, Hong 
Kong government placed a great importance to the control of basic goods’ 
prices, the increasing of which was considered the main reason of the 
disturbances (Ray Yep 2008, 122-39).29 
Following the announcement, an Executive Council meeting was con-
vened to decide on the Colony’s response. During the afternoon of 19 No-
vember, Singapore and Malaysia announced that they were not going to 
follow the sterling. Their announcement opened the door to the protest of 
the HSBC representative in the Council meeting, supported by the Chinese 
members. The HSBC expressed for the first time a clear position in favor of 
the autonomy of Hong Kong’s economy and currency from British Govern-
ment decisions, manifesting its role as main actor and warrantor of China’s 
new economy in the international financial system (Peruzzi 2014, 279-81).
We can easily understand this lack of transparency. During 1966 and 
1967 officials of the Bank of England had frequently expressed their con-
cern for massive capital flight through Hong Kong. In late October 1967 
when D.F. Hubback of the Treasury met Chief Financial Officer John James 
Cowperthwaite in London, the latter reassures him: “Now that the Chi-
nese had relaxed their pressure, funds were returning to Hong Kong from 
Singapore and elsewhere”.30
Therefore, it is understandable that the attention focused on Hong Kong: 
being a Crown Colony, there was a way for the Bank of England to exert 
control, though only as an observer. The Bank could require information 
from financial institutions and other actors that performed exchange op-
erations. The Bank could also request information on bank deposits. Never-
28 On sterling crisis and devaluation: Cairncross, Eichengreen 1983; Strange 1971a, 302-
15; 1971b. 
29 The absolute relevance of the Hong Kong’s disorders from Autumn ’66 to Summer of 
’67 in determining extreme political and economic decisions of the Colony administration 
is well shown in Ray Yep’s research.
30 Sarcastically he underlined that he reputed much more realistic the eventuality of a 
‘sudden’ devaluation of the sterling than a Chinese threat to Hong Kong. T 295/240/Top 
Secret/ ‘Note on a Meeting in Mr Hubback’s Room, 2nd Floor, Treasury Chambers, Great 
George Street, SW1, on Friday 15th September 1967, at 10.15 a.m.’ At the meeting were 
presents: D.F. Hubback, J. Cowperthwaite (Financial Secretary of Hong Kong), H.P. Hall 
(Commonwealth Office), E.P. Haslam (Bank of England), A.K. Rawlinson, S.H. Wright, A.R. 
H. Glover (the last three for the Treasury). 
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theless, there was no legal obligation for the institutions to respond. They 
could release information on a voluntary basis. The Bank, therefore, had 
no means to independently verify whether such information was or not 
complete, neither could she sanction those who refused to share or those 
who gave partial or false information. It is interesting to note that the Bank 
of England would only activate her observer status in early 1967. She had 
not felt any need to do it before that date. But this was not enough and 
a limited power could not allow the Bank of England to act with rapidity 
avoiding the possible threats and consequences for the sterling devalua-
tion that she was secretly preparing till the end of 1966. 
In February 1967, the Bank of England and the Treasury Department 
started a discussion on the opportunity to enact a strategy to exert a 
strict control over those financial operations performed in Hong Kong 
that involved exchange of sterling into other currencies and capital ex-
port.31 An episode happened in 1941, when, due to the existence of the 
external menace of a Japanese invasion of the Colony, a series of Emer-
gency Regulatory Acts had been approved. Those regulations conferred 
the Colonial Government special powers, including the possibility to exert 
direct control over all exchange operations involving sterling and foreign 
currency fluxes. In 1941 the Colonial Government allowed the power to 
control the activities of all financial institutions including all British and 
foreign banks registered in the Colony. From these discussions, we can 
infer that in 1967, if the existence of a similar ‘external menace’ would be 
acknowledged and proved, the British authorities could have invoked the 
precedent, to declare the Emergency status, and confer special powers to 
the Bank of England. With such special powers, the Bank of England could 
have exerted direct control over exchange operations and preventing any 
possible threat in light of the impending devaluation.
In the years 1966-1967 Hong Kong detained the most relevant liquidity 
reserves in sterling outside the United Kingdom and part of such reserves 
was held at the Bank of England. The Colony regulations, and its financial 
structure, could potentially enable a real-time conversion of capitals in the 
event of sterling devaluation, because of the possibility to convert sterling 
into Hong Kong dollars and the latter into other currencies, without any con-
trol. Of course, the Bank of England and the Treasury observers felt this situ-
ation as a relevant potential threat for any successful devaluation initiative.
It is possible to advance a hypothesis on the fact that the Bank of Eng-
land and the Treasury in early 1967 found a way to adopt the emergency 
measures that were independently proposed by governor David Trench. 
It is very likely that to be fully accepted in London, such harsh measures 
had to be presented with a very good justification, for example a marked 
31 Bank of England, OV44/258.
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involvement of Beijing in the local disturbances. In case there appeared 
a clear evidence that the riots were orchestrated by Beijing, then this 
would have made an excellent motivation for the British Government to 
heavily intervene in Hong Kong, enacting emergency measures and strict 
controls over the movement of capitals. Having proved the existence of 
an ‘external menace’, in July 1967 the Colony was able to enact the Emer-
gency Regulatory Acts, which included special powers in financial matters 
and the possibility for the Bank of England to control exchange and other 
financial operations by invoking the 1941 episode (Bickers, Ray Yep 2009; 
Ray Yep 2008).32
6 Conclusions
When London devalued sterling in 1967, the way this operation was con-
ducted as far as Hong Kong is regarded, shows that British Government 
and the United Kingdom’s main banking institution, harboured many 
doubts on Hong Kong’s trustworthiness. The decision to devaluate sterling 
without allowing Hong Kong to prepare for this eventuality derived from a 
clear aim: blocking the main channel whereby the money exited from the 
British economic empire. The conclusion is that the financial world was 
already projected towards a new era and new protagonists, they could 
foresee already in 1967 that the times were ripe for a new balance ruled 
by the United States and for the ascent of China as a world player. Hong 
Kong was already part of this new balance, whereas the United Kingdom 
had met the obstacles of new players and was just undergoing a difficult 
economic reshuffle, which would lead the country to largely abandon the 
manufacturing sector for services. Whereas the British business and finan-
cial community had a clear idea on how to address such issues, the London 
Government and the Bank of England were not prepared to change, nor to 
rephrase their relationship with the Crown Colony of Hong Kong. 
The year 1967 marks the acquisition of a new consciousness by the Hong 
Kong financial and industrial milieus: from then on, the Colony will turn her 
back to United Kingdom and direct her gaze right towards the Mainland.
On 1967 turmoil and riots there was no official inquiry. Both London 
Government and British Colonial administration in Hong Kong decided 
which was the nature and origins of the disturbances. They gave an official 
and political vulgata, which established there was no need to know more 
about the protests. About 1966 events a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission 
investigated every little aspect of the riots with quite limited results for 
ten months, but for a much larger and relevant episode as the May-August 
32 FO 40/45, Hong Kong to the Commonwealth Office, 7/5/1967, telegram no. 947.
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disturbances of 1967 no enquiry at all was done. The official interpreta-
tion became the mainstream representation and narrative of the facts of 
that year, and still today it is. Even a superficial reading of the archives 
materials gives way to a doubtfully view of this consolidated interpreta-
tion. The bulk of memorials and interviews with witnesses or journalistic 
reconstructions33 often show their agreements with the official interpreta-
tions but nevertheless contradictions with the archives documents remain 
in evidence (Ka-wai Cheung 2009).
If the riots were the expression of a Beijing will to subvert the Brit-
ish power in Hong Kong, as a prelude to a Communist invasion of the 
Colony, as the British authorities said, so the Emergency Act of July 1967 
was justified. The financial control measures and the powers given to the 
Bank of England with the new regulatory act were assumed in a context 
of security measures intended to defend the Colony from an invasion. 
Was it by chance that these were exactly the powers the Bank of England 
needed to guarantee the success of the programmed devaluation? In 1967, 
were the Hong Kong riots a precious opportunity for British interests? It 
is not yet possible to give a certain answer to this question but certainly 
we could underline the evidence of the connection between the riots and 
the financial measures adopted. If in 1967 sterling devaluation was the 
central strategic issue for the United Kingdom Government, in the long 
run the success in achieving this aim represented also the beginning of 
the end of British power in Hong Kong. The crucial year of 1967 created 
a definitive fracture between the colonial power and the workers of the 
Colony. Their protest was successfully repressed but resentments against 
the British rule rose up and survived. On the other side, in the same year 
the local financial and industrial interests were heavily damaged by the 
sterling devaluation. Local economic lobbies were humiliated by the means 
used to achieve the aim and by the arrogance of British Government in as-
suming such important decisions without any considerations for the local 
priorities. The 1967’s Hong Kong emergency was successfully managed 
by the British colonial authorities, but maybe their success was the first 
step of the loss of their power. 
33 Among them Cheung’s book is one of the more interesting. 
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France Facing the People’s Republic of China 
(1949-1964) 
A Policy of Economic Relations Under Control
Thierry Robin
(Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France)
Abstract This contribution brings to light a French policy widely subjected to the Indo-Chinese 
interests, to the multilateral system of control of the exchanges and, more globally, to the American 
politics. The attitude of the French government is marked with the seal of the opportunism, and by 
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The Gaullist decision of January 1964 to create diplomatic relations with the PRC takes place in a 
phase of intensification of the economic, technical and commercial relations.
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Even before the end of World War II, the French government had set itself 
ambitious targets regarding its policy in Asia: to regain its presence and 
role in Indochina followed by China. Though France emerged from the War 
greatly weakened and with a shattered morale, it still retained significant 
economic and financial interests in China. Franco-Chinese relations con-
tinued to be strained till 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists lost 
power, and the passage from the pre-War ‘dominant/dominated’ relations 
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(the concession and unequal rights)1 to a more egalitarian one proved dif-
ficult. The transition, which continued all through 1949, required much 
haggling between Chinese and French authorities, especially regarding 
the transfer of rights and properties in the former concessions of Canton, 
Shanghai, Tientsin2 and Hankow – all within the context of an ongoing civil 
war between nationalists and communists, widespread corruption, soaring 
inflation and currency depreciation.
In 1949, some 110 French enterprises and 1300 nationals,3 mostly in 
Shanghai and Tientsin, still remained. To this were added investments 
amounting to 248 million US dollars,4 which nevertheless represented 
less than 6% of total French foreign investments. They were often direct, 
for the creation of branch offices or independent enterprises – the major-
ity being trading companies or other closely linked enterprises such as 
financial establishments (35%, 87 million dollars) and transport companies 
(34%, 85 million). A significant number of French tradesmen and corporate 
bosses working in China did not see the communists coming to power as a 
catastrophe and believed that they would be able to work with the new Chi-
nese leaders who they hoped would be less corrupt than the nationalists 
and more likely to tame the inflation and instability that was vitiating the 
business climate. The growing Chinese economy was expected to provide 
lucrative business opportunities to Western enterprises.5 
1 China had been subjected to the so-called ‘unequal treaties’ imposed by Western pow-
ers in the aftermath of the Opium Wars of 1840-1860. French territorial and economic 
privileges took the form of concessions, enclaves within Chinese territory that, for the 
Chinese, symbolised their subjection to foreign rule. France had four concessions, at Can-
ton, Shanghai, Tientsin and Hankow, and had administrative rights in the international 
concessions of Shanghai and Amoy and in the Peking Legation Quarter as well. Territori-
ally, it administered the leased Bay of Canton area and had annexed the islands of Hainan 
and Spratly in the South China Sea. Moreover, France had acquired the concession of the 
Yunnan railroad and the attached privileges in 1898. From 1910, the railway line linked 
Haiphong, in Tonkin, to Yunnanfu (later Kunming), capital of the Yunnan province, allow-
ing the diverting, via the port of Haiphong, of a portion of South-West China’s trade to the 
coastal cities in French Indochina. Thus, France wielded some influence in the Yunnan, 
the gateway to French Indochina. France also controlled, in partnership, some major pub-
lic services such as tax collection, customs and the postal service, whose director was a 
Frenchman. This in theory allowed it to guarantee the repayment of many Chinese loans 
underwritten by French investors. 
2 In keeping with the traditional system, the more common proper names have been re-
tained the way they were written in those days: Tientsin, Canton, etc.
3 The reports generated from the Consular surveys undertaken in China in 1946 and in 
1947 allow us to draw a rather precise map of French interests in China.
4 This amount is for the year 1931 (the last year for which we have data). 
5 Note of 11 January 1949 a/s. Repercussions of Communist China’s victory on our interests 
in the Far East; Aide-mémoire of 2 February 1949 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Asia-
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During the final months of the nationalist regime in continental China, 
the French government began planning, not without misgivings, its stance 
towards a future Communist China. When the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) was founded in October 1949, French policy consisted in recognis-
ing the Republic of China (Formosa), as governed by the exiled nationalist 
party and not having any official political relations with the PRC. It is in 
this light that there arises the question of France’s manoeuvring room for 
developing contacts and business relations with Communist China (Qu 
2005; Robin 2013a). 
From 1949 to 1955, these bilateral economic relations were marked 
by the French government’s continued stance regarding the PRC and 
its refusal to establish political and diplomatic relations in the context 
of strong international tensions and restrictive economic embargoes. All 
through this period, the French government retained a policy of discrete 
but systematic control in its relations with the PRC. 
The year 1956 finally saw the first inflexion point in these relations, 
though without any actual break. With the tacit consent of the French gov-
ernment, a mission was sent to China, which had to set up a commercial 
framework between the two countries for the medium term. Gradually, 
from 1956 to 1964, trade grew and collaborations diversified. More or 
less unofficial means permitted the exploitation of this development and 
a growing number of private players began to forge business links with 
Peking till the French finally decided to establish diplomatic relations with 
the PRC in 1964.
1 From 1949 to 1955, Franco-Chinese Economic Relations  
Were Frozen in a Tight Embargo which Nothing Seemed 
Likely to Loosen
1.1 The Gradual Implementation of an Economic Embargo  
(1949 to End 1951)
The Communist regime that came to power in continental China in October 
1949 broke away from the existing network of alliances, especially with 
the United States. Moreover, it seemed quite capable of threatening the 
foreign economic interests on Chinese soil. Thus, the question of what at-
titude to adopt regarding the new power took on some urgency.
Oceania Division) to the British Embassy in Paris; Report of 1 February 1949 on Tientsin by 
M. Aiby, Banque de l’Indochine.
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Great Britain’s stance was that of keeping a foot in the door6 so as to 
keep Communist China outside the ambit of USSR and retain its economic 
and financial interests there. The United States, France and Great Britain 
wanted to take a common stand regarding their future relations with the 
Communist regime in China. Still, the United States recalled some of its 
diplomatic agents from China and evacuated its nationals from the summer 
of 1949. Great Britain on the other hand sought to preserve its economic 
interests and Hong Kong. Furthermore, the wishes of some Commonwealth 
States, especially India, had to be taken into account. The latter therefore 
reconciled itself to accepting the authorities in Peking and ultimately of-
ficially recognising the PRC in January 1950 (Porter 1967, 34).7
As for the French government, it had begun to define, from the begin-
ning of 1949, the strategy it wanted to employ: to liaise with its Western 
allies, be opportunistic and retain its presence.8 Towards the end of sum-
mer 1949, France strove to maintain a balance between nationalists and 
communists (Robin 2013b). Though the French government was unhappy 
with the United States’ hostility towards the PRC, it was even more worried 
about the recognition accorded by the British to ‘Red China’. Not having 
recognised the new regime, France ran the risk of appearing hostile to 
a PRC that could constitute a serious threat to Indochina with which it 
shared 1,200 kilometres of common boundary on its south: what if these 
new masters of China decided to launch military incursions into their 
neighbour? (Qu 2005, 92). The French government’s primary motivation 
was to preserve Indochina and its frontiers with China. French policy be-
gan as ‘Indochinese’ before becoming ‘Chinese’. 
While Indochina was the determining factor, there was also the French 
government’s consideration for, and agreement with, the representatives 
of several enterprises with interests in China9 who wanted to remain. To 
leave would be never to return or, at the least, with great difficulty. On 7 
February 1949, Hubert Rosier, Director of Olivier, one of the largest import-
export companies dealing with China, wrote that, despite the increased 
bureaucracy compared to that of the nationalist regime, the communists 
could “nevertheless offer better opportunities. […] Everything points to the 
fact that all these efforts are about to bear fruit. […] Far from withdrawing, 
6 British Aide-mémoire Submitted on 4 January 1949 Far Eastern Situation.
7 Memorandum by Mr. Bevin on Recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, 1949; 
Aide-mémoire Submitted on 31 October 1949 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding 
Great Britain’s Recognition of the Government in Peking.
8 Aide-mémoire of 2 February 1949 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Asia-Oceania Divi-
sion) to the British Embassy in Paris.
9 Note of 11 January 1949 a/s. Repercussions of Communist China’s victory on our interests 
in the Far East; Report of 1 February 1949 on Tientsin by M. Aiby, Banque de l’Indochine.
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private French companies in China are determined to stay and continue in 
the certitude that conditions are bound to improve in the coming years”.10 
William Wecter, the Franco-Chinese Bank’s agent in China, was also op-
timistic in his report of 6 October 1949 to his Parisian headquarters: “As 
regards future prospects, it would seem that France is well placed to do 
business with the new regime [...]. All the official declarations point to the 
fact that China has an immense and urgent need for industrial equipment 
and the Russians are not able to meet all their needs – if indeed they want 
to!”.11 Good days were seemingly around the corner.
Yet another issue was the PRC’s ambition to be appointed to the UNO’s 
Security Council, something that the United States was adamantly op-
posed to. In this matter, France maintained an identical stand. With the 
outbreak of the Korean War in autumn 1950 and the intervention of Chi-
nese ‘volunteers’, Communist China’s efforts at being accepted into the 
Security Council seemed doomed to failure with France voting consistently 
to thwart any such eventuality (Qu 2005, 199-201).12 As with the other 
Western countries, France had little room to manoeuvre – the Cold War, 
begun in 1947, had divided the world into two major camps, the West, led 
by the United States against the Socialists (the USSR and PRC mainly). The 
Korean War greatly heightened tensions, especially with China leaping so 
belligerently into the fray. It was difficult not to be loyal to one’s alliances, 
to Formosa, to the United States and to the West in general. 
Moreover, the War also imposed strict constraints to exports to China in 
1950. The unilateral measures taken by the United States against China 
were gradually and reluctantly adopted by the other countries, including 
Great Britain and France. After America decided, in December 1950, to 
place China under an economic blockade, France found it impossible to 
have any future political relations with Peking and trade was made very dif-
ficult. The strategic capital goods contracts could no longer be honoured. 
The year 1951 saw this blockade against the PRC becoming complete with 
the initiative taken by the United States, under the aegis of UNO, to add 
a China-specific clause to the COCOM13 (a system of trade restrictions 
against the Eastern Bloc set up in 1949) (Yasuhara 1991).
10 Letter of 7 February 1949 from Hubert Rosier Director of Olivier China.
11 Letter of 6 October 1949 from William Wecter, Representative of the Banque franco-
chinoise in China, to the Headquarters of the Bank.
12 Dispatch No. 93 of 21 February 1950 from Jean Chauvel, Ambassador of France, Chief of 
the French Delegation to the United Nations to Robert Schuman a.s. Representing China to 
the Various Organs of the United Nations; Telegram no. 57-61 of 9 January 1950 from Paris to 
RP at UN (Paris); Telegram no. 545-548 of 30 March 1950 from Diplomatie Paris to Chauve.
13 COordinating COmmittee for Multilateral expert control.
122 Robin. France Facing the People’s Republic of China (1949-1964)
Roads to Reconciliation, 117-138
1.2 The Economic Conference of Moscow and the USSR’s Attempt  
at Opening the Embargo (1952)
The restriction to international trade proved very painful to the Eastern 
Bloc. The USSR tried to loosen the restraints by launching a propaganda 
offensive, a sort of economic equivalent of the Stockholm Appeal,14 in the 
form of the Economic Conference of Moscow in April 1952.15 Its aim was 
to resume trade between the East and the West and to widen the rift be-
tween the United States and its allies regarding international trade and 
the embargo. 
The PRC saw its trade relations with Western countries decline dras-
tically after 1949 to the benefit of COMECON16 member states. While 
some roundabout trade and smuggling poked holes in the embargo, the 
PRC found itself increasingly dependent on the USSR, especially after 
1951, and mainly for consumer and capital goods. Meanwhile, the Korean 
conflict was proving very expensive for the Chinese and the USSR found 
itself increasingly limited in its role as a supplier to the Chinese not only 
because of the trade restrictions, but also due to its own developmental 
needs. The lifting of the embargo was thus a major objective of the Eco-
nomic Conference of Moscow where contacts were indeed made between 
Chinese officials and French enterprises.
Two-thirds of the French delegation (36 members) were businessmen 
like Jean-Baptiste Doumeng, President of agricultural cooperatives and 
boss of Interagra, Jean-Baptiste Chatain, Director of Potasses d’Alsace 
and Campenon-Bernard, Michel Goldschmidt, importer and exporter of 
cereals and Charles Hilsum, Director of the Banque commerciale des pays 
de l’Europe du Nord (BCEN). 
Of these, special mention must be made of Jean-Baptiste Doumeng and 
Charles Hilsum. Hilsum largely built his career at BCEN, where he became 
CEO after the War. Under Hilsum the BCEN came to be nicknamed ‘Bank 
of Moscow’ because of its close ties with the Soviet State and the PCF 
(Parti Communiste français) and its quasi-monopoly over the capital flows 
14 The Stockholm Appeal of March 1950, presented as apolitical, wanted to turn the public 
opinion in Europe against the American nuclear arms policy. It was launched by the World 
Peace Council, an arm of the Supporters of Peace or the Peace Movement that, from the 
beginning of 1948, had brought together celebrities and intellectuals, often Communist, 
but not only. French physicist Frédéric Joliot-Curie was the first signatory of the Stockholm 
Appeal as President of the World Peace Council.
15 Economists for Peace Conference at Moscow October 1951-April 1952; Economists for 
Peace Congress April 1952-July 1952.
16 COMECON or CAEM, acronym for Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, created by 
Stalin in 1949 as an organisation for mutual economic assistance between the Communist 
bloc countries.
Roads to Reconciliation, 117-138
Robin. France Facing the People’s Republic of China (1949-1964) 123
between France and the USSR (Gomart 2003, 80-4). As for Doumeng, he 
was the most important French businessman in Moscow. Called the ‘Red 
billionaire’, he formed a Union of over 200 agricultural cooperatives of the 
South-West (cereals, meat, wines, fruits and vegetables). He was also CEO 
of Interagra, an export company for the agricultural cooperatives of the 
South-West. He was helped initially by Charles Hilsum and began doing 
business with the East in 1945-1946. 
On its side, the Chinese delegation included some prominent figures 
such as Nan Hanchen, President of the People’s Bank and of the National 
Import and Export Company of China (CNIEC), a State body with a mo-
nopoly on Chinese foreign trade. There was also Lei Renmin, Vice-Minister 
of Commerce, Lu Suchang, Director of CNIEC, as well as other important 
banking, industrial and trade representatives. 
The meeting between the two delegations resulted in tentative contracts 
valued at 4 million pounds sterling each way (Lipkin 2011). Doumeng 
signed on behalf of all the French enterprises present in Moscow while Lu 
Suchang represented his side. The following goods were to be exported by 
France to the PRC: metals, chemical products, textiles, industrial equip-
ment and raw material. In return, China was to provide France with tea, 
vegetable oils, silk, manganese and handicraft. Moreover, the Chinese 
delegates extended an invitation to their French counterparts to come to 
China and to resume their bilateral trade relations. The Economic Confer-
ence of Moscow would thus seem to have been a success for the USSR 
and the Communist bloc. 
1.3 America’s Reaction: Creation of CHINCOM (September 1952)
Wary of the danger to the cohesion of the Western Alliance, the United 
States quickly set up CHINCOM (China Committee) to further constrain 
trade with the PRC. Up till then, the COCOM lists were applied against 
all Communist countries except Yugoslavia and Cuba (Cohen, Dernberger, 
Garson 1971). As for the PRC, the member States of the COCOM had 
agreed, in the summer of 1950, to impose the same restrictions to it as 
to the Communist countries in Europe. Nevertheless, in the wake of the 
Moscow Conference, the United States pressured its allies for more strin-
gent action against China. Two factors were in play: 
 – first, the Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict had raised the 
issue of treating Communist China differently as it now concerned a 
country that was in direct military conflict with the United States. CO-
COM members adopted special provisions against the PRC by drawing 
up longer and more stringent banned product lists as compared to the 
rest of the socialist camp. When the Korean conflict escalated, there 
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arose the question of creating an ad hoc committee specialised in 
matters of trade with China and North Korea, different from COCOM.
 – Second was the impending change in Japan’s statutes coupled with 
its geographic and strategic position in the context of the Korean 
conflict. Under American occupation since 1945, it was to regain its 
independence on 22 April 1952.17 From January 1951, all Japanese 
exports to the PRC that came under the restricted list had to have 
the approval of the occupying authorities.18 When this responsibility 
reverted to Japan, it had to be integrated into the Western bloc, the 
embargo and COCOM. 
Under pressure from the United States, a special list regarding China was 
drawn up in July 1952 and imposed on Great Britain, France, Canada and 
Japan. In September, a committee within the framework of the COCOM 
was especially created to oversee, define and supervise trade restrictions 
with China and North Korea: the China Committee (CHINCOM). In the 
spring of 1953, this new organisation drew up a list of some 400 categories 
of articles whose export to China would be banned or restricted – double 
that of the COCOM (Cain 1994, 1995, 2007; Brada, Wipf 1974; Cohen, 
Dernberger, Garson 1971; Mastanduno 1992; Shu 2001). Washington had 
thus succeeded in its economic war against China, an offensive that now 
consisted of four layers: the restrictions set by the Americans, the COCOM, 
the CHINCOM and the UNO.
1.4 The Determined Stance Taken by the French Government  
from 1952 to 1955
While the American government remained intransigently hostile to the 
PRC, the French seemed, at first, to be swayed by the results obtained in 
the Moscow Conference. 
At the Ministerial Council of 26 April 1952, Robert Schuman, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, noted that “The French who had been to Moscow had 
come back rather impressed. […] There will certainly be some excitement 
regarding the revival of business, especially those afflicted by unemploy-
ment. […] The question is whether we would accept the embargo of certain 
products. We will need to come to an understanding with the English and 
17 The date of the entry into force of the Treaty of San Francisco signed by the United 
States and its allies (8 September 1951).
18 The SCAP (Supreme Command for the Allied Powers). This clause was reinforced by the 
necessity of obtaining an authorisation from SCAP for the export of any strategic product, 
whatever be the destination country, in order to eliminate the risk of a re-export resulting 
in the circumvention of the embargo.
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then approach the Americans for lifting certain restrictions” (Auriol 1978, 
284). Obviously, the French government thought that there were economic 
advantages to be gained by meeting the Chinese representatives. But 
Schuman was soon to realise that Communist-led enterprises wanted to 
have a monopoly over the trade with China. 
The procedure envisaged in Moscow was that negotiations would be 
conducted in East Berlin so that definitive commercial contracts could be 
signed. After the conclusion of the Conference, Jean-Baptiste Doumeng 
made several trips to finalise contracts. Meanwhile, in the background, 
a fierce rivalry was underway between Interagra and those companies 
that had been dealing for long with China such as Olivier-Chine, Rondon, 
Denis Frères and Optorg. These latter enjoyed a privileged position in 
Franco-Chinese trade and were loath to see the arrival of competitors, 
especially those led by Communists – all being very aware of the close ties 
that Doumeng had with the USSR. No wonder then that these traditional 
companies refused to have to go via Interagra to trade with the PRC. Real-
ising that the CNIEC would grant import-export licences only to Interagra 
sponsored companies that would give it a de facto monopoly on all trade 
with the PRC, the French government vetoed all import-export licenses. 
Ultimately, most of the agreements concluded in Moscow did not pan out, 
but the failure of this attempt at a monopoly finally led the authorities of 
both China and France to initiate the process of forging direct commercial 
links between the two countries. 
The first Conference of Geneva (June-July 1954) could very well have 
facilitated these relations, especially in view of China’s and especially Zhou 
Enlai’s moderating stance vis-à-vis the Vietminh for putting an end to the 
Indochina War. Sanctioned by the French Foreign Office, French business 
leaders and Chinese officials had numerous meetings.19 Lei Renmin, Vice-
Minister of Foreign Trade, who was present in Geneva along with many 
experts, was the mainstay and part initiator. He met with Robert Tabouis, 
Director of the Compagnie française de télégraphie sans fil (TSF) (Qu 2005, 
312), M. Vicaire, Deputy General Manager of the Aciéries du Creusot,20 de 
Pavloksky, Director of Le Matériel technique and Rondon representatives 
Chassier and Muller.21 These contacts though had few concrete results. 
19 Note of 22 June 1954 – The Development of Franco-Chinese Economic Relations after 
1949.
20 Schneider’s presence in Geneva was requested by Zhou Enlai and the Chinese Com-
merce Minister. Telegram no. 329 of 6 May 1954 from the Delegation to the Conference of 
Geneva to President Bidault.
21 The presence of Lei Renmin, along with numerous experts in Geneva, led to a multitude 
of contracts with private enterprises of all nationalities, sending a shiver of excitement 
through the European business community. Many were the missions and delegations which 
wanted to meet the Chinese officials, especially those in charge of foreign trade. The Chi-
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Nevertheless, we can point to a Chinese participation in the Lyon Fair of 
April 1955 as well as a visit by Chinese technicians to France in March of 
the same year. The latter was led by Zhang Xinchen, Vice-President of the 
CNIEC and was comprised of experts in electronics, telecommunication 
and mechanical equipment. Its composition was the result of the meetings 
held in Geneva between Lei Renmin and the Director of TSF of France 
and the Deputy General Manager of the Aciéries du Creusot.22 It was at 
the instance of the Franco-Asiatic Chamber of Commerce23 that the CNIEC 
delegation was invited by two of its members, the Compagnie française de 
TSF and Schneider. This visit of Chinese technicians initiated, for France, 
a movement that the PRC would replicate often in the coming years: tech-
nical information-gathering missions to hi-tech, exceptional installations. 
In the political domain, relations remained conventional and prudent. In 
the weeks following the Geneva Conference, various organisations were 
invited to China, but they were mainly either Communist or Communist-
inspired associations and movements. Though some visa applications were 
granted by the French government in response to the demands of private 
actors who were impatient to forge or renew their ties with China, others 
were refused, like those for the delegates of the Pan-Chinese Athletics 
Federation who had been invited by the Sports and Gymnastics Works Fed-
eration for its 20th anniversary (from 17 to 26 December 1954) because of 
the exclusively political nature of the event (the FSGT was Communist).24 
Visas were only granted on a case-by-case basis.
nese trade delegation thus had discussions with delegations and businessmen from Italy 
(13 June 1954), Belgium (especially representatives of the railways, the steel industry and 
import-export houses), Netherlands (three meetings in three weeks: 9, 10 and 29 June). In 
the beginning of September 1954, China also invited a West German trade mission to visit 
the PRC. In the case of the Netherlands, these contacts were also an occasion to begin the 
process for establishing diplomatic relations: the arrival in Peking of a Dutch delegation 
to negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations (26 May) preceded the first trade 
negotiations (from 9 June). 
22 After its arrival on 24 March 1955, the team made many visits, especially to factories 
and industrial enterprises such as the Génissiat power plant, Europe’s first major hydro-
electric station. The importance of such an installation for China cannot be overstated.
23 The Franco-Asian Chamber of Commerce was established in April 1925 as an associa-
tion under law of 1901 with the aim of aiding in the creation, development and improve-
ment of the economic, trade, maritime and intellectual relations between France and Asian 
countries. It lent its support to enterprises, facilitated transactions and other related pro-
cesses between importers and exporters, provided relevant documentation and information, 
organised conferences and study trips, gave its views on questions of trade legislation. In 
1955, Hubert Rosier, Director of the Olivier company, was its President.
24 File of 17 December 1954 for the Secretary of State Regarding Chinese Nationals or 
Organizations Who Had Asked for or Received French Visas.
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Pressure on the government mounted in the wake of a mission to China 
undertaken by the Conseil de la République25 led by Edmond Michelet (20 
to 25 September 1955). Though from different political parties, the par-
liamentarians all agreed that there was a need to “strengthen economic 
ties while at the same time knowing that they cannot progress far [...] in 
the absence of diplomatic relations […]. Should we always be the last? 
[...] Also this must not be some off-hand relationship. China, dare we say, 
would like to be a spouse and not a concubine. Let us not forget that our 
‘recognition’ would have no value if we are the last.”26 On their return, the 
parliamentarians went on a veritable publicity campaign, exhorting the 
Conseil de la République and the public via the press to recognise the PRC. 
A second parliamentary mission, this time from the National Assembly, 
quickly followed (19 October). The deputies were received for two hours 
by Zhou Enlai, who told them of his desire to resume diplomatic relations, 
adding: “we believe that we could always begin, as a preparatory phase, 
by developing commercial and cultural relations. There is a proverb which 
says that when the water arrives, the trench gets made.”27 Concerning the 
economic issue, Zhou Enlai hoped “that France would embark on the road 
to full diplomatic relations with China as well sing a ‘semi-official’ trade 
agreement between the two countries” (Qu 2005, 337). This would be the 
role of the French trade mission of 1956. Meanwhile, on the political front, 
the French government, under pressure from the Americans, retained its 
stern stance and refused to recognise the PRC.
2 From 1956 to 1964, Franco-Chinese Trade and Collaborations 
Grew and Diversified. Unofficial Means Began to be Set Up, 
Involving a Growing Number of Players
2.1 The ‘Henri Rochereau’ Trade Mission to China (1956)
A French economic mission, led by Henri Rochereau, member of the Con-
seil de la République, was sent to China from 23 January to 20 February 
1956. Officially non-public and private in nature, its preparation and pro-
25 Name of the Upper House under the 4th Republic.
26 Report File in the Name of the Coordinating Committee for Studying the Problems 
Regarding Business in Indochina and on the Mission Sent to Indochina and China from 5 to 
27 September 1955, Presented to the Conseil de la République on 28 February 1956 by M. 
Michelet, 200)
27 Conclusions of the Mission Extracts of the Minutes of the Audience Granted by Zhou 
Enlai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC to the Members of the Mayer Delegation on 1st 
November 1955.
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gress were followed closely by the government. In fact, it was the first 
time that the government had given its official approval for a business 
visit to China. Though this mission had been envisaged towards the end 
of the Geneva Conference, it was only now that it could be realised. It 
is no coincidence that the first diplomatic documents that talk of it are 
dated end July 1955, the same time that the United States agreed to hold 
Ambassador-level discussions with China.28 
The mission marked the first direct contact with the Chinese administration 
and technology ministers since the founding of the PRC (Robin 2013c)29 such 
as the Ministry of Foreign Trade (including its Export Division), the National 
Planning Commission, the Committee for the Development of Foreign Trade, 
the National Import Export Company of China (CNIEC), Bank of China, etc. 
The second gain was the signing of several firm contracts,30 the initia-
tion of others and the creation of business leads.31 The Rochereau mission 
brought an end to the contractual agreement system that had been in 
place since 1949. In fact, the government did not impose any limit on the 
trade amount, nor even that it had to be balanced. On the Chinese side, 
though “the oft-repeated official stand was that the trade be balanced, in 
practice, Chinese authorities did not seem to give any thought to this in 
their dealing with the members of the mission. In fact, the total volume of 
French exports concluded during the stay of the mission, was double that 
of Chinese imports.”32 It would seem the delegation made full use of this 
freedom from having to balance the trade. 
28 Note of 28 July 1955 for the Minister a.s. Development of contacts with the PRC. On 25 
July 1955, two bulletins, published simultaneously in Washington and Peking, announced 
that the two governments, American and Chinese, had decided to raise the level of the 
discussions taking place in Geneva from the consular to the Ambassadorial level (between 
Alexis Johnson and Wang Bingnan). The object of these discussions was the repatriation of 
certain categories of civilians who had been detained or retained in China and the United 
States. As the establishment of diplomatic relations did not figure in these discussions, 
French policy remained unchanged.
29 Annexe I of the Agreement, List of Names of the Chinese who had Participated in the 
Negotiations with the French Mission, 1956; Note of 22 February 1956 of Beaulieux (DEFA 
of the MAE, Hong Kong) to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, from Rochereau.
30 Firm import contract amounting to 350 million francs were concluded, including 20 
million for oil seeds and 220 for tea. Firm export contracts amounting to about two billion 
francs were signed, which included mainly chemicals, pharmaceuticals and dyes (900 mil-
lion), textiles such as combed wool, rayon thread (400 million), small mechanical equipment 
and tires for light motor vehicles (300 million). 
31 500 million more in import were expected, including 300 in silk and 25 in oil seeds. As 
regards export, the delegation bagged specific orders worth a billion francs more which 
could be met in the short term. They included 500 million in watches, 350 million in combed 
wool, 100 million in embroidery thread and 50,000 tonnes of sugar.
32 Information Report no. 570 of the Conseil de la République, Annexe to the Minutes of 
the Meeting of 27 June 1956, 14.
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A financial arrangement between the two central banks and the payment 
modalities for the commercial transactions eliminated some of the hurdles 
encountered hitherto in trade with Communist China. This financial proto-
col included using the Franc for Franco-Chinese trade and the transferable 
Franc regime. As a matter of fact, up till then, Chinese authorities had 
held back business considerably and “imposed unequal risks, with only 
the Western traders having to bear all consequences.”33
Finally, the Chinese authorities were also to host a group of engineers 
who would study, over the long term, the French participation in the con-
struction of major industrial installations.
In his report presented on 27 June 1956 to the Conseil de la République, 
Henri Rochereau prophesied: “A day will come when, after normal diplo-
matic relations are re-established and China joins the UNO, these kinds of 
negotiations would no longer be unusual. We will then have to sit across the 
table on equal terms with men of the first rank, experts in business affairs, 
combining the natural finesse of the Chinese with a Marxist dialectic. We 
must from now begin to look for capable negotiators if we want to come out 
ahead in the discussions which will no doubt prove to be extremely difficult”.34
Meanwhile, the year 1956 saw, for the first time since the War, a trade bal-
ance tipped in favour of France35 as well as a significant quantitative growth. 
In billion Francs 1,949 1,955 1,956
Imports 1.495 4.414 5.292
Exports 0.721 2.635 7.976
2.2 A Growing Number of Official Meetings with Representatives  
of Communist China
The PRC tried to gain, gradually, greater commercial autonomy. It tried to 
circumvent the international embargo by forging de facto trade relations 
with French officials and business leaders, especially those who had been 
present in Geneva in 1954. Both countries sought, as discretely as pos-
sible – so as not to displease either the USSR on one side, or the USA on 
the other – to find new ways of conducting business.
In summer 1955, France decided to activate the contacts established 
in Geneva a year previously. Considering the sensitive nature of the rela-
33 Note of 25 January 1956 from R. Grimaud, Commercial Advisor in Hong Kong, to DREE 
Subject: Hong Kong Visit of the Private Economic Mission to China. 
34 Information Report no. 570 of the Conseil de la République, ordinary session of 1955-
1956, Annexe to the Minutes of the Meeting of 27 June 1956, 8-9)
35 French Customs Statistical Yearbooks, 1949-1956.
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tions with China, the contacts needed to remain discrete and unofficial. 
The understanding between China and France was that Berne would be 
the meeting place for cultural, visa and specific issues. London, Berne 
and Berlin were ‘dedicated’ to commercial relations. In practice, Berlin 
was rarely used while Berne attracted the lion’s share because both the 
PRC and France had embassies there.36 It must be noted that this mode 
of communication was in no way exclusive to Franco-Chinese relations 
and that the Swiss capital hosted many such meetings between Chinese 
officials and their counterparts and businessmen from many other West 
European countries. 
The establishment of official relations between France and China marked 
the beginning of a period of increasing contacts and bilateral relations 
between the two countries, with the Rochereau mission being the most 
important example. At the same time, numerous economic actors, enter-
prises, federations and professional syndicates were eager to gain access 
to the Chinese market which was thought to be very promising.
2.3 The Disappearance of CHINCOM in 1957
Meanwhile, the last few French enterprises and assets in China were being 
liquidated, such as the Banque de l’Indochine (whose remaining branch 
offices closed in 1957), as part of the general drive towards the nationali-
sation of industrial assets. The end of business within China marked, no 
doubt, the real beginning of business with China. 
As for the COCOM, though the Americans had succeeded in imposing its 
views regarding the embargo on its allies from 1950 to 1953 (Mastanduno 
1992), the tables were completely turned from 1954 onwards, when it was 
the allies who gradually began to assert themselves.37 Thus, in keeping 
with the improving international situation, European nations initiated a 
series of meetings to revise the COCOM embargo lists and to rescind many 
non-military items (Brada, Wipf 1974). 
The same question arose for CHINCOM, which the United States had 
managed to enforce upon its allies in 1954 and 1955.38 Starting from Janu-
ary 1956, a series of summit-level meetings between American President 
Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Eden showed how diametrically 
opposed the two camps were (Shu 2001, 178). The United Kingdom’s politi-
36 The Swiss Confederation officially recognised the PRC in January 1950 and established 
diplomatic relations on 14 September of the same year. 
37 The armistice agreement of Panmunjom that ended the Korean War was signed on 27 
July 1953.
38 Even though a country like Great Britain enjoyed an increasing number of exemptions.
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cal and economic interests no longer allowed it to support the China dif-
ferential in that difficult economic context which, moreover, also penalised 
Malaysia and Hong Kong. No amount of British pressure had any impact 
on the American administration, especially as the latter was dealing with 
a Congress that was firmly opposed to any relaxation of the embargo. In 
the summer of 1956, the British decided to change tack and to try and 
convince the other allies into abolishing CHINCOM. The Suez Crisis put 
paid to all such thoughts and compelled the United Kingdom to avoid any 
further friction with the United States. The year 1956, which had begun 
so ominously for the CHINCOM, ended with neither France nor the United 
Kingdom being able to bring about its disintegration. The Congress’ in-
transigence and the threat of the coming Presidential elections forced the 
President to adopt a hard and inflexible stand in the matter. 
But once Eisenhower was re-elected, the year 1957 saw renewed allied 
pressure to end the China differential. He too on his side turned more 
flexible, admitting that there were good reasons to reduce, if not elimi-
nate, the China differential. Two factors helped bring about this change: 
the belief that continuing the embargo would throw the USSR and China 
together as the latter’s economic need would be met by the former and 
second, the damage caused by the embargo to the Japanese economy and 
the subsequent effect on US-Japanese relations. In February and March 
1957, the administration decided to trim the special list that would now 
contain only truly strategic goods and managed to convince the Congress 
in April after a particularly effective campaign.
But it was too late: in a report dated 1 May 1957, Harold Caccia, the 
British Ambassador to Washington, declared: “we should regard it as final 
that the U.S. Government will not (repeat not) be a willing party at this 
stage to any agreement which virtually abolished the differential” (Shu 
2001, 189). The United Kingdom now wanted the differential to be abol-
ished completely, especially as it was inexplicable why, after the events in 
Hungary at the end of 1956, the USSR should be treated less strictly than 
China. At the CHINCOM summit of 7 May 1957, the American proposal 
for reducing the multilateral regulations was met by the French counter-
proposal of eliminating the special list immediately. On 22 May, the United 
Kingdom let it be known that it would not be happy with any compromise 
and announced on the 27th that it had already decided to eliminate the 
differential unilaterally. Almost four years after the Korean armistice, the 
United States could no longer hold back the flood gates.
2.4 The Growth in Franco-chinese Trade Relations Between 1958 and 1963
Franco-Chinese trade relations grew significantly, albeit in fits and starts, 
between 1958 and 1963. Two examples stand out: railways and cereals.
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Thanks to the Banque de l’Union des Mines’s contacts with the Chinese 
Embassy at Berne since 1956, a group of Chinese engineers visited France 
from 7 February to 3 April 195839 to study the French technology. Led by 
the Chinese Vice-Minister of Railways (Yu Kuang Sheng), it included 26 
individuals divided into three groups dealing with three different sectors,40 
one of which was the railways.41 The trip included numerous technology 
meetings as well as visits to the SNCF’s plants and factories in the North 
and East,42 providing an in-depth view of French railway technology.43 A 
memorandum signed on 27 March 1958 provided the base for a techno-
logical collaboration between the two countries in the domain of railroad 
equipment.44 Most importantly, a series of meetings concluded on 5 July 
1958 with the signing of a contract for the purchase of 25 single-phase 50 
Hertz locomotives to be delivered in 1960,45 for an FOB amount of close 
to 3.5 million Pounds Sterling.46
Bilateral trade increased through the years 1962-63, marked especially 
by the sale of massive quantities of French cereals. This was due to the 
coincidental occurrence of catastrophic harvests in China and bumper 
crops in France. After eight months of negotiations, a deal was finalised 
between Louis-Dreyfus47 and China Resources48 on 19 December 1961 for 
the delivery of one million tons of cereals for between 50 and 60 million 
39 While originally, the mission was to have lasted only six weeks.
40 Group I: Railways, mines, automobiles; group II: electricity; group III: chemicals, food.
41 “Première mission officielle de techniciens envoyés en France par le Gouvernement de 
Chine Populaire du 13 février au 6 mars 1958, Note of 31 January 1958 from Jean Hugues, 
Trade Advisor at Berne to M. Mauris, the SNCF’s Chief Representative in Switzerland.
42 SNCF: Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer français.
43 Internal note no. 208 of 13 March 1958 – Presentation of the Pescara Locomotive to a 
Delegation from the PRC, Programme Sent by the SNCF’s Director of General Studies to C. 
Martin, Manager of equipment and traction.
44 Regarding electrification, telecommunication, signalling, the tracks and rolling equipment.
45 It was signed between the China National Transport Machinery Import Corporation 
and some French companies: the Matériel électrique, which was comprised of the SFAC 
(Schneider factories), the Forges et Ateliers de constructions électriques de Jeumont and 
the Matériel électrique S.W. (Schneider-Westinghouse); the Société générale de Construc-
tions électriques et mécaniques Alsthom. The locomotives were to be delivered according 
to a fixed timetable between April and October 1960. 
46 Contract no. 8 GKC 36201F, 1958. The unit price of an electric locomotive was fixed at 
138,215 pounds; the total amounting to 3,455,375 pounds.
47 The merchant bank Louis-Dreyfus.
48 The role of the China Resources Company was to import into Hong Kong goods originat-
ing from the PRC. In October 1955, this office, which was based in Hong Kong, became not 
only an office of the CNIEC but also of all of the PRC’s technology corporations specializing 
in commerce and industry.
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dollars spread over the years 1962 to 1964.49
The following table details the Franco-Chinese bilateral trade over the 
years 1957 to 1964. It shows not only the extent of the variation in volume 
but also that France enjoyed a massive surplus throughout.
In billion francs 1,957 1,958 1,959 1,960 1,961 1,962 1,963 1,964
Imports 2.93 4.85 8.01 11.22 7.85 8.35 10.41 15.22
Exports 4.64 18.65 19.66 26.06 17.95 21.38 28.82 24.49
Still, as for its overall trade balance with China, France trailed far behind 
many other countries – for imports as well as exports (between 7th and 
12th places in this period). The competition intensified after the break in 
Sino-Soviet relations in 1960-1962. Henceforth, it was not enough to just 
offer good products at competitive prices, the financial and commercial 
modalities assumed a growing importance and cornering a market re-
quired more generous payment conditions, e.g. credit.
These commercial developments were made possible by the removal of 
several hurdles to trade internationally. The Sino-Soviet break in 1959-
1960 forced China to review its trade flows and look for other suppliers. 
As a result, the share of the PRC’s imports from non-Communist countries 
rose from 43.2% in 1958 to 55.3% in 1962 (Eckstein 1971, 276-7), pro-
viding new opportunities. The end of the Algerian conflict removed yet 
another barrier as the PRC had recognised and supported the FLN, a fact 
that had been a big thorn in Franco-Chinese relations.
The autumn of 1963 saw Guillaume Georges-Picot lead an important 
French business delegation to China. He forged contacts at the highest 
echelons of the Chinese government,50 which was interested mainly in the 
development of mechanical industries, ship building and the construction 
of an oil refinery. The visit also confirmed the Chinese government’s keen 
interest in the exchange of economic and technological missions.51 In the 
case of the business delegation, it was necessary to have direct contacts 
with the people at the highest levels of the Chinese Foreign Trade Depart-
ment.52 The CNPF delegation of 1963 highlighted the fact that the eco-
49 Telegram no. 328/330 of 20 December 1961 from the commercial advisor.
50 He was received not only by Lu Suchang, but also by Chen Yi, Vice-Prime Minister and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai.
51 Rapport Général de la Mission du Conseil National du Patronat Français en République 
Populaire de Chine (September-October 1963).
52 Apart from Lu Suchang and his department, the French delegation met not only engi-
neers from public enterprises who were also advisors for the purchase and sale of products, 
but also competent officials from various technological ministries. 
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nomic and commercial relations inherited from the ’50s (indirect contacts) 
was no longer sufficient and that Franco-Chinese economic relations now 
required to be much more ‘private’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ than what they 
had been.53
It was in this context of growing economic, technological and commer-
cial relations that Charles de Gaulle declared, in January 1964, the deci-
sion to establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC (Krouck 2001; La 
Gorce 2004; Mengin 2001). This decision was first and foremost political, 
the recognition of a simple fact, the reality of a Communist China. 
But from another point of view, de Gaulle’s decision could also be con-
sidered as the culmination of the process of increasing economic contacts. 
In this sense, it would be no exaggeration to say that this political result 
could have been, a posteriori, why diplomats had begun thinking as early 
as 1949-1950 that a political rapprochement could well result, in fine, 
of the actual contacts and the accumulation of small steps and micro-
advances which were of little significance in themselves. Obviously, there 
is no question of minimising the decisive role played by the President in 
the decision of 1964, but of simply stating that it had been in preparation 
and had ripened over a succession of contacts. 
The ’50s model ran its course and gave way to that of the ‘openly’ of-
ficial. Henceforth, political and economic interests converged, with the 
consequence that both these spheres could now enjoy a relative autonomy.
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Abstract It is surprising that the very existence and recognition of China had significant repercus-
sions on domestic policy in Italy, which was the country with the strongest Communist party in the 
West. In the ’50s the Italian official policy was compelled by membership in Atlantic alliance and 
relations with United States, to refuse economic exchanges with China. According to documents 
found in “Ministero degli Affari Esteri” and in “Aldo Moro” archives, even in the same years political 
characters such as the Socialist Pietro Nenni, the Christian Democrats Giovanni Gronchi and Amintore 
Fanfani worked to favour China-Italy exchanges and economic actors like Dino Gentili and Enrico 
Mattei organised economic Italian missions to China. Since 1960, thanks to trade relations set up 
in the ’50s, and to political events (December 1963 the first centre-left government with Aldo Moro 
president, Pietro Nenni vicepresident and Giuseppe Saragat to foreign affairs, and at the beginning 
of 1964 the French political recognition of China), the process was accelerated. Thus, in December 
1964 the first commercial agreement between Italy and China was concluded and commercial offices 
were opened in Rome and Beijing. After 1964 the Chinese question entered Italian foreign policy and 
was included in parliamentary debates and government programmes. The American diplomacy, 
dominated by the Vietnam war, opposed any initiative to Chinese recognition but Italy anticipated 
the better reported, more celebrated US recognition.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 Trade Relations Offices. – 3 Italy, China and the UN. – 4 Recognition.
Keywords China. Italy. United States. Cold War. Recognition.
1 Introduction
The success of the Chinese Revolution of 1949 has been viewed in litera-
ture as a central event in the Cold War, which would influence it and shift 
its centre of gravity from Europe to East Asia (Westad 2005; Chen 2001).
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the very existence and recognition 
of the new state would have significant repercussions on domestic politics 
in Italy, i.e. the country with the strongest Communist party in the West; 
nor that relations between the small European country and the populous 
Asian giant should follow the ups and downs of the Cold War.
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As the first stirrings of the new Chinese state were taking place, Italy 
was emerging from the first phase of the process that would return it to 
the international stage after emerging from World War II as a destroyed 
and impoverished nation. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Alcide 
de Gasperi and Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza, in the immediate post-war 
years Italy concentrated on rebuilding its economy and its international 
identity. The country’s economic, social and political fragility, together with 
the hang-overs from Fascism and defeat, would relegate the country to the 
side-lines of the evolving Western system.
Italy had paid a high price to get back onto the international scene: 
firstly, forced to accept the unfavourable conditions of the peace treaty that 
evicted it from its African colonies and conceded nothing on its Eastern 
borders; and later taking up a clear position with De Gasperi’s visit to the 
United States, the request for a loan and the agreement to the Marshall 
Plan. The internal repercussions resulting from this taking this side created 
a bitter climate of conflict which characterised the 1948 election and, later, 
would shut the Communists out of the government after the clear victory 
of the Christian Democrats (CD). Italy had chosen to depend economically 
and politically on the US and by joining NATO in 1949 had plunged into the 
Cold War logic (Giovagnoli 2016; Di Nolfo 2008; Craveri 2006).
On the national front, the ongoing clash of ideologies arising from the 
strong presence of the left was evident in parliamentary debates and in 
party newspapers. The birth, between September and October 1949, of 
the new Chinese state aroused different reactions in Italian politics. Public 
debate in Il Popolo, the DC’s official party paper, concentrated on Italian 
interests, on the consequences of the loss of the colonies, the economic 
situation of the country and on the policies implemented to overcome the 
crisis. As regards international politics, space was given over above all to 
European and Western issues: Yugoslavia detaching itself from the Eastern 
front, the German question, atomic control and the meetings of Atlantic 
committees. Il Popolo completely ignored Chinese events, restricting itself 
in the first few months of 1950 to a consideration of the effects on the 
workings of the UN of the USSR’s boycott of Security Council meetings 
that were paralysing the most important body of the entire organisation. 
China was expected to turn to the West if it was looking to grow. It was 
hoped there would be a shift similar to Tito’s Yugoslavia whilst the refer-
ence country was still Formosa (Il Popolo, 1949-12-07, 1950-01-08). 
After all, historically, Italy’s interests were chiefly in Europe and Africa, 
particularly after giving up its colonial claims, and in the Mediterranean; 
whereas there was no really significant history as far as Asia was con-
cerned, nor were any moves being made towards one as yet.
Left-wing papers treated the events in Asia rather differently. From 
mid-September L’Unità published reports on the front page from their 
correspondent in Beijing, Velio Spano, a leader of the Italian Communist 
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Party (ICP), who had been sent to cover developments in the new China 
and Mao Zedong’s latest victories over the nationalists (L’Unità, 1949-10-
01, 1949-10-06).
The Italian Socialist Party (ISP) too had their paper, Avanti!, covering 
Chinese affairs and, like the Unità, it applauded Mao’s victory, considered 
a national victory but also as a victory over Imperialism. On 22nd October, 
the leader of the PSI, Pietro Nenni, urged that Italy recognise the new 
country (Avanti!, 1949-11-10, 1950-01-22). However, recognition would 
soon prove to be a far from trivial political issue.
In the months following the proclamation of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), the West had approached the question of recognition warily 
but not too ideologically. In Europe, following in the wake of Great Britain 
who defended its interests in Hong Kong, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and 
Switzerland recognised the People’s Republic.
In Rome, Foreign Affairs Minister, Carlo Sforza, who had served a dip-
lomatic tour of office in the final days of Imperial China and also in the 
Republic, was keeping a very close eye on developments in the country and 
did not rule out the possibility of recognition, notwithstanding the fact that 
in April 1949 Italy had signed a treaty with Nationalist China (Pini 2011).
Very soon the entire scenario would change with the treaty drawn up 
in February 1950 between the People’s Republic and the Soviet Union 
and, in June of the same year, the outbreak of the Korean War. The East-
West conflict intensified with the developments of the crisis, the Western 
coalition against North Korea, the Chinese attack on American forces and 
the sanctions imposed by the UN on the PRC prohibiting the sale of some 
types of strategic materials and goods to China. US allied countries were 
expected to apply the embargo in their dealings with Communist China 
(Cain 1995; Chen 1992).
A shaky Italian government found itself caught up in events in a gloomy 
international climate. Tightly linked to the Western front, Italy in the early 
’50s was involved in the early phases of European development: a plan 
for a European political community developing out of the European de-
fence group; moreover, it was dealing with the question of Trieste, which 
would see a settlement only in 1954 with the London Memorandum. On 
the domestic front, the DC lost votes compared to the results in 1948. The 
electoral reform law passed by De Gasperi introducing a majority bonus, 
later dubbed the ‘swindle law’, was a failure and led to De Gasperi’s res-
ignation in 1953 and his departure from the political stage (Craveri 2006; 
Varsori 1998; Giovagnoli 1996).
The following governments were no less conditioned by events and 
viewed recognition of the new state as a Cold War issue that called for 
strict adherence to the decisions taken by the US. In addition, in the 
early ’50s, although Rome government had managed to carve out a role 
for itself in the most important organisations of the Western system and 
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to play a part in the economic reconstruction of Europe, from abroad the 
country still appeared plagued by political instability and economic and 
social backwardness.
There was no lack of forward-looking companies, such as FIAT, Edison, 
Pirelli and Montecatini who, with the support of a handful of politicians, 
technocrats in the public sector and diplomats, were leading the way to-
wards a modernisation of the country (Petri 2002). The man responsible 
for encouraging some of these companies to look East to China was the 
business genius, Dino Gentili, who had worked as a member of the PdA 
(Action Party) and after the war had returned to business, where a net-
work of influential acquaintances, his support for socialism and friendship 
with Nenni, were melded together by the attraction China held for him 
(Capisani 2013; Luti 1994).
Although Italy was officially excluded from the Geneva Conference in 
1954, Gentili did meet Zhou Enlai in Geneva and laid the foundations for 
a long-lasting relationship. In 1955 Pietro Nenni was delegated to Beijing 
as partisan of peace, but also because he was an influential politician in 
Italy. Also in 1955, men of industry and finance, led by Dino Gentili, met 
in Beijing to negotiate the first import-export agreements (Luti 1994; 
Nenni 1981).
Gentili’s initiative was backed above all by Pietro Nenni, but found 
support also in discussions taking place in the Left on the question of 
opening up economic and cultural relations with China. Questions in 
Parliament, articles in party newspapers and solid initiatives, such as 
the opening in 1953 of the ‘China Centre’, pressed for an alternative to 
the two blocs, and also for a reduction of economic dependence on the 
US (Samarani 2014).
The ideological position of the left-wing parties was backed up by more 
practical requests from the economic and business sectors that trade be-
tween Italy and China be made easier. The government parties, although 
preoccupied with pressing issues in the country, steered clear of an ideo-
logical clash, aware that trade opportunities were opening up in China, 
particularly interesting considering Italy’s trade deficit. Most remarkable 
was the position of Liberal Foreign Minister, Gaetano Martino, a leading 
figure promoting European recovery and an assiduous defender of Ital-
ian industry, who worked to ensure that the China ‘initiative’ was not left 
solely in the hands of the Socialists and Nenni. Responding to pressure 
from businesses that were unable to satisfy the demands of the Chinese 
market, for instance the mechanical firm RIV, Martino pressed the US to 
ease sanctions and started talks with Chinese delegates in Geneva (Saija, 
Villani 2011;Villani 2008). Nothing came of this because of US vetoes and 
because China hoped to negotiate beyond strictly trade matters.
What did prevail was the logic of global Cold War: trade and the sup-
ply of items considered of strategic importance between Italy and China 
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were reduced and subjected to US-supervised restrictions, the result of 
the embargo imposed on Chinese goods during the Korean War.1
The situation changed during the second half of the ’50s. The settle-
ment of the question of Trieste, the admission to the United Nations, the 
first détente between the superpowers, represented for Italy conditions 
favouring the revival of national issues. The leading actors in Italian for-
eign policy cultivated the same desire to play a more dynamic and asser-
tive role. The Italian president Giovanni Gronchi wanted Italy to act as a 
mediator between East and West. The pacifist mayor of Florence Giorgio 
La Pira favoured dialogue between Christian, Jewish and Muslim. On the 
domestic front, considering the deep transformation of the Italian society, 
the left-wing Christian Democrats led by Amintore Fanfani, party secretary 
at the time, joined the Socialist party in projecting the move from a coali-
tion dominated by the Christian Democrats toward a centre-left coalition. 
Events of 1956 showed that new scenarios were opening up in Italy for 
international relations: the Suez crisis made clear the growing dependence 
on Middle Eastern oil, whilst Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolt 
brought about the final break-away of the Italian Socialists (PSI) from the 
ICP. Those events, coupled with decolonization, favoured the presence of 
Neo-Atlanticism: foreign policy built around a firm alliance with the US, 
and a special interest in the Mediterranean area. Furthermore, there was 
strong commitment for relations with newly independent African and Asian 
countries that had become or were in the process of becoming independ-
ent and above all with Arab countries towards which, it was argued, Italy 
should adopt a particularly open policy. Such a policy and such stronger 
ties would serve to bind those countries to the West thereby removing 
them from Soviet influence. Representatives of this new strategy were, 
for example, Giovanni Gronchi, Giorgio La Pira and ENI president Enrico 
Mattei who was very active in North Africa and Middle East (Mammarella, 
Cacace 2010; Giovagnoli 2010; Bagnato 2004; Ferraris 1996).
In July 1958 a DC-PSDI (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano) gov-
ernment was formed, led by Amintore Fanfani, who also acted as Foreign 
Minister. For several years, Italian foreign policy would be marked by his 
decisions, and his attempts to create a centre-left group would influence 
Italy’s performance on the international stage (Formigoni 2010).
With the support of Fanfani and Gronchi, both of them Neo-Atlanticists, 
the role of Enrico Mattei in domestic and international politics became 
more significant. Mattei, the business genius and realist who had turned a 
failing business (Agip) right around, and transformed it into the solid pub-
1 Archivio storico del ministero degli Affari esteri (ASMAE), Affari politici (1950-1957), 
b.33, Washington Embassy, telegrams from Martino from Roma on 5th and 6th April 1956, 
Cattani from Rome on 17th March, 16th April, Brosio from Washington, on 17th, 18th March, 
8th, 12th, 15th, 17th April 1956
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lic sector company and oil holding, ENI, was a firm believer that political 
independence went hand in hand with economic independence and that 
this was reached through strategic control of energy resources. Mattei 
negotiated trade agreements with several Mediterranean countries as well 
as with Iran, the USSR and, finally, with China. As a public official, in ac-
tual fact, he had personal contacts and high level meetings with countries 
with whom ENI was negotiating, going beyond his remit and practically 
implementing his own foreign policy.
He realised China’s enormous potential, the opportunities arising out 
of the frictions between China and Russia and the revolutionary impact 
of economic and geopolitical changes taking place following the process 
of decolonisation (Rocca 2014; Tremolada 2010; Samarani 2007; Bagnato 
2004; Perrone 1989; Pietra 1987). Towards the end of 1958, he went to 
China and set up profitable bilateral agreements that remained in place 
even after his death in 1962.
2 Trade Relations Offices
Alongside Mattei’s work, during the transition years from centrism to 
centre-left, trade relations set up in the ’50s with the Far East grew rapidly 
enough for the Hong Kong representative office for trade and commerce 
to become more important. Rome agreed that contacts with Chinese del-
egates be kept up and subsequently meetings were arranged to lay the 
foundations for an increase in trade between the two countries.2
The process was accelerated by the announcement in January 1964 that 
France officially recognised the PRC. France had realised back in the ’50s that 
recognising the PRC would be of great advantage to France – an opportunity 
to recover the influence it had had in earlier centuries. Having rid himself of 
the Algerian question in 1962, De Gaulle audaciously established diplomatic 
relations with China, thereby signalling France’s independence from the 
Western bloc (Krouck 2012; Suri 2003; Cesari, Varaschin 2003; Vaisse 1998).
The first centre-left government made up of DC, the Socialist Party, the 
Social Democrats (PSDI) and the Republican Party (PRI) had just formed 
in Italy. Leading figures held important posts: Aldo Moro Prime Minister, 
Pietro Nenni deputy prime minister and Giuseppe Saragat at the Foreign 
Office. Although Italy could not follow in France’s steps, it was in a posi-
tion to recognise trade interests and relations, which had been in place 
with China for many years. In February 1964, between Chinese supporter 
Nenni and the Western-looking Saragat, with Moro at the head of gov-
2 ASMAE, telegrammi ordinari, Gran Bretagna e colonie, arrivi e partenze, 1962, from 
Hong Kong to Rome, 12th July 1962; ASMAE, Gran Bretagna consolati, telegrammi ordinari, 
1963, Cattani from Rome, 7th May 1963.
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ernment, an understanding was reached which managed to hold things 
together internally and at the same time guarantee loyalty to the Atlantic 
pact achieved through Saragat’s declaration. The declaration recalled 
that the Chinese question had existed for a long time and stated that it 
was not important to “know whether our government means to proceed 
to an agreement with the Peking government, but rather […] when it will 
be in the best interests of Italy and her allies, and of the democratic free 
world, to reach such recognition” (Atti parlamentari). This statement by 
the Foreign Minister proved both that Italy was postponing diplomatic 
recognition, which would not have been accepted by Washington, but that 
it wanted to negotiate towards a normalisation of trade relations.
These remarks were followed up: an Italian trade-diplomatic mission met 
leading Chinese businessmen in Beijing in June to lay the groundwork.3 This 
was followed by diplomatic exchanges at the Chinese Embassy in Egypt to 
deal with technical issues in the run-up to actual talks. The opening of trade 
offices, moreover, would have to be agreed with the Americans. Once the inev-
itable difficulties had been overcome, the official statement regarding the new 
Chinese policy was issued in December, above all in answer to Washington’s 
request that the November presidential elections should not be influenced 
by any such announcement. The decision taken by Saragat and his govern-
ment, coming as a result of national economic and political pressure as well 
as in the light of overseas events, was an independent act of foreign policy 
in an already rather boisterous year. The new centre-left government had 
had to manage a negative economic situation, which was partly responsible 
for a cabinet crisis in June, solved at the end of July with the appointment of 
a second Moro-led government. In addition, Antonio Segni, President of the 
Republic, had fallen ill, while the Communist Party had lost its leader, Palmiro 
Togliatti, who died at Yalta on 21st August (Varsori 1998; Ferraris 1996).
At an international level, the moves for a creation of a united Europe had 
stalled through French hostility for admission of Great Britain, whilst on the 
Atlantic front, plans for a multi-lateral defence force, a strategic move to 
govern US-Europe relations, and negotiations for an agreement on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons, were challenging European governments. 
On the world stage, US’ involvement in Vietnam, the first Chinese nu-
clear weapons test in October and the resignation of Communist Party 
First Secretary, Nikita Krushchev, were creating problems for the future 
of Asia, bringing the Cold War back to front-stage (Di Nolfo 2008).
World events, above all the clash with the Vietcong, had some bearing 
on US reaction which was not overly negative for they had in any case 
3 Archivio centrale dello stato (ACS), Carte Moro (CM) (1953-1978) series 3, b.61,f.117, 
telegramma segretissimo by Saverio Santaniello, Hong Kong, 23rd June 1964; news on meet-
ing of Vittorelli, Santaniello with Mao Zedong also in ASMAE, 1964, telegrammi ordinari 
Gran Bretagna e consolati.
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accepted French recognition. On 14th December, Saragat, meeting US 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, stated once more that “we recognise that 
the greater responsibility in this area lies with the United States, and we 
have not yet decided to recognise China, nor will we do so without first hav-
ing opportune, friendly talks with the United States”.4 In February 1965, 
Prime Minister Moro put an end to the matter before the Italian Senate 
stating once again that diplomatic recognition of China must occur in an 
atmosphere of détente and peace and that at that time circumstances were 
not favourable. But, as Saragat had clarified in his speech to the Chamber 
of Deputies on 4th December, the Chinese question involved four issues: as 
well as trade matters and the question of diplomatic recognition, on the 
table were also UN membership for the PRC and Formosa.5
From contacts with diplomats at the US embassy in Rome, it appeared 
that the United States, caught up in the war in Vietnam and the domino 
theory, had returned to a Cold War logic and feared that they would 
soon have to take the war in North Vietnam to China. For this reason, 
they concentrated on the hypothesis that Italy at the United Nations, by 
abstaining from voting on the ‘important question’, would open the way 
for future recognition of China. By following the French method of going 
it alone, in isolation, the chance for a real united Western front would 
be compromised.6 In actual fact, in 1961, in an attempt to frustrate the 
annual requests by the Asian countries for China to be admitted to the 
UN, Italy had proposed a resolution, jointly with Australia, Columbia, 
Japan and the United States, which would recognise that the decision 
that China be given a seat was ‘an important question’ and therefore 
was to be taken by a supermajority of two thirds of members present and 
voting.7 The Johnson administration kept up a firm opposition to allow-
ing China into the organisation and granting it a permanent seat on the 
Security Council, even though they were fully aware that with the entry 
of decolonised countries, the majority opposing the proposal had been 
reduced over the years to a mere handful of votes. The State Department 
put great pressure on allied and friendly countries to prevent Communist 
4 Telegramma segretissimo by Saragat from Ottawa, 14th December 1964, ACS, CM, 
series 3,b. 61.
5 Intervention of the Foreign Minister in the discussion of the budget of the Foreign 
Ministry, to the Chamber of Deputies to the Commission of 75, 3rd December 1964 in ACS, 
CM, series 3, b.61
6 Memorandum Cottafavi, 21st November 1964, ACS, CM, series 3, b. 61.
7 In the attempt to render useless the annual demands from the Asian states, on the ad-
mission of China, the United States, together with Australia, Colombia, Japan and Italy, had 
proposed a procedural motion that declared a decision on making the Chinese seat an ‘im-
portant question’ and so to be made by a qualified majority of two-thirds of members present 
and voting. Vinci to Moro on the Chinese ‘seat’, 2nd November 1965, ACS, CM, series 3, b.61.
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China’s succeeding in its bid, which would constitute a serious political 
defeat for Washington.8
3 Italy, China and the UN
The man who would create a breach in the agreement which had held firm 
till then, and provoke a confrontation with the US and with the other lead-
ing figure of Italian politics, Aldo Moro, a character completely different to 
his own, was Amintore Fanfani, Foreign Minister from March 1965 to 1968, 
and appointed president of the 20th Session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in September. As seen above, Fanfani had already proved 
he was interested in, and in favour of relations with, Communist China, 
however fragmentary his view, he was then convinced that the solution to 
the conflict in Vietnam was China. Like his friend, Giorgio La Pira, whose 
concurrent mission to Hanoi he had encouraged, Fanfani believed that 
world peace depended upon peace in Vietnam (Giunipero 2010; Sica 2011). 
For this reason, in Autumn 1965, in view of the 20th General Assembly, he 
charged, or at least encouraged, the leader of the Italian delegation to the 
UN, friend and sympathiser, Senator Giacinto Bosco, to present a resolu-
tion concerning the admission of China to the United Nations.
What sparked this proposal were recent developments on the inter-
national scene: the increased importance of Communist China after the 
atomic explosion, the idea that the fall of Khrushchev might bring about 
a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, thereby increasing the weight of the Com-
munist world and making East-West relations more difficult. Furthermore, 
French recognition of Beijing, together with recognition from several Fran-
cophone African countries, had raised a new a consideration of the possi-
bility of reopening the discussion and voting at the UN on the admission of 
Communist China. The question had, moreover, been tabled for discussion 
at the 20th Assembly upon the request of Cambodia.
The proposal produced intense diplomatic activity between Italy and 
the United States, involving the Italian ambassador to the US, Sergio 
Fenoaltea, Foreign Minister Fanfani, Giacinto Bosco himself and US Sec-
retary of State, Dean Rusk. In Italy, there were stormy clashes between 
government and opposition. Although in favour of the initiative, Moro had 
to mediate both at home and abroad, and put up with US hostility.
The Bosco resolution has been discussed in literature, exhaustively by 
Elisa Giunipero. Some passages only need be referred to here which con-
firm that the Chinese question was not a minor issue for Italy considering 
8 Notes by Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning ‘ Questione della rappresentanza cinese 
alle Nazioni Unite’,23rd September 1965 in ACS, CM, series 3,b.61
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its national and international implications, and that it was closely tied with 
its Atlantic choice.
The first draft of the resolution, which made reference above all to the 
universality of the UN, asked China to show willing to bring itself in line 
with the principles of the Charter, thereby contributing to the solution 
of the conflict. It asked the US to step down from its polemic and sterile 
opposition on the Chinese question. UN members were further asked to 
undertake an objective analysis of the issues, of the difficulties and con-
ditions, means and timelines for a solution to the question, in the event 
adopting new procedures and measures.9
The draft was sent on 25th September to Moro who, while approving 
the proposal, pointed out that it was not possible to set the People’s Re-
public on the same footing as the US, nor to submit concrete, coordinated 
proposals. Moro reminded members of the position taken up the previous 
year and which was still valid: recognition was a question of time, it was 
unwise to leave the Americans isolated, nor was it prudent to encourage 
giving up Western solidarity which represented the best guarantee that 
the politics of détente would continue.10
As confirmation of what Moro was hinting at, that the question of admit-
ting China to the UN was for the United States an extremely sensitive is-
sue, was the outcome of the meeting promoted by Fanfani with Dean Rusk 
on 26th September during which the Italian minister hoped to convince 
the US Secretary of State of the soundness of the proposal.
During the meeting, Dean Rusk illustrated how US national interests 
were focused on the conflict taking place in South-East Asia, which, in 
his view, depended very much on the Chinese attitude. For this reason he 
had little hope there would be any negotiation with Vietnam because of 
Chinese opposition, and war with China could not be ruled out. In addi-
tion, he held a negative view of the Italian proposal, for China’s entry to 
the UN “would be to reward Communist China’s combative stance, a fur-
ther step toward war”. Furthermore, European lack of interest in Vietnam 
preoccupied him as did also De Gaulle’s policy, which strengthened the 
conviction on the part of Chinese Communists that they were on the right 
road. Finally, he asked that hasty decisions be avoided at least until year’s 
end and, rather – but this fell on deaf ears – that Fanfani, President of the 
Assembly, should help persuade smaller countries of the consequences of 
the People’s Republic of China’s entry to the UN.11
Dean Rusk would be consulted on several occasions and would never 
change his position. In a meeting with ambassador Fenoaltea on 13th Octo-
9 Vinci to Moro, 25th September 1965, ACS,CM, series 3,b.61
10 Moro to Fanfani, 26th September 1965, ACS, CM, series 3, b. 61
11 Fanfani Rusk discussion, 26th September 1965, ACS,CM, series 3,b.61
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ber, the Secretary of State once again expressed his opposition to the Ital-
ian initiative. In his analysis, China had become weaker after the setback 
in Indonesia with the failed coup d’état by left-wing officers linked with 
the Chinese. China had lost not only its strongest support in Asia, but also 
the favour of some African states. It was time, therefore, to persuade the 
leaders in Beijing that they were set on the wrong road, whereas encour-
agement to continue their aggressive policy would push them into war.12
To complete the Italian proposal came the setting up of an ad hoc com-
mission to investigate and report at the next assembly on the issues con-
cerning UN membership. This addition to the proposal was supported 
also by Moro for it could represent a fall-back in the event of an uncertain 
outcome in the vote at General Assembly, an alternative to the ‘important 
question’.13 It was Bosco above all who defended the commission claiming 
it would produce objective data as a basis for later votes; would ward off 
the entry of China counter to US wishes; safeguard the integrity and pres-
tige of the UN; and give the two super-powers time to consolidate coopera-
tion, which was indispensable for the smooth running of the organisation.
In a final talk on 4th November between Rusk and Fenoaltea, it was 
confirmed that US objections were being influenced by the war in Viet-
nam. According to Rusk, the call for universality might pose the question 
of divided states but the certainty of having still a small margin of votes 
in favour of the success of the ‘important question’ argued in favour of 
rejecting the creation of a commission. As confirmation of Washington’s 
wish to hold to its position, on 16th November, the day before Italy was to 
declare its vote, planned for 17th, Aide to US Secretary of State, Joseph 
Sisco, deemed it wise to deposit the text of a resolution that aimed to con-
firm the validity of the 1961 decision, thereby preceding the presentation 
of a procedural motion by supporters of Beijing and warding off for that 
year the danger of a pro-Chinese motion.14
To this end he called a meeting in which the signatories of the 1961 mo-
tion as well as another four states – Brazil, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Madagascar – took part.
On the other side, China had toughened its position: isolated in the 
stirrings of the Cultural Revolution, it had reacted to consideration of 
its entry by setting what diplomacy felt were unacceptable conditions, 
which were in line with the ideological propaganda being carried on at 
that time. China required that condemnation for the aggression on Korea 
12 From Washington Fenoaltea, 10th October 1965 and 15th October 1965, ACS, CM, 
series 3, b. 61
13 Vinci to Moro,2nd November 1965,ACS,CM,series 3,b.61
14 On talks with Rusk, Fenoaltea to Moro,4th November 1965; on Joseph Sisco’s initiative, 
Vinci to Moro,16 November 1965, inACS,CM,series 3,b.61
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be withdrawn, that the charter be modified so that all independent states 
should in any case be admitted to the UN, whilst, together with Formosa, 
other states considered imperialist puppets should be expelled. Above all, 
China refused the idea of the ‘two Chinas’, which inspired the Bosco and 
Fanfani motion (Chen 2001).
That the Chinese conditions were found to be unacceptable made it 
easier for Moro to reject Communist demands to give up the Atlantic pact 
and to resist pressure from the Socialist groups which, while rejecting 
the Communist motion, insisted on an undertaking to create favourable 
conditions for China to join the UN. Nenni, lastly, showed that he appreci-
ated the Prime Minister’s position and pushed for abstaining only in the 
Council of Ministers, with the option of making this public, if necessary, 
only after the vote.15
China’s position, argued Moro, was in contrast with the norms of world 
cooperation; nationalist China, a permanent member, could not be ex-
pelled; the military balance of the Pacific would shift and, finally, the issue 
could not be dealt with separately from the issue of Vietnam.
On 7th November, summing up for Fanfani the reservations which had 
been expressed in the Council of Ministers, Moro pointed out that it had 
been argued that China’s admission brought no advantage either to détente 
or to the USSR, nor did it favour the functioning of the UN, of whom China 
was highly critical. Far from it, for the existence of Formosa was still impor-
tant from a military point of view and also as a haven for Chinese refugees, 
and Christians. Italy would have to study conditions which would encourage 
a solution to international problems as well as Italy-US relations.16
Support for the ally was confirmed and the problems with Fanfani were 
resolved by Moro’s resignation in January 1966 and the formation in Feb-
ruary of the third Moro-led government, which included supporters of the 
Scelba and Fanfani line.
The motion was presented again in following years, the US position re-
maining the same, because of the ongoing war in Vietnam. The proposal 
of an ad hoc committee, particularly unpopular with Beijing, was also put 
forward again but was voted down by the General Assembly.
Fanfani’s diplomatic moves have met with varying criticism: on the one 
hand, some commentators see it as an opening up to the left, on the other, 
as just another episode illustrating a foreign policy which several times 
earned Fanfani and Italy the charge of amateurism and unreliability on the 
Atlantic front, perfectly in line with American complaints that the country 
represented NATO’s weak link. What did become apparent, as shown also 
by La Pira’s mission to Hanoi at that time, was Fanfani’s tendency to attrib-
15 Nenni to Moro, 29th October 1965, ACS,CM,series 3,b.61
16 Moro to Fanfani, 7th November 1965, ACS,CM,series 3,b. 61
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ute to Italy a role as mediator in international affairs, which did not always 
mirror Italy’s real political influence (Gentiloni Silveri 2010; Varsori 1998).
4 Recognition
In the following years, with the opening of trade offices, the volume of 
trade between Italy and China increased but conditions remained unfa-
vourable both internally and internationally for recognition of the People’s 
Republic of China to be granted. The opportunity would not arise until 
1969. At the end of 1968 the Rumor-led government appointed Pietro 
Nenni as Foreign Affairs Minister. On 24th January 1969, Nenni, without 
US consultation, announced that he wished to resolve the question of rec-
ognition of the People’s Republic, showing that he was determined to bring 
about a change in Italian foreign policy. But Nenni was not unaware of the 
effects this would have on the two sides of his party, nor of the consensus 
the initiative might garner among PCI dissidents and moderate public 
opinion, hostile to the United States after their intervention in Vietnam (Di 
Nolfo 2010; Olla Brundu 2006). In addition, Nenni gave due consideration 
also to the many new scenarios on the international front.
Internationally, the climate was one of détente, with a round of talks 
announced by the new US president, Richard Nixon, and a further move 
towards European integration proposed by French president, Georges 
Pompidou; the Federal Republic was opening up to the USSR and Eastern 
Europe, and the trend would be confirmed in the course of 1969 with 
Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik.
From Washington, Italian Ambassador Egidio Ortona informed his gov-
ernment that President Nixon wanted to distinguish himself from his pre-
decessors by forging a new US policy for China (Ortona 1989; Nenni 1983). 
China itself was also ready for change. With the excesses of the revolution 
behind him, Mao had undertaken to set both party and society, both on the 
verge of collapse, in order. The People’s Republic felt isolated internation-
ally and surrounded by enemy countries: India, Japan, South Korea, and 
also, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the announcement of 
Soviet policy with the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet Union. The ideological 
disputes between the two Communist countries, which had appeared at the 
end of the 1950, were spreading to affect inter-state relations. The Chinese 
worried that Moscow might extend its interventions to Asia. Sino-Soviet 
tension was bound to increase and in March 1969 fears became reality 
with the border conflict along the Ussuri river (Luthi 2008; Chen 2001).
Nenni’s initiative, therefore, came at a most appropriate time. China 
welcomed the Italian proposal: in February, talks between the Chinese 
chargé d’affaires and Minister Walter Gardini of the Italian Embassy in 
France started in Paris. It was clear from the very start that China lay down 
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the condition that the PRC be acknowledged as the only lawful government 
to represent the Chinese people. This brought with it a break in diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan and, at the UN, the withdrawal of the unpopular ad 
hoc committee along with the vote in favour of admission of the People’s 
Republic as permanent member.
Although France also had been asked in 1964 to recognise a single 
China, in Italy’s case, the request was prejudicial. In previous years, Italy 
had always upheld the ‘two Chinas’ theory and there was still within the 
DC and the other governing parties, leading members favouring that line. 
Furthermore, as other countries, Belgium and Canada were considering 
the issue of recognition. It was vital that Italian talks should not leave any 
space for misunderstanding (Di Nolfo 2010).
The negotiation process started with difficulty. Aware of the Italian ini-
tiative, American diplomats recommended to be cautious, fearing negative 
consequences on the Vietnam peace negotiations under way in Paris. They 
opposed the Italian consent to the third point, which meant Taiwan’s expul-
sion from the United Nations. These exceptions stopped the initial rush of 
Nenni who had not yet replied to the Chinese claims, when, in July 1969, 
a new split within the PSI brought down the Rumor government that was 
reformed in August as a single party with Aldo Moro as Foreign Minister. It 
was Moro, therefore, who overcame the internal resistance. Again, it was 
Moro who had to deal with two cabinet crises in February-March and July 
1970 and who led the talks in Paris, bringing to a close the long process. 
Moro introduced a more gradual approach: he understood time was 
necessary to solve the problem of recognising China and not breaking up 
with United States.
Italy was disposed to recognise the PRC as the only Chinese govern-
ment. But as Moro considered the subsequent conditions unacceptable, 
he gained time. In October 1969 the talk with president Nixon, the speech 
in the General Assembly of UN, and the conversation with the Canadian 
Foreign Minister were in agenda. Canada was also engaged in recognis-
ing Communist China. Consequently, Rome’s attitude did not change, as 
in the previous years, Italian delegation in New York voted ‘the impor-
tant question’ and abstained on the Albanian resolution. In the meantime 
Moro’s advisors were looking for a solution, a compromise not to dislike 
Americans. Recognise China and not to expel Taiwan.
In December Chinese diplomats refused the proposal submitted by 
Rome and negotiations interrupted again. In Italy, on 12th December 1969 
a bomb exploded in the Banca nazionale dell’agricoltura in Milan, provok-
ing a cabinet crisis (Di Nolfo 2012).
On the Chinese side, negotiations were carried out with great care and 
caution, often interrupted because of ideological tensions accompanying 
the end of the Cultural Revolution and by international events such as US 
intervention in Cambodia.
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In summer 1970, Moro understood that China had toughened its position 
and during the long negotiation process Italian diplomacy come to accept 
the Chinese claims. Then the problem to be solved was American reactions. 
It is understandable that Nenni wanted Italy to break from the Washington 
line. As a matter of fact, Moro, who in the previous years had supervised 
the Atlantic loyalty and expressed ‘understanding’ for the US involvement 
in Vietnam, had finally come to believe that it was time for “a more flex-
ible attitude on the part of the United States towards the Chinese issue”.17
Moro’s choice resulted from the awareness of the need to be realistic 
and attentive and to adopt a responsible vision of the world balance of 
power, which was shifting towards China. Moro realised that China was 
emerging as a world power from the ‘carcass of colonised China’. There 
were a huge, organised population (then over 800 million), a nuclear arms 
store and a revolutionary ideology, which made China influential both 
among libertarian movements of the Third World and among subversive 
movements in the West. Although the PRC did not implement a policy of 
aggression and did not aspire to being a third world power, Moro believed 
it was very likely that China would become a world superpower, and this 
would be a determining factor both regionally and globally. This confirmed 
his view that the time was ripe for a united Western Europe to establish 
close, workable links in the different areas of the world, to work together to 
ensure that the meeting of great powers would not give rise to a conflict.18 
Recognition of China, then, fell into Italy’s plans and prospects for the fu-
ture and was not motivated by an anti-American or an anti-Soviet feeling.
Moro’s attention to global policy did not neglect attention to Europe’s 
future. He was worried by a clear tension in transatlantic relations. EEC’s 
choices, CSCE (Conference on security and cooperation in Europe)’s initia-
tive and German Ostpolitik were not approved by Nixon; on the contrary 
Europe did not like bilateral dialogue between US and USSR and interven-
tion in Vietnam. So American attitude toward Europe represented another 
reason for Moro’s choice.
At the end of October, after almost two years of talks, a joint commu-
niqué was issued with similar wording to the Franco-Chinese of 1964, 
accompanied by a unilateral Italian declaration which satisfied China. 
In 1971, the Italian delegation to the UN voted in favour of the motion 
proposed by Albania which called for Formosa to be substituted by Mao’s 
China as member of the UN and of the Security Council, thereby forgoing 
application of the US-backed ‘important question’ (Di Nolfo 2012).
17 Conversation Minister with secretary of state US, 10th October 1969, ACS,CM,b.138
18 Telegramma riservatissimo Moro, 6th December 1970, Meeting in Djakarta. Ital-
ian ambassadors in South east Asia and Far East. Conclusions and instructions, 1970, 
ACS,CM,b.150
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The Italian diplomatic initiative was a national success and showed that 
the historic moment could be grasped. With Canada and Belgium, Italy 
anticipated the better reported, more celebrated US recognition. The time 
of isolation for the PRC was over. 
Archival sources
Archivio storico del Ministero degli affari esteri ASMAE, Roma.
Archivio centrale dello stato (ACS), Roma, Carte Moro.
Atti parlamentari, Senato della Repubblica, IV Legislatura, 14th Febru-
ary 1964.
Bibliography
Bagnato, Bruna (2004). Petrolio e politica. Mattei in Marocco. Firenze: 
Polistampa.
Cain, James (1995). “The US-led Trade Embargo on China. The Origins of 
Chincom, 1947-52”. Journal of Strategic Studies, 18(4), 33-54.
Capisani, Lorenzo (2013). “Dino Gentili, la Comet e il dialogo commerciale 
fra Italia e Cina (1952-1958)”. Studi storici, 2, April-June, 419-47.
Cesari, Laurent; Varaschin, Denis (éds.) (2003). Les relations franco-
chinoises au vingtième siècle et leurs antécédents. Arras Cedex: Artois 
presses Université.
Chen, Jian (1992). The Sino-soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Ko-
rean War. Working paper no. 1, Cold War International History Project, 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.
Chen, Jian (2001). Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: The Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press.
Craveri, Piero (2006). De Gasperi. Bologna: il Mulino. 
Di Nolfo, Ennio (2008). Storia delle relazioni internazionali, 1918-1999. 
Roma-Bari: Laterza. 
Di Nolfo, Ennio (2010). “La normalizzazione delle relazioni diplomatiche 
tra la Repubblica italiana e la Repubblica Popolare cinese”. Di Nolfo, 
Ennio (a cura di), La normalizzazione delle relazioni diplomatiche tra la 
Repubblica italiana e la Repubblica Popolare cinese. Soveria Mannelli: 
Rubbettino Editore, 1-47.
Di Nolfo, Ennio (2012). “Le reazioni americane al riconoscimento italiano 
della Cina”. Eunomia, 1(1), 9-32.
Ferraris, Luigi Vittorio (a cura di) (1996). Manuale della politica estera 
italiana 1947-1993. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
Formigoni, Guido (2010). “Fanfani, la DC e la ricerca di un nuovo discorso 
di politica estera (1954-1968)”. Giovagnoli, Tosi 2010, 78-102.
Meneguzzi Rostagni. Italy’s Attention Turns to China between the ’50s and the ’60s 157
Gentiloni Silveri, Umberto (2010). “Fanfani visto da Washington”. Gio-
vagnoli, Tosi 2010, 105-29. 
Giovagnoli, Agostino (1996). Il partito italiano e la Democrazia Cristiana 
dal 1942 al 1994. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
Giovagnoli, Agostino; Tosi, Luciano (a cura di) (2010). Amintore Fanfani e 
la politica estera italiana. Venezia: Marsilio.
Giovagnoli, Agostino (2010). “L’impegno internazionale di Fanfani”. Gio-
vagnoli, Tosi 2010, 39-53. 
Giovagnoli, Agostino (2016). La repubblica degli italiani 1946-2016. Roma-
Bari: Laterza.
Giunipero, Elisa (2010). “Fanfani e la Cina”. Giovagnoli, Tosi 2010, 432-40.
Imperato, Federico (2011). “Aldo Moro e la Guerra del Vietnam negli an-
ni del centrosinistra”. Perfetti, Francesco; Ungari, Andrea; Caviglia, 
Daniele; De Luca, Daniele (a cura di), Aldo Moro nell’Italia contem-
poranea = Atti del convegno (Roma, 4-5 dicembre 2008). Firenze: Le 
Lettere, 424-46. 
Krouck, Bernard (2012). De Gaulle et la Chine. La politique francaise à 
l’égard de la Republique Populaire de Chine (1958-1969). Paris: Les In-
des savantes.
Luthi, Lorenz (2008). The Sino-Soviet Split. Cold War in the Communist 
World. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Luti, Giorgio (1994). Tra politica e impresa. Vita di Dino Gentili. Firenze: 
Passigli Editori. 
Mammarella, Giuseppe; Cacace, Paolo (2010). La politica estera dell’Italia. 
Dallo stato unitario ai giorni nostri. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
Meneguzzi Rostagni, Carla; Samarani, Guido (a cura di) (2014). La Cina di 
Mao, l’Italia e l’Europa negli anni della guerra fredda. Bologna: il Mulino. 
Nenni, Pietro (1981). Tempo di guerra fredda. Diari 1943-1956. Milano: 
Sugarco Edizioni.
Nenni, Pietro (1983). I conti con la storia. Diari 1967-1971. Milano: Sug-
arco Edizioni.
Olla Brundu, Paola (2006). “Pietro Nenni. Aldo Moro e il riconoscimento 
della Cina comunista”. Le carte e la storia, 2, 29-51. 
Ortona, Egidio (1989). Anni d’America. La cooperazione 1967-1975. Bolo-
gna: il Mulino.
Perrone, Nicola (1989). Mattei, il nemico italiano. Politica e morte del 
presidente dell’Eni attraverso i documenti segreti 1945-1962. Milano: 
Leonardo Editore.
Petri, Rolf (2002). Storia economica d’Italia. Dalla grande guerra al mira-
colo economico (1918-1963). Bologna: il Mulino.
Pietra, Italo (1987). Mattei. La pecora nera. Milano: Sugarco Edizioni.
Pini, Mario Filippo (2011). Italia e Cina. 60 anni tra passato e futuro. Roma: 
L’asino d’oro edizioni.
158 Meneguzzi Rostagni. Italy’s Attention Turns to China Between the ’50s and the ’60s
Roads to Reconciliation, 141-158 
e-ISSN 2610-9042
ISSN 2610-9654 
Rocca, Camilla (2014). “Enrico Mattei a Pechino. Diplomazia parallela 
interessi economici in un mondo che cambia”. Meneguzzi Rostagni, 
Samarani 2014, 55-91. 
Saija, M; Villani, A. (2011). Gaetano Martino 1900-1967. Soveria Mannelli: 
Rubbettino.
Samarani, Guido (2007). “Enrico Mattei e la Cina”. Guarneri, Davide (a 
cura di), Enrico Mattei. Il comandante partigiano, l’uomo politico, il 
manager di stato. Pisa: Biblioteca Franco Serantini, 91-8. 
Samarani, Guido (2014). “Roma e Pechino negli anni della guerra fredda. 
Il ruolo del Centro Studi per le relazioni economiche e culturali con la 
Cina”. Meneguzzi Rostagni, Samarani 2014, 93-117.
Schulzinger, Robert (2011). “The Johnson Administration China and the 
Vietnam War”. Ross, Robert S.; Changbin, Jiang (eds.) (2001). US-China 
Diplomacy 1954-1973. Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 
238-61. 
Sica, Mario (2011). «La Pira e la pace nel Vietnam». Nuova Antologia, 
136-62.
Sica, Mario (1991). Marigold non fiorì. Il contributo italiano alla pace in 
Vietnam. Firenze: Ponte alle Grazie.
Suri, Jeremy (2003). Power and Protest. Global Revolution and the Rise of 
Détente. Cambridge (USA): Harvard University Press.
Tremolada, Ilaria (2010). “Mattei, Fanfani, l’Eni e le relazioni internazi-
onali dell’Italia”. Giovagnoli, Tosi 2010, 283-332.
Vaisse, Maurice (1998). La grandeur politique étrangère du Général de 
Gaulle 1958-1969. Paris: Fayard.
Varsori, Antonio (1998). L’Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 
1992. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
Villani, Angela (2008). Un liberale sulla scena internazionale. Gaetano 
Martino e la politica estera italiana 1954-1967. Messina: Trisform.
Westad, Arne (2005). The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions 
and the Making of Our World. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University 
Press. 
Zhou, Taomo (2013). Ambivalent Alliance. Chinese Policy Towards Indone-
sia, 1960-1965. CWIHP working paper no. 67.
Sinica venetiana 5 ISSN [online] 2610-9042 | ISSN [print] 2610-9654
DOI 10.14277/6969-220-8/SV-5-9 | Submitted: 2017-04-03 | Accepted: 2017-07-17
ISBN [ebook] 978-88-6969-220-8 | ISBN [print] 978-88-6969-221-5
© 2018 |  Creative Commons 4.0 Attribution alone 159
Roads to Reconciliation
People’s Republic of China, Western Europe and Italy  
During the Cold War Period (1949-1971)
edited by Guido Samarani, Carla Meneguzzi Rostagni and Sofia Graziani
Italy’s Communist Party and People’s China 
(’50s-early ’60s)
Guido Samarani
(Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia)
Abstract In the ’50s and early ’60s the Italian Communist Party (ICP) was one of the main actors 
involved in informal and unconventional diplomacy between Italy and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). In the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the presence in Italy of the 
largest Communist party in Western Europe undoubtedly acted as an important channel for unofficial 
Sino-Italian exchanges. This paper tries to trace the development of ICP-CCP relations focusing in 
particular on the Italian Communists’ views and analysis of the CCP’s historical experience. It also 
would like to show that ICP leaders generally viewed the CCP’s revolutionary in a positive way, an 
evaluation which largely stemmed from the ICP’s own national experience and its search for a more 
autonomous international role. 
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1 Introduction
In the ’50s and early ’60s the Italian Communist Party (ICP) was one of the 
main actors (together with the Italian Socialist Party) involved in informal 
and unconventional diplomacy between Italy and the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). In the absence of diplomatic relations between the two coun-
tries, the presence in Italy of the largest Communist party in Western Eu-
rope undoubtedly acted as an important channel for unofficial Sino-Italian 
exchanges. Besides conducting pro-China action through official party me-
dia and in parliament, the ICP was particularly active in making its mem-
bers, as well as the public/man in the street, aware of what was going on in 
East Asia. This was accomplished and maintained by various means such as 
organising cultural and scientific missions to Red China. Members of these 
missions included individuals and institutions closely connected with the 
ICP, the most prominent example being the Centro Cina (Samarani 2014). 
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During the ’50s, especially after the end of the Korean War, a few Ital-
ian Communists had the opportunity to reside and work in the PRC.1 In 
1959, the ICP was able to send its own high-level delegation to China for 
the first time to meet leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of-
ficially, and sign a joint document formalising the establishment of direct 
bilateral relations. However, the Sino-Soviet split and the hardening of the 
CCP’s ideological positions put a great strain on party-to-party relations, 
which cooled significantly after 1963. By then, the ‘China question’ was no 
longer just a matter for the ICP, and more generally, for Italian left-wing 
parties. Since 1964, some members of the government had been stepping 
up efforts to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. At the same 
time, emerging radicals and groups defending the pureness of Marxism-
Leninism, who viewed the Chinese concept with interest from the point 
of view of the ICP’s ‘revisionism’, provided new channels for disseminat-
ing China’s ideological propaganda in Italian society (Pini 2011, 99-112; 
Meneguzzi Rostagni 2014).
Political relations between the Italian and the Chinese Communist par-
ties were inevitably influenced by developments taking place within the 
world Communist movement. Indeed, up until 1957, close ties continued 
to develop, largely based on solidarity and common viewpoints. Italian 
Communists’ appreciation of the Chinese revolution mainly stemmed from 
its peculiarities, from the way the CCP leaders defended their autonomy 
and pursued distinctive features in their revolutionary action (see for in-
stance Bordone 1979). For them, as Gian Carlo Pajetta (1911-1990) – one 
of the leading members of the ICP at that time – would later state, “the 
peculiarities of the Chinese revolution, its weight within the world pro-
letarian and revolutionary movement, and the problem of the autonomy 
of the party that guided that revolution were questions beyond dispute” 
(Pajetta 1976, 7).
As a matter of fact, the Italian Communists’ attention to and apprecia-
tion of the distinctive features of the Chinese revolution at that time was a 
positive judgement on merits as well as method. Actually Palmiro Togliatti 
(1893-1964), who was National Secretary of the ICP from 1927 until his 
death in 1964, was strongly committed to the search for and definition 
of an Italian road to socialism (the “via italiana al socialismo”), seeking a 
more autonomous role within the international Communist movement. It 
was in the wake of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) – which sanctioned the thesis of the plurality and diversity 
of the roads to socialism and opened up new opportunities for autonomy 
for Communist parties – that the ICP leaders started to feel, as Alexander 
1 On this aspect, and more generally on the question of the visits made by Italian intel-
lectuals to the PRC and their impressions during the ’50s, see in particular De Giorgi 2017 
and her paper in this volume
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Höbel put it, that “‘the strongest communist party in the capitalist world’ 
could itself become an international political subject” (Höbel 2005, 516). 
With a view to overcoming military blocs, and firmly anchored in the 
strategy of peaceful coexistence, Togliatti tried to fulfil his desire to carve 
out greater space for autonomous action where the USSR was concerned, 
by elaborating an original idea based on ‘polycentrism’. Such a perspective 
implied a re-assessment of the traditional leading role of the Soviet Union 
within the Communist movement and also sparked off the ICP’s interest 
in the non-European world, with initiatives such as the ‘non-aligned move-
ment’, whose origins date back to the 1955 Bandung Conference (Galeazzi 
2011; Pons 2012).
In any case, it can be said that 1957 marked a turning point in the rela-
tions between Italian and Chinese Communists. From that year, as Pajetta 
clearly suggests, both parties began to develop along different lines, and 
their relationship – which had been based upon solidarity and identity of 
judgement – eventually fell apart, resulting in the breaking off of bilateral 
relations (Pajetta 1976).
In 1962 the Sino-Soviet split and the radicalization of Chinese politics 
and ideology led to the CCP’s condemnation of the ICP position on interna-
tional politics, and especially of Togliatti’s idea of a transition to socialism 
through democratic and peaceful means (the “via italiana al socialismo”) 
branding it ‘revisionist’. However, Togliatti, despite being critical, refused 
to condemn the Chinese theses, and firmly rejected the idea of conven-
ing an international conference to condemn China, as proved by his 1964 
memorandum written before his death in Yalta (Spagnolo 2007). Moreo-
ver, even in the years during which the political and ideological dispute 
between the two parties was vitriolic, the ICP leadership continued to 
support diplomatic recognition of the PRC as one of the main objectives 
of Italy’s foreign policy.2
2 Party to Party Relations: Meetings and Exchanges
In 1951 the CCP Central Committee (CC) set up a department, the External 
Liaison Department (Duiwai lianluobu or Zhonglianbu) to be specifically 
responsible for the CCP’s external affairs, under the direction of Wang 
Jiaxiang (1906-1974), the first Ambassador to the Soviet Union after 1949 
and who during the ’50s had attended the 1954 Geneva Conference and 
the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The depart-
ment’s main task was to establish contacts with the Communist parties in 
socialist countries, thereby to strengthen the unity of the socialist bloc; it 
2 Within this article, translations from the original Italian text into English are mine.
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also developed relations with other Communist parties who were part of 
the international Communist movement, and even established contacts 
with socialist parties in Western capitalist countries (Zhu 2012; Zhao 2010).
The exchange of delegations soon became one of the most important 
forms of interaction that allowed direct contact between party leaders. 
It was the 1956 national congresses of both the CCP and the ICP that 
provided the occasion for the first exchange of delegations between the 
two parties. More than fifty foreign delegations were invited to partici-
pate in the 8th CCP National Congress, which was held in Beijing in the 
second half of September. It was the first National Congress to be held 
after the founding of the PRC. Members of the Italian delegation were Gi-
uliano Pajetta (1915-1988, Gian Carlo Pajetta’s brother), and Davide Lajolo 
(1912-1984): the delegation was led by Mauro Scoccimarro (1895-1972), 
who delivered a speech at the Congress in which he praised the particular 
features and achievements of the Chinese Communist revolution, and em-
phasized that the CCP’s invaluable experience could also serve as a lesson 
for the Italian proletariat. Scoccimarro took a similar approach during a 
long conversation between the Italian delegation and Mao Zedong during 
a side meeting. According to Franco Calamandrei (1917-1982), special 
correspondent of the ICP’s party organ L’Unità in China from 1953 to 1956 
(on his experience, see Calamandrei S. 2014), the conversation covered 
common history, the problems of the workers’ movement and new issues 
raised by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) (Calamandrei F. 1956). 
After returning to Italy, Scoccimarro reported the results of the CCP’s 
8th Congress at a meeting of the ICP CC, and argued that, thanks to the 
Congress, the world had come to know, for the first time, the principles 
and criteria upon which the Chinese revolution was based and the peace-
ful transition from the completed bourgeois democratic revolution to the 
socialist proletarian revolution. “The new fact – he stated – is the mainte-
nance of the alliance with the national bourgeoisie: such an alliance was 
justified and logical during the period of the fight against imperialism and 
for national independence […]; however, in the period of the building of 
socialism it seemed to many people impossible […]. Here we can find the 
most original contribution of the Chinese Communist Party” (Scoccimarro 
1956, 10; see also the review “L’VIII Congresso del Partito comunista cine-
se”, published in Le vie del socialismo, 3 and 10-13).
Two months later, in December 1956, a CCP delegation was invited to, 
Italy to attend the 8th Congress of the ICP in Rome. During the congress, 
as will be further explained below, Togliatti took up the theme of the “via 
italiana al socialismo”, making it clear that socialism should be realised ac-
cording to specific national conditions. The Chinese delegation was headed 
by Peng Zhen, then member of the CCP Politburo and Mayor of Beijing. 
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This first bilateral exchange of delegations prepared the groundwork 
for further contacts in the years following. In April 1959, a high-level of-
ficial ICP delegation travelled to China to develop bilateral relations at 
a time when China’s domestic and external policies were radicalising, 
distrust and tension between Beijing and Moscow were growing, and the 
implementation of the Great Leap Forward across China was causing ten-
sions among CCP leaders. It was an important political event that allowed 
Italian Communist leaders to observe first-hand some aspects of Chinese 
life. Invited by the CCP CC, the ICP delegation was headed by Gian Carlo 
Pajetta (1911-1990) and included party leaders like Antonio Roasio (1902-
1986), Celso Ghini (1907-1981), Luciano Barca (1920-2012), Maria Mi-
chetti (1922-2007), Gerardo Chiaromonte (1924-1993) and Giuseppe Boffa 
(1923-1998) who was in charge of the L’Unità foreign news services and 
had been Moscow correspondent for the newspaper.
The delegation arrived in Beijing on 6th April and stayed in China for 
nearly a month, travelling to Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang, Anshan, and 
other cities and agricultural areas for scheduled visits to factories, large 
iron and steel plants, people’s communes, schools, and cultural and so-
cial institutions. According to Italian archival sources, the delegation had 
meetings with CCP leaders at the highest level, including Mao Zedong, Liu 
Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Wang Jiaxiang, Yang Shangkun, Chen 
Yi, and Liu Ningyi. During these meetings information was exchanged 
about the party’s work and discussions focused mainly on the newly-es-
tablished people’s communes, industrialization, CCP policy regarding the 
national bourgeoisie, as well as the international situation and Italian do-
mestic politics (see ICP Archives, quoted in Samarani, Graziani 2015, 17). 
Upon arrival in Beijing, the delegation was welcomed by Liu Ningyi and 
then met with Peng Zhen to whom Pajetta said that Italians and Chinese 
Communists could understand each other well because “we, as much as 
you, have always wanted to be a national party, closely linked to the na-
tional situation and at the same time to socialist internationalism” (see ICP 
Archives, quoted in Samarani, Graziani 2015, 17). The conversation with 
Peng Zhen soon turned to the current nature of imperialism: Peng Zhen 
outlined imperialism’s strategic weakness stating that “in the case of a 
war today, there is no doubt on which side the victory would be”. Pajetta 
emphasised instead that the political struggle for international détente 
and peace was the most suitable means with which to weaken American 
imperialism (see ICP Archives, quoted in Samarani, Graziani 2015, 17).
The journey consolidated the political relationship among parties, lead-
ing to the formal signing of a joint document, a ceremony covered by the 
national media. In July, the ICP’s journal Rinascita dedicated an entire is-
sue to the visit, with articles written by members of the delegation full of 
positive descriptions of the Chinese economy and society under the Great 
Leap Forward. Based on this response, it would seem that the delegation 
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members did not pick up any signs of hardship in China’s countryside, or 
at least chose to keep it to themselves if they did. They also did not per-
ceive the problems related to the implementation of Mao’s policies and 
the emerging tensions within the CCP leadership group. For example, 
Giuseppe Boffa wrote that the visit to China left him with a clear under-
standing of the “decisive weight of China in the relations of power among 
the great social systems in which the world is divided. [… ] What matters 
is not just the presence of 600 million people, but rather the powerful 
energies that these immense masses have in themselves, [masses] that 
today are being set in motion” (Boffa 1959, 557-8).
Later in the same year, a delegation headed by Girolamo Li Causi (1896-
1977), with four others including Pietro Secchia (1903-1973) and Salvatore 
Cacciapuoti (1910-1992), travelled to China to attend the celebrations for 
the 10th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. Upon arrival in Beijing, 
the delegation attended the official ceremony held at the Great Hall of the 
People, where a warm welcome message from Togliatti was read. In the 
message, Togliatti praised the CCP’s achievements in the struggle for the 
national and social emancipation of the Chinese people and in socialist 
construction. He also described the successes of the CCP’s 8th National 
Congress, the Great Leap Forward, and the people’s communes as, “the 
guarantee that your [CCP] march forward will be increasingly rapid and 
victorious” and stated that, “the growing weight of your country is now 
felt in every aspect of world life” (see ICP Archives, quoted in Samarani, 
Graziani 2015, 18).
After the 1st October celebrations, the delegation was asked to attend a 
confidential meeting during which all foreign Communist party representa-
tives were informed of current domestic political developments, and espe-
cially the recent purge and removal of Minister of Defence Peng Dehuai, for 
having criticised the party’s general line and the economic conditions that 
resulted from the implementation of the Great Leap Forward. Afterwards, 
the Italian delegation visited Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, and other, minor 
urban centres, and had meetings and conversations with factory and local 
labour and political leaders, which gave them the impression that the CCP 
had complete control over the country’s situation and a close and profound 
relationship with the masses. The members of the delegation were also 
struck by the enthusiasm they noticed in big factories and heavy industry 
plants as well as the patient, tenacious effort the overwhelming majority 
of the population was dedicating with great conviction to the construction 
of roads, dams and so on, with but primitive methods and tools.
On 13th October, upon their return to Beijing, the delegation had a 
meeting with Liu Shaoqi, then President of the PRC: Liu, according to the 
delegation’s report, expressed the belief that the general tendency in inter-
national relations was toward détente, and also showed a ‘warm interest’ 
in Togliatti. From the visits and talks, the delegation had the impression 
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that the work done by the delegation headed by Gian Carlo Pajetta a few 
months earlier had been appreciated by Chinese leaders (Secchia 1959, 
folder 11.4). 
The last contact at delegation level occurred in August, 1961, when a 
politically lower-level delegation of the ICP composed of Umberto Scalia, 
Otello Nannuzzi, Giorgio Milani, Enzo Roggi, and Vasco Jacoponi was sent 
to the PRC on a study journey. The delegation travelled throughout China 
(Beijing, Qingdao, Zhengzhou, Luoyang, Sanmenxia, Shanghai), visiting 
a few people’s communes and modern industrial complexes. During this 
visit they were able to observe, and later to report to the ICP centre, the 
difficult socio-economic conditions of the country, and the extreme poverty 
in the countryside. Moreover, during meetings and talks, which avoided 
discussions on general policy, the Chinese posed weighted questions, with 
veiled allusion to ICP policy (see ICP Archives, quoted in Samarani, Gra-
ziani 2015, 19).
By then, ideological divergences had indeed started to beset relations 
among Communist parties, as was evident at various international meet-
ings held in 1960 (including the Beijing meeting of the World Federation 
of Trade Unions and the Moscow meeting of 81 Communist parties), which 
clearly revealed the seriousness of the Sino-Soviet dispute and its impact 
on relations within the international Communist movement. 
The occasion for a direct and open attack by the Chinese Communists 
was provided by the 10th National Congress of the ICP held in December 
1962. It was here that the Chinese delegation, headed by Zhao Yimin, 
branded the Italian policy (the ‘via al socialismo attraverso le riforme di 
struttura’, road to socialism through structural reforms) as ‘revisionist’, 
presenting a critique that would soon turn into a public condemnation of 
the ICP, and especially of its leader Togliatti. Between December 1962 and 
March 1963, two articles appeared in China’s official party press condemn-
ing the Italian party for its alignment with Moscow and for the ‘via italiana 
al socialismo’ (Höbel 2005, 542-55). 
Togliatti immediately requested that the ICP be given the opportunity to 
reply to the critiques, without producing a break in the relations between 
the two parties. In fact, Italian Communists were insistent in inviting the 
CCP to send a delegation to Italy to exchange views and explain respective 
positions (see ICP Archives, quoted in Samarani, Graziani 2015, 19). Togli-
atti would also firmly reject the Soviet idea of a collective condemnation 
of China, an action the Chinese leaders regarded with respect, seeing it 
as a sign that the ICP was not completely dependent on the Soviet Union. 
However, from then on until 1980, even though the Italian and Chinese 
Communist parties never reached the point of a formal break, bilateral 
contacts were practically non-existent.
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3 Looking at the CCP and People’s China:  
Italian Communists’ Analysis and Memories
As stated above, it was in 1956 that the first bilateral exchange of delega-
tions between the ICP and the CCP took place. As has been pointed out, 
the 20th Congress of the CPSU and Nikita Khrushchev’s report and secret 
speech had a tremendous impact on Communist parties worldwide, greatly 
influencing their views on the question of war and peace and the different 
paths the transition from capitalism to socialism could take within each 
country (Benvenuti 1983, XXI-XXII). The 20th Congress was followed by 
protests and revolts in Poland, and especially Hungary during the second 
half of the year: the revolts led to Soviet military intervention in Hungary 
in the last part of the year, which resulted in János Kádár’s rise to power. 
At the same time, the crisis in the Middle East in October-November 1956 
seemed to confirm the existence of new, and growing tensions in the con-
text of the Cold War, after the emergence in previous years – marked by 
the end of the war in Korea, the Geneva Conference and the Bandung 
Conference – of more optimistic views about the future of the world.
It was in this period, during which the ICP leadership was torn between 
its search for autonomy and alignment with Moscow, that the 8th National 
ICP Congress took place (8-14 December 1956). 
Before the 8th Congress however, the Secretary of the ICP, Palmiro 
Togliatti, had clearly expressed, on different occasions, his views on the 
results and the historical meaning of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, with 
particular reference to the problem of the ‘national roads to socialism’. 
In his speech to the ICP CC on 13th March 1956, Togliatti stressed the 
importance of acknowledging that there were different roads to socialism 
and quoted the Chinese experience, together with that of Nehru’s Indian 
National Congress, as examples of other possible paths. He indicated that 
any mechanical application of the ‘Soviet model’ to other experiences 
would provoke potentially serious problems and imbalances, and conceded 
that the ICP had made an obvious mistake in joining Moscow in its total 
condemnation of the Yugoslavian experience in 1948 (Togliatti 1968a, 15-
17). On 24th June 1956, in his speech at the ICP CC in preparation for the 
8th National Congress, Togliatti emphasised that it would be a big mistake 
to expect that People’s China would follow the same path as the Soviet Un-
ion, because great differences existed between them in political tradition, 
economic structure and methods of organization (Togliatti 1968b, 66-7).
The main slogan of the ICP 8th National Congress clearly indicated that 
the party was determined to confirm and develop its political strategy regard-
ing the ‘Italian road to socialism’. In his political report, the party secretary 
stressed that in most socialist countries the building of a new economy and 
society had largely progressed with success, while in both Poland and Hun-
gary serious problems had arisen. Spontaneous, popular protests broke out 
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in both cases, due mainly to the process of adjusting to the system, and to the 
actions of counter-revolutionary forces. He then maintained that in order to 
achieve real consolidation of international relations, the existence of a social-
ist world should be recognised and accepted by the imperialist powers, in the 
first place by ending the ban against People’s China (Togliatti 1983a, 23-25). 
In Togliatti’s view, the political conclusions of the 20th Congress of the 
CPSU, with its emphasis on the possibility that different roads could lead to 
a socialist society, would be well received in China, since the CCP had a long 
tradition of autonomy, and had built its success on wide popular support.
At the 8th Congress of the ICP, Peng Zhen (the head of the CCP delega-
tion) was welcomed with warmth and exceptional enthusiasm by all Con-
gress delegates. His attitude and style impressed everybody and the ICP’s 
official newspaper, L’Unità, defined his approach as eloquent, penetrating, 
and persuasive, and described him as a participant who never stopped 
listening with extreme attention to the speakers, showing absolutely im-
partial interest in every topic, with an ‘attentive and grave’ expression, 
which was ‘always serious and impassive’. In his welcome address to the 
Congress, Peng Zhen reminded his audience of the great strength of the 
ICP, as well as its prominent position within the international Communist 
movement. He praised the revolutionary tradition of the Italian people 
who – he said – thanks to their strength and unity with other democratic 
forces, had struggled against fascism and later achieved great things (the 
creation of a Republic, the drawing-up of the Constitution and the devel-
opment of democracy). Then he touched upon the issue of world peace at 
a time of increasing international tension, and stressed the importance 
of the international unity of the workers’ class. At the end of his speech, 
he also praised efforts made thus far to establish and expand contacts 
between Italy and China, and to contribute to mutual understanding and 
confidence, which in turn would certainly lead to the establishment of 
diplomatic relations (L’Unità, 11 December 1956, 8-9). 
In his memoirs, Emilio Rosini (1922-2010), in charge of accompanying 
the Chinese delegation to Vienna after the end of the Congress, remembers 
how, during the trip to Vienna, he formed the clear impression that Peng 
Zhen was quite dissatisfied with his talks with ICP leaders, especially since 
the CCP did not at all welcome the way in which Chruščev had denounced 
Stalinism. According to Rosini, the delegation was made up of 3 people: 
Peng Zhen, an interpreter and a third, unidentified person. The main rea-
son for the delegation’s trip to Vienna was to meet some Chinese who 
were active within the Partisans of Peace (later, the World Peace Council), 
a movement fighting for world peace and strongly backed by the Soviet 
Union (in 1956 the offices of the movement were in Vienna) (Rosini 2003). 
A somewhat different view about Peng Zhen was expressed by Luciano 
Barca, elected at the 8th Congress onto the ICP Central Committee. In 
charge of taking care of Peng Zhen, Barca remembers him as a man of 
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great culture, who was fascinated by Roman civilisation and never tired 
of visiting Roman ruins (Barca 2005, 1: 166-9) 
The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the late ’50s further restricted 
ICP interaction with China, narrowing its breadth of manoeuvre. However, 
it was in this complex situation, when the Sino-Soviet alliance was already 
deteriorating, that the Italian Communists sent a high-level delegation to 
China with the aim of exchanging views with CCP leaders, and signing a 
joint document that would formalise the establishment of direct bilateral 
relations. It was the first and last ICP delegation to travel to China to offi-
cially meet CCP leaders, apart from conventional exchanges of delegations 
at national party congresses and minor delegations.
Luciano Barca was a member of the ICP delegation to China in 1959 led 
by Giancarlo Pajetta, a member of the Direzione (a kind of Politburo) and 
the Secretariat of the ICP. In his memoirs, Barca stressed that deciding to 
make the journey to China while a secret dispute was going on between 
Moscow and Beijing, “was in itself a relevant political act”, and nothing 
less than a “calculated act of autonomy by Togliatti”. This is how the Soviet 
leaders actually read the initiative, as demonstrated by the fact that upon 
arrival in Moscow, the Italian delegation found that no leaders or officials 
from the foreign section were there to meet them (Barca 2005, 1: 202; 
Barca 1959, First series, envelope 2 and Travel notebook, 1).
According to Barca, the CCP leaders warmly welcomed the delegation, 
and reserved special treatment for Pajetta, as if he were a head of state. 
During a meeting with Liu Ningyi (then President of China’s Federation 
of Trade Unions), which took place upon their arrival in Beijing, Pajetta 
presented the delegation’s requests and expectations from the visit: to 
exchange information with the CCP on the party’s work, the issues related 
to the people’s communes and industrialization, and on the international 
situation. Pajetta also stated that Chinese policy regarding Catholics was 
one of the problems the delegation wished to discuss with Chinese leaders. 
The delegations had meetings and long conversations with the highest-
ranking leaders of the CCP: the Mayor of Beijing Peng Zhen, the Foreign 
Minister Chen Yi, Liu Shaoqi, and finally, Mao Zedong. The conversations 
were initially formal, but gradually became more frank and focused. As 
soon as the issue of peaceful coexistence was introduced, divergences 
surfaced, with Pajetta defending the result of the 20th Congress and Togli-
atti’s (and the ICP’s) position on the offensive nature of the struggle for 
world peace. The conversation with Chen Yi (7th April) mainly covered the 
international situation, with particular attention for East and Southeast 
Asia, and touched upon recent events in Tibet, and relations with India. 
Chen Yi defined US imperialism as the most ferocious in the world and 
pointed to the differences between the strategy and tactics of US imperial-
ism, stating that, while strong from a tactical point of view, it was strategi-
cally weak, and for this reason was to be considered both a paper and an 
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iron tiger. Afterwards, the delegation had a meeting with Peng Zhen (8th 
April), to discuss several issues related to China’s domestic politics, such 
as the development of class relations and class struggle, the policy regard-
ing counter-revolutionaries, the nationalization of industry, the Hundred 
Flowers movement, and finally, the creation of the people’s communes, one 
of the most controversial issues in China’s relations with the USSR. Given 
that the communes were the emblem and symbol of a different road to 
socialism from the one taken by the USSR, the Italian delegation seemed 
particularly interested in understanding what the people’s communes re-
ally were (Barca 2005, 1: 202-25).
Scheduled visits took place in Beijing University, two people’s com-
munes in Manchuria, and the metallurgic kombinat in Anshan and Shang-
hai. Upon returning to Beijing, the delegation met with Liu Shaoqi (17th 
April) and discussed topics related to war and peace, international détente 
and the relations between Communist parties. Stimulated by Pajetta’s 
statement that the ICP did not expect the solution of national problems to 
come from outside, Liu Shaoqi – while defending the unity of the Socialist 
bloc – argued that every party should solve its problems according to the 
experience acquired in its own country and not according to any other 
parties’ will. During talks with Mao Zedong, polemic allusions emerged 
from Chairman Mao when he, probably alluding to Togliatti’s ‘via italiana 
al socialismo’, stated that a peaceful transition to a new system of relations 
was difficult and in all class fights it is not possible to seize power without 
a struggle (Barca 2005, 1: 221).
As for Giancarlo Pajetta, in an article written for the ICP’s monthly, 
Rinascita, in 1976 he reiterated his impression that the Chinese politi-
cal line was diverging from the positions of the 20th Congress, and more 
generally from the policy of the other Communist parties on the themes of 
détente and peace, as well as on the possibility of a democratic road to so-
cialism. The Italians clearly perceived that there was a concealed polemic 
and that the Chinese might want to sound out the Italians’ real positions. 
According to Pajetta, talks were dominated by diplomacy and allusion, so 
much so that upon their return to Italy, while reporting and confirming a 
strong appreciation for, and positive judgement of, the CCP leaders and 
the Chinese road to socialism, the members of the ICP delegation did not 
hide their serious worries about the future (Pajetta 1976, 7-9).
And in 1978, in a long interview with Ottavio Cecchi about his experi-
ences in the field of ICP foreign policy, Pajetta recalls (Pajetta 1978, 135-6):
In 1959, I was in China with a party delegation. I soon got the impression 
that China’s political line was clearly diverging from that of the Soviet 
Union. […] During that visit we met with Peng Chen [Peng Zhen], Teng 
Hsiao-ping [Deng Xiaoping] […], we met with Liu Shao-chi [Liu Shaoqi], 
Chen Yi and finally we were received by Mao Tse-tung [Mao Zedong] 
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himself, with whom we had a long conversation. During these talks we 
defended the positions of Togliatti, which, after all, were also the Soviet 
position about foreign policy and international prospects: détente, non-
inevitability of war, the search for a national and peaceful road to social-
ism in our country. On these themes we encountered coolness, we were 
asked insidious questions, and more than once we had to reply firmly 
to polemical allusions towards us. We discussed for entire days, even 
the nights, on every sentence of the final communiqué. To the extent 
that I left Comrade Barca and others with the task of going on, begging 
them to let me sleep and to call me only if they encountered problems 
for which the Chinese would request my intervention.
As mentioned above, this visit to China by the delegation of the Italian Com-
munist Party contemplated the solemn signing of a protocol as previously 
agreed. Pajetta accepted, but only on condition that nothing contradicted 
ICP positions, and that an explicit mention was made of the “via italiana 
delle riforme di struttura” (the Italian road of structural reforms). The Chi-
nese demanded that mention be made of the people’s communes. Barca 
was in charge of negotiating the text, a long process that forced Italians to 
work day and night and that revealed Chinese dissent regarding the Italian 
positions (peaceful coexistence and “via italiana” to socialism). The Italian 
delegation made every effort to reach a consensus without breaking up the 
talks. According to Barca, the Chinese considered Italian recognition of 
the original experience of the people’s communes to be a point that could 
not be given up (for the Italians it was a delicate point, as it had led to a 
change in China’s relations with the USRR) and bound this point to their 
own acceptance of a mention of Togliatti’s structural reforms, “an unusual 
term in Marxist and Communist literature” (Barca 2005, 1: 218).
Misunderstandings and divergences were finally resolved, albeit only 
formally, with a compromise, and on 19th April, Pajetta and Deng Xiaop-
ing signed the joint document in a solemn atmosphere, in the presence of 
Mao Zedong. The picture appeared in the CCP official newspaper, Renmin 
ribao (People’s Daily), the following day. Pajetta then left China to return 
to Rome, while the other members of the delegation continued the trip 
around China. While in Xi’an they were informed that Liu Shaoqi had 
been elected President of the People’s Republic, but were reassured that 
it would in no way change Mao’s role (Barca 2005, 1: 217-24).
Within the ICP delegation, which went to China in 1959, and more gen-
erally within the Italian Communist Party itself, while everybody else was 
supporting the PRC’s international cause there was disagreement, with 
some members holding a rather flexible view of Chinese internal politics 
and ICP-CCP relations while others took a narrower view. 
One such member was Giuseppe Boffa, who had been working in Mos-
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cow from 1953 to 1958 as correspondent of L’Unità. In his memoirs he 
writes about the 1957 Moscow Conference, stating that the meeting be-
tween Togliatti and Mao Zedong was very disappointing: “I don’t really 
know what Togliatti was actually expecting from this meeting. But I do 
know that around the Communist world many considered the Chinese with 
a favourable eye: the prestige of their revolutionary victory was still intact 
[….] The taste of the “Hundred Flowers” and the “Hundred Schools” was 
everywhere at that time [….] But in Autumn 1957 Mao changed his mind: 
“Flowers” and “Schools” were cut when they had just started to grow” 
(Boffa 1998, 50-1).
Despite the growing divergence between Italian and Chinese Commu-
nists, one important point should be considered: during the 1960s, the 
Italian Communist Party continued its political battle for Italian recogni-
tion of the People’s Republic of China. The ICP leader, Palmiro Togliatti, 
in a talk given at the 9th National Congress of the ICP (January-February 
1960), argued (Togliatti 1983a, 205) that:
The great People’s Republic of China can no longer be kept out of the 
debate on the main international issues just to give satisfaction to the 
American militarist cliques […] The Italian people, in large part, cannot un-
derstand why the People’s Republic of China is still not recognized by Italy 
and why Italy does not support China’s admission to the United Nations.
Two years later, at the 10th ICP Congress, which marked an important step 
forward in the political debate between the two parties, the final political 
report approved by the Congress affirmed that, “it is indispensable that 
China is given its place within the United Nations” (Decimo Congresso PCI 
1962, “Risoluzione politica”). At the same time, Togliatti was determined 
to defend the party’s political positions against criticism from the ‘Chinese 
comrades’ (the reference was to the speech at the Congress given by the 
CCP representative, Zhao Yiming), indicating that the Italian Communists 
had great consideration and respect for Chinese Communists, but they 
did not agree with the CCP’s vision of the problem of war and peace, and 
their critique of the ‘peaceful coexistence’ (Togliatti 1983b, pp. 386-389).
Togliatti also expressed deep concern regarding the recent military 
clashes between China and India, and their potential to produce a seri-
ous weakening in the anti-imperialistic struggle, and asked that the two 
sides find a peaceful solution to the conflict as soon as possible (Togliatti 
1983d, 329-30).
In the debate that followed Togliatti’s opening report, Giancarlo Pajetta 
gave a speech in which he was highly critical of certain CCP positions 
as expressed by Zhao Yiming. Pajetta maintained that the ‘structural re-
forms’ that were part of the ICP strategy were not at all contrary to the 
struggle for socialism, but rather a part of it. He then strongly criticised 
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the positions of Albania’s Party of Labour headed by Enver Hoxha, asking 
why “such positions are encouraged by some”. Finally, Pajetta found fault 
with the CCP’s radical critique of, and ‘anathemas’ against, the views of 
the Yugoslav comrades, while at the same time he recogniaed that the ICP, 
too, had reservations about some of their positions (Pajetta 1968, 159-67).
A few weeks after the conclusion of the ICP’s 10th National Congress, 
between late 1962 and the early months of 1963, two long editorials from 
the Renmin ribao and Hongqi (Red Flag) harshly criticised the positions 
that had emerged from the Congress, paving the way for an intense and 
fierce debate (“Sulle divergenze tra il compagno Togliatti e noi” 1962; 
“Ancora sulle divergenze tra il compagno Togliatti e noi” 1963). 
As Luciano Barca would later remember, 
the seriousness of the CCP attack against Togliatti lies not so much in 
its motivations [the CCP accusing Togliatti of revisionism], but rather 
in the fact that the joint agreement stipulated in 1959 is totally under-
mined […] and because the attempts carried out by the ICP in such a 
very difficult situation in order to keep a line of communication open 
with a great communist party considered by Moscow to be an enemy, 
are misconceived. (Barca 2005, 1: 306)
In October 1963, a long resolution approved by the ICP CC denounced the 
“mistaken views of the Chinese comrades”, and criticised the CCP’s vision 
of Asia, Africa and Latin America as the “stormy center of world revolu-
tion” (“Per una nuova avanzata e per l’unità del movimento comunista 
internazionale” 1968).
In his Memorandum on Issues Relating to the International Working 
Class Movement and Its Unity (the so-called ‘Yalta memorandum’, written 
as a reminder for a scheduled meeting with Chruscev), on the one hand 
Togliatti denounces the ‘divisive actions’ of the CCP, while on the other he 
stresses that quite a few Communist parties around the world had replied 
to such actions with ideological polemics and propaganda and not in a 
political and constructive way (Togliatti 1968c; see also Hobel 2005 and 
Spagnolo 2007).
Again, in the late ’60s, Luigi Longo, then secretary of the ICP, expressed 
in a series of articles a strongly critical opinion of CCP positions but 
stressed at the same time the need to be very careful and cautious, given 
the divisions among the various Communist parties, about the possibility 
of convening an international conference of communist and workers par-
ties (Longo 1968).
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4 Conclusions
In addressing the political ties and exchanges between Italy’s Communist 
Party and People’s China in the ’50s and early ’60s, this paper has tried 
to trace the development of ICP-CCP relations focusing in particular on 
the Italian Communists’ views and analysis of the CCP’s historical ex-
perience. The paper shows that ICP leaders generally viewed the CCP’s 
revolutionary experience and politics in a flexible way, attributing a posi-
tive judgment to its nationally-rooted peculiarities. This evaluation largely 
stemmed from the ICP’s own national experience and its search for a more 
autonomous international role. 
At the same time, light is shed on the complexity of party-to-party relations 
as they fell within the broader framework of the international Communist 
movement that, from the second half of the ’50s, began to show its limits 
and lose its cohesion. In this respect, the events unfolding in 1956 marked 
a crucial historical moment. The issues that began to be addressed and de-
bated at that time (i.e. de-Stalinization, peaceful coexistence and the thesis 
of the plurality of the national roads to socialism) soon revealed the existence 
of profound divergence of opinion among Communist leaders worldwide. 
Differences in the viewpoints of Italian and Chinese Communist leaders 
could be felt as early as the 8th National Congress of the ICP held in Rome 
in December 1956. Then, at the 1957 Moscow conference, Italian leaders 
realised that distinctly different positions were becoming apparent between 
the two parties. Influenced by the escalating Sino-Soviet dispute and the 
radicalization of China’s internal and external politics, relations between 
the ICP and the CCP eventually deteriorated, ending with the abrupt con-
demnation by the CCP of Togliatti’s policy in late 1962/early 1963.
Yet awareness of emerging divergent positions on crucial issues such 
as ‘peaceful coexistence’ did not prevent the ICP leadership agreeing on 
the important decision to send a high-level delegation to China in 1959. 
This initiative proved the ICP leaders were attentive to the PRC and its 
international influence as well as that they were committed to reaching a 
consensus on issues on which the Chinese and Italians had already taken 
up clearly different positions. 
As Qiang Zhai emphasised based on CCP senior leader Bo Yibo (1908-
2007)’s memoirs (Qiang Zhai 1996), the 1958-59 period was particular-
ly important in the shaping of Mao Zedong’s views on the question of 
‘peaceful evolution’, especially after the US Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles’, statements about encouraging a peaceful change of the Commu-
nist system. In Qiang’s opinion, Mao’s apprehension about the future de-
velopment of China was closely related to his analysis of the degeneration 
of the Soviet system: he basically believed that Dulles’ idea that peaceful 
evolution within the Communist world could be brought about, was already 
taking effect in the Soviet Union with Khrushchev. 
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Above all, as the paper shows, even after the CCP’s condemnation of 
the Italian Communists’ positions in 1963, Togliatti opposed the idea of a 
collective condemnation of China, and at the same time the ICP continued 
to support the PRC’s international cause, carrying on the political battle 
for diplomatic recognition within Italy. This on the one side will pave the 
way, thanks also to the efforts by Pietro Nenni, leader of the Italian So-
cialist Party, to the recognition of the PRC by Italy on November 1970; on 
the other side, it will maintain a thread, however thin, between the two 
parties, creating the conditions that led to the reprise of bilateral relations 
before with Enrico Berlinguer’s visit to China in 1980 (see for instance 
Bordone 1983).
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Abstract Velio Spano was an important member of the Italian Communist Party, who visited Com-
munist China in the crucial period of Autumn 1949 and wrote the first book in Italian about the 
Chinese revolution. Often mentioned in works dedicated to the history of Sino-Italian relations, 
this event has never been thoroughly studied. The recent availability of Spano’s personal archives 
offer the possibility to better investigate his visit to China and to place it in the complex political 
environment of that period. This paper is a first attempt to use Spano's personal records about his 
stay to explore the actual reality of his experience and the implications of his presence in 1949 China.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 Velio Spano’s Travels in Liberated China: a General Overview from 
His Personal Notes. – 3 Behind the Public Narrative: Spano and Mao’s ‘Cold Bench’. – 4 Conclusions: 
Velio Spano in the Relations Between CCP and ICP.
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1 Introduction
After 1949, relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the 
Italian Communist Party (ICP) played a significant role in the evolution of 
relations between Italy and China, contributing to those contacts that in 
the ’50s fostered the emergence of Sino-Italian bilateral trade and cultural 
ties in spite of the lack of political recognition (Samarani, De Giorgi 2011). 
Indeed, these inter-Party relations occurred against a very complex 
backdrop. On the one side, they were articulated within the ideological 
and political framework of the Socialist camp dominated by the Soviet Un-
ion and later by the rivalry between the USSR and the People’s Republic 
of China (Samarani, Graziani 2015, 7-29). On the other, they developed in 
a complicated interplay of cooperation and competition with other Italian 
and West European political forces and individuals (Samarani, Meneguzzi 
Rostagni 2014). Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that intellectuals and 
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political figures of the Italian Communist Party played a pivotal role on 
several occasions in the history of Western Europe’s long process of rap-
prochement to the People’s Republic of China since 1949. 
Actually, before the establishment of the People’s Republic, as far as 
it is known, no Italian Communist, or Italian agent of the Comintern or 
sympathiser for Communism was in China. The contacts between the CCP 
and ICP originated in Moscow, where Palmiro Togliatti stayed during the 
World War II. In the Soviet capital city Italian and Chinese Communists 
lived or sent their families to flee from political persecution, and so had 
the opportunity to meet and get to know one other (Pini 2011, 46-52). 
The turning point, as yet unexplored, in the relations between the two 
parties came in Autumn 1949 with the visit of a prominent Italian Com-
munist, Velio Spano (1905-1964), who was in China from the beginning 
of September 1949 until early January 1950. Velio Spano was there as 
the correspondent of the ICP party newspaper, L’Unità. He published his 
reports describing the events and context of the establishment of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China in the newspaper (De Giorgi 2010), and later in a 
book, the first dedicated to Mao’s China (Spano 1950). 
This essay is a preliminary attempt to investigate the experience of 
Velio Spano in 1949 China as emerges from his unpublished personal 
travel notes and records.1 These documents offer interesting research 
prospects. Giving an account of the activities of Spano in China, his per-
sonal diaries offer a rich portrait of the complicated environment of the 
Liberation. As an important member of a Communist Party, Spano was 
given the opportunity to meet the top Chinese leaders and to follow the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in South China. But, though he was a 
foreign comrade, his role was also a sensitive one for his Chinese hosts 
(Brady 2003). An analysis of his experience offers some insights into the 
political context of that period, both in the domestic field and from the 
perspective of Chinese relations with the outer world, and especially Sino-
Soviet and Sino-Italian relations.
As a first exploration of these sources, the essay will first give an outline of 
Spano’s journey as described in his personal travel journal,2 and then present 
some issues relating to Spano’s presence, with details of Spano’s meeting 
with Mao Zedong in the light of the Italian visitor’s perception and experience 
1 The author wishes to thank Chiara and Paola Spano, Velio’s daughters, and the Archives 
of the Gramsci Foundation (Archivi Fondazione Gramsci) in Rome for the kind support given 
to this research.
2 Velio Spano, Taccuino blu. Archivi Fondazione Gramsci, Fondo Velio Spano e Nadia 
Gallico, Serie 6: Esteri e Movimento per la Pace, FF 90, busta 13, Taccuini. Hereinafter 
referred to as Taccuino blu.
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of Liberation in China.3 Finally, it will conclude with details of the role that 
Spano played in relations between CCP and ICP after his return in the ’50s. 
2 Velio Spano’s Travels in Liberated China:  
a General Overview from His Personal Notes
At the time of his trip to China, Velio Spano was not just the correspondent 
of the ICP’s paper. He was one of the most important Party figures, and very 
close to Secretary Palmiro Togliatti. Spano had a long career in the ICP. He 
had joined the Party just after its foundation, as a young student (he was 
born in the same province, Sardinia, as Antonio Gramsci). Due to the fascist 
repression, he began his activities as an underground member. Denounced 
and arrested in 1928, he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. After his 
release, Spano continued his political activities abroad, as an underground 
Communist in France, Egypt, Spain and Tunisia, working mainly as a journal-
ist and a propagandist (El Houssi 2014). In October 1943, Spano and his wife 
Nadia Gallico returned to South Italy, at that time under Allied occupation. He 
became the director of the South Italy edition of L’Unità and a member of the 
Political Bureau of the ICP. From 1946 to 1948 Spano was a member of the 
Constituent Assembly as representative for Sardinia, and in 1948 a member 
of the Italian Senate (Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d’Italia).
His stay in China can be quite precisely reconstructed through his travel 
journal. He remained in China from 6th September 1949 to 10th January 
1950, spending most of his time in Beijing, but also visiting several places 
in Central and South China, and in North China and Manchuria. Almost 
every day, he reported in a small blue notebook the main activities of that 
day, the people he met and, not rarely, his first-hand impressions, allowing 
the reader to have quite a precise idea of his experience in China, though 
the lack of detail often hinders a full understanding of the actual events 
and of Spano’s ideas. Besides his short travel notes, at any rate, Spano 
reported much more detailed accounts of his visits and interviews on some 
other notebooks, to be used as the basis for his newspapers articles and 
later his book. While the travel journal gives us some hints on Spano’s 
feeling and opinions, the unpublished reports are less personal and in 
most cases in them he just recorded the information received by his hosts 
at meetings and visits.4
3 Velio Spano, Appunti presi in Cina, I-IX. Archivi Fondazione Gramsci, Fondo Velio Spano 
e Nadia Gallico, Serie 6: Esteri e Movimento per la Pace, FF 90, busta 13, Taccuini. Here-
inafter referred to as Appunti presi in Cina. 
4 During his trip, Velio Spano took almost 400 photographs. The author is currently work-
ing on this interesting visual source in order to analyse Spano’s gaze at China and to better 
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It is hard to say how much of Spano’s trip was planned before his ar-
rival in China. Apparently not much. His tour was organised taking the 
opportunities offered by the socialist internationalist network that, under 
the Soviet aegis, developed across the two blocks during the Cold War and 
that, in 1949, had began to include also China (Geoffreys 2014). Spano 
was one of the foreign speakers at the foundation meeting of the Chinese 
Congress for World Peace, held in Beijing on 2nd October 1949. Never-
theless, his visit was obviously linked to the wish of the ICP to develop 
contacts with the Chinese Communists, as the Italian draft of a letter of 
introduction written by Palmiro Togliatti and dated 29th July 1949 testifies. 
In this letter the Italian leader mentioned that Spano was going to China 
to better understand the Chinese revolution and collect the correct infor-
mation for the Italian public opinion.5 Not by chance, in the few original 
Chinese documents – mostly official invitations – preserved in the Archives 
at Fondazione Gramsci, Spano is more often indicated as a member of the 
Italian Communist Party’s Central Committee that as a journalist of the 
Communist newspaper L’Unità. 
According to his own notes, Spano left Rome on 19th August 1949 and 
two days later, in Prague, he was joined by the Communist Emilio Sereni, 
the secretary of the Italian Socialist Party Pietro Nenni, with his wife, the 
painter Renato Guttuso and the architect Pio Montesi.6 The four were on 
their way to Moscow as members of the Italian delegation at the meeting 
of the Soviet Partisans for Peace, the Soviet branch of the World Com-
mittee of the Partisans for Peace, whose vice-Chairman was Pietro Nenni 
(Giacomini 1984; Geoffreys 2014). 
Once in the Soviet capital city, on 23rd August (Spano wrote “they were 
not expecting us”),7 he met Carolina Misiano. She was Francesco Misiano’s 
daughter, a Socialist politician and film director who had fled to the USSR 
and died in 1936 (Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani). Carolina Misiano, 
at that time professor of modern history at Moscow University, provided 
Spano with a contact for a certain Dyakov, probably the Soviet expert on 
Asian affairs, Aleksei Mikhalovic Dyakov. This man was somehow in charge 
of Spano’s trip, though there are no traces of him in Spano’s notes on his 
stay in China. On Sunday 28th August, Spano left Moscow at 10 p.m. to 
go to China by train, apparently together with Dyakov. 
reconstruct the human and social context of his experience. 
5 “Minuta di lettera di Togliatti di presentazione di Velio Spano ai dirigenti del Pc cinese, 
in occasione del suo viaggio in Cina 29 luglio 1949”, Archivi Fondazione Gramsci, Fondo 
Palmiro Togliatti, Serie 5, Corrispondenza politica, 1949, 08/01/1949-25/11/1949, UA 6, Busta 
1 (URL http://www.archivionline.senato.it/default.htm).
6 Taccuino blu, 22nd August 1949. 
7 Taccuino blu, 23rd August 1949.
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On that occasion he met or was introduced to Wang Jiaxiang. In Spring 
and Summer 1949, together with Liu Shaoqi, Wang had stayed in Mos-
cow in order to negotiate the future alliance between the two countries. 
While Liu had gone back to Beijing in July, Wang was returning to China 
in late August in order to participate in the Central Political Consultative 
Conference in September (Heinzing 2015, 221). Spano spent some time 
with Wang and his wife, travelling together with some Chinese students 
and was left with a very positive impression. Later, in Beijing, Wang was 
put in charge of the organisation of Spano’s work by Mao Zedong himself, 
and so became a pivotal figure in managing the presence of the Italian 
visitor in China, something that could suggests that the Chinese leader 
was especially sensitive to the role of Spano as it concerned the relations 
with the Soviets. 
Spano arrived in China on 5th September at Manzhouli, and one day 
later he was in Harbin. His first official meeting occurred when he was 
welcomed by Gao Gang in Shenyang. After a short visit of the city, just one 
day later, on Wednesday 10th Spano arrived in Beijing. He was hosted at 
the former Germania Hotel. The same evening, Zhou Enlai visited him at 
the hotel, bringing Mao’s greetings, and two days later, he was invited by 
Liu Shaoqi and his wife for dinner. 
Spano spent more than one month in Beijing, leaving for the South on 
October 20th. During this period he attended two main events, namely the 
meeting of the new Central Political Consultative Conference, held from 
21st September to 30th September and the establishment of the People’s 
Republic on 1st October. Besides meeting with several leading figures 
of the CCP, including Mao, he also participated in several social events, 
especially banquets and theatre shows, and visited factories, universities, 
offices and villages. Moreover, as noted above, he addressed the meeting 
for the foundation of the Chinese Congress for World Peace, which was 
held on 2nd October, but also gave several lectures to cadres and students 
and released interviews. For a couple of days, he went also to visit Tianjin 
and gave talks there. 
Hu Qiaomu and Wang Jiaxiang were the two most important CCP mem-
bers in charge of supervising Spano’s work in Beijing. Hu was actually 
the secretary of Mao Zedong. During the first week in Beijing, Spano dis-
cussed with Hu several aspects of his work as a journalist. He was eager 
to send news and dispatches home, and he was allowed to use the French 
telegraph.8 This was very expensive and he was obliged to stop. Authorised 
then to use the Chinese telegraph at Press fees, he realised that the costs 
were still too high to send full articles to Italy. Effectively, Spano used the 
telegraph to communicate briefly with Togliatti (T. or To. in his notes), 
8 Taccuino blu, 13th September 1949.
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while the articles about China were sent by ordinary mail, and published 
in Italy some weeks after the events described.9 
Wang, who was made responsible for Spano by Mao himself, was actually 
in charge of organising and approving his travel and work activities. As 
Spano noticed, at any rate, Mao had the last word regarding his work-plan.10 
The first social event Spano participated in was the banquet for Sino-
Soviet friendship, held on 15th September in Beijing. On that occasion he 
had the opportunity to meet the mayor of Shanghai, Chen Yi, and also Li 
Lisan and Zhu De. Zhu De invited him for dinner, but it was with Chen Yi 
that Spano apparently developed a more substantial relationship, since 
they met several times also in Shanghai. He also had the opportunity to 
meet and interview Guo Moruo, and Song Qingling. Moreover, in Beijing 
he also had long conversations with Peng Zhen, and other members of 
the local Party and government. He often spent time with some Soviet 
colleagues, sharing several visits and coordinating his writings with them. 
In the second half of October 1949, Spano was allowed to make a long 
trip to the South, provided with an official authorisation signed by Zhu 
De himself. He left from Beijing with a group of interpreters and aides on 
20th October. The first stop was Xuzhou, where the group (Spano often 
speaks of ‘us’ but it is not clear if he refers to his interpreters) waited all 
day long “the Soviets from the South and Liu Bocheng from the North”.11 
Then they decided to leave together with the staff of the Second Army, and 
were joined by Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping. 
The journey to the South with the People’s Liberation Army was neither 
comfortable nor easy. After Xuzhou, Spano together with Liu Bocheng and 
the other military commanders moved to Zhengzhou and then to Hankou. 
Here they were welcomed by Lin Biao, whom he interviewed. From Hankou, 
the group continued by boat to Jiujiang where they arrived on 26th October. 
Spano fell ill. Travelling in a truck, he arrived in Ji’an in Jiangxi. From that 
moment, due to his precarious health, it seems that relations with his hosts 
became slightly more complicated, since his poor health made him less 
patient and co-operative before the Chinese’ eyes. By truck, ‘on impossible 
roads’ that followed the course of the Ganjiang River, the group reached 
Ganzhou, and then Shaoguan in Guangdong Province. On 1st November, 
at last, he was able to leave for Canton, just two weeks after the city had 
been conquered by the PLA. 
His journey in the South revealed to Spano a different situation from 
that in the North. There was still war, as he emphasised in his book (Spano 
1950, 96-103). From his annotations in the travel journal, it would seem 
9 Taccuino blu, 14th September 1949.
10 Taccuino blu, 17th October 1949.
11 Taccuino blu, 21st October 1949.
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he had the impression that, whereas in Manchuria and North China the 
Party was actually in full control of the situation, in the Southern regions 
this was not the case at all. Commanders complained that subordinates 
ignored orders, local cadres were quite reticent, disorganisation reigned 
everywhere and comrades seemed to take many things too lightly.12 As he 
wrote in the published book, this was another China, and Northern com-
rades were simply not able to speak the local language (Spano 1950, 97). 
But the problem was more complex than just a question of communication. 
In Shaoguan he noticed that the Party’s authority was really weak and 
often challenged at local level. 
We must leave at 5 a.m. Yeh Kien-Yin [Ye Jianying author’s note] has 
telegraphed twice ordering that we leave immediately. But the local 
cadre, Huan, does not want to understand and simply goes on sleeping. 
At the station, there is an indescribable confusion. At last, at 7 a.m. an 
armored car arrives to be used as a locomotive. We know that Huan has 
lied: the telephone line to Canton is working and the only interruption 
of the line is the bridge.13 
Several similar episodes of disorganisation and insubordination were re-
ported briefly by Spano during his trip to the South. 
The Italian journalist spent ten days in Canton, meeting Ye Jianying sev-
eral times, and having conversations with several local military cadres. He 
got the impression that the political and social situation there was really 
complicated. His entry for 8th November reports he had had a conversa-
tion with Fang Fang, who was in charge of rural reform in Guangdong. “I 
have the impression that they finally begin to think seriously of the prob-
lem of the agrarian class”.14 Later he had conversations also with Chen 
Geng, military commander of the Fourth Army. He had the feeling that in 
South China the Communists had a lot of work to do, and that there was 
not enough awareness of the challenges the Party had to face. 
On 12th November, Spano left Canton. Through Shaoguan, Ganzhou, 
Nanchang, he reached Hangzhou, where he met Tan Zhenli. In Shanghai, 
where he arrived on 20th November, he had talks with Rao Sushi and Chen 
Yi and several other important CCP cadres, such as Zhang Hanfu, who later 
became vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Liu Xiao, who in 1955 became 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Talks in Shanghai mainly concerned the 
economy. On 4th December, after two weeks in Shanghai, Spano left for 
Nanjing, and on 8th December he was again in Beijing, where after some 
12 Taccuino blu, 27th October, 30th October 1949.
13 Taccuino blu, 2nd November 1949. 
14 Taccuino blu, 8th November 1949.
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days he was informed by Hu Qiaomu that Mao had left for Moscow (“This 
thing can evidently be of enormous relevance”, he wrote in his travel 
journal).15 In Beijing, Spano had now the opportunity to talk to Bo Yibo 
and Li Lisan, and made some visits around the outskirts of the capital. A 
few days later, he went to visit Baoding. During his last days in Beijing 
he mainly worked at home, feeling quite lonely, despite official banquets 
and meetings. On 2nd January, Spano left Beijing, making his way back 
to Moscow through Manchuria, where he stopped for several days, and 
met Gao Gang. On 10th January, he finally crossed the border. His visit to 
China had come to an end after four whole months. 
During his trip, Spano had the opportunity to have talks at the highest 
level of power in China. These conversations furnished him with infor-
mation about the old China and the revolution that were reported in his 
articles and books, but evidently they also touched upon sensitive issues, 
such as rural reform and party organisation at local level. Besides work 
meetings, Spano’s contacts with his hosts were developed not only at 
official events, like banquets, dinners and the theatre, but also through 
informal occasions such as strolls and private visits to family homes, which 
are often not reported in detail. 
But the Chinese were not the only figures in the picture. Spano was also 
in close contact with the Soviets and other foreigners present in China 
at that time. As can be seen in Spano’s travel journal, the Soviets played 
a great role in his stay in Beijing. He often, apparently, coordinated his 
informative work with his Soviet colleagues, and especially with Vladimir 
Rogov, the Tass correspondent who had long experience in China. Rogov 
features prominently in Spano’s diary referred to on several occasions as 
a friendly colleague. Spano also met Alexander Fedeev, the Soviet writer, 
at that time Chairman of the Writers’ Association of the Soviet Union, who 
was there for the establishment of the People’s Republic and the birth of 
the Chinese Congress for World Peace. Besides Rogov, Spano reports meet-
ings with General Ivan Kovalev, at the time Stalin’s middleman in Beijing. 
After a dinner with him, in 17th October, he wrote that he absolutely had 
to meet him again after his return to Beijing after the trip to South, though 
the diary does not report when, if at all, this new meeting took place. With 
Rogov and Kovalev, Spano exchanged views and impressions about China 
and their hosts. He also had a long conversation, which he defined a ‘cour-
tesy visit’ with Pyotr Shabaev, chargè d’affaires at the Soviet Embassy in 
Canton.16 According to Soviet sources, the visit was requested secretly by 
Spano himself (Meliksetov 1996; Hou 2010). 
Moreover, Spano met several Westerners who were there for the Peace 
15 Taccuino blu, 11th December 1949.
16 Taccuino blu, 9th December 1949.
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Conference, part of the network of international solidarity that, in the 
name of peace, the Soviet Union was creating, offering new channels of 
exchange and contacts between the West and China. Among these, he met 
the famous Russian violinist, Galina Barinova, and the French Communist 
Party feminist activist, Simone Bertrand. 
He did also meet some Italians. In his book on China, Spano mentioned 
only Father Paludetti, who was in charge of an Italian school in Hankou 
that he was invited to visit17 (Spano 1950, 90). But he also met an un-
named Italian priest in Tianjin, a well-known Italian resident in Beijing, 
Dr. Ugo Capuzzo, a physician one-time owner of one of the most famous 
nightclubs in the city, and in Shanghai, Giuseppe Altomare, trade attachè 
at the Italian Embassy there.18 Spano spent several days with Altomare 
and was considerably impressed by him, as he recorded in his notes. He 
also introduced Altomare to Zhang Hanfu, suggesting that Spano was 
also exploring the business opportunities for Italian firms in view of the 
huge sums that the Chinese told him were earmarked for investment in 
industrial development.19 Incidentally the relationship between Spano and 
Altomare is quite intriguing, as it apparently continued in the following 
years. A letter of Altomare to Spano, dated 20th July 1952, when Altomare 
was already moved to Hong Kong, suggests that not only the two were 
good friends and shared common views and ideological positions regard-
ing Communist China, but also that Altomare was eager to support the 
Chinese propaganda in the West.20
All these elements compose a complex picture of Spano’s experience 
during these four months in China. Actually, his presence was a notewor-
thy, but also apparently a problematic, event where political, cultural and 
contingent factors were intertwined, influencing the attitude of the Chi-
nese leadership towards him and his perception of the Chinese revolution. 
3 Behind the Public Narrative: Spano and Mao’s ‘Cold Bench’
Considering Spano’s background, his close relation with Togliatti and the 
support he evidently received from the Soviet Union, his visit to China raises 
17 Informed of Spano’s arrival, Father Paludetti in person invited him to visit the school he 
directed. See “Lettera di padre Paludetti”, 25th October 1949, Archivi Fondazione Gramsci, 
Fondo Velio Spano e Nadia Gallico, Serie 6, “Esteri e Movimento Pace”, FF 91, Viaggio in 
Cina: Lettere e Foto. Busta 14.
18 Taccuino blu, 21st, 22nd November 1949.
19 Taccuino blu, 29th November 1949.
20 See “Lettera di Giuseppe Altomare a Velio Spano”, 20 luglio 1952, Archivio Fondazione 
Gramsci, Fondo Velio Spano e Nadia Gallico, Serie 6: Esteri e Movimento per la Pace, FF. 
91, Viaggio in Cina: Lettere e foto, busta 14. 
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important questions. Though the specific historical circumstances that de-
termined Spano’s visit are still to be explored, it occurred in a period when 
China was reflecting about and preparing itself for a possible integration in 
the Socialist world. Nevertheless, though he met international activists and 
spoke to the assembly of the Chinese Congress for World Peace, Spano was 
not actually in China just as a representative of Communist international-
ism. His presence had also a more specific political impact, since it also had 
something to do with inter-Party relationships. As we have seen, Togliatti 
himself wrote a letter of introduction for Spano to the Chinese leaders. The 
Italian Communist leader’s interest in developing contacts with the Chinese 
Communists and understanding better the Chinese situation is confirmed 
by the fact that, during his stay in China, Spano frequently made references 
to dispatches addressed directly by him to the ICP leader. 
Moreover, Spano’s visit came during a crucial moment for China for 
important decisions on economic strategy and international politics were 
being taken by the Chinese Communists in those months. More precisely, 
it was at this time that the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists were 
discussing a future alliance (Heinzig 2015; Shen, Xia 2015). Spano arrived 
in China from the Soviet Union. The Soviets supported his trip, and in 
China he was in close contact with Soviet journalists and representatives. 
And, as already noticed, during Spano’s stay in China, Mao himself made 
Wang Jiaxiang responsible for Spano’s work.
All this reveals a complicated scenario. Certainly the relationship that 
Spano had with the Soviets was an important factor for it affected the 
Chinese attitude towards him, as well as his view of the Chinese revolu-
tion. Spano’s experience in China may well reveal much concerning rela-
tions between the Soviet Union and China at that time: annotations in his 
travel diary, for instance, would suggest that talks with Rogov, Cavalev 
and Shabaev were important for Spano’s views of China. In spite of the 
revolutionary enthusiasm and strength that he clearly acknowledged his 
Chinese hosts possessed, he was aware of the huge challenges that the 
Chinese Communist Party had to face and recognised that, in many cases, 
the leaders undervalued the risks and the challenges ahead, relying almost 
blindly, on their military capacity and Mao’s ideology of rural revolution. 
An evaluation of his relations with the Chinese, and of how his presence 
was considered by the Chinese leaders at that time is also rather compli-
cated. Certainly, he received material support and appreciated the friendly 
attitude of Chinese leaders and cadres shown him on many occasions. He 
had the opportunity to visit several places, even recently-liberated Canton, 
and, with the help of some interpreters, was able also to have long con-
versations with several Chinese national and local leaders, in the North as 
in the South. These visits and conversations, duly recorded, represent the 
bulk of his articles, travelogue and a book on the Chinese revolution that 
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he wrote but never published.21 Nevertheless, such unpublished sources 
as his travel journal reveal that Spano’s experience of China was not all 
plain sailing. His journal entries seem to suggest that Spano was aware 
of some ambivalence in his regard especially during and after his trip to 
the South. He made frequent reference to a Chinese proverb, mention-
ing that he had found ‘a cold bench’ (leng bandeng) as a way to indicate 
the difficulties and obstacles of various kinds that he had encountered. 
Interestingly enough, it was Mao himself who suggested this expression to 
Spano during their conversation. The President warned him that he might 
well come upon ‘a cold bench’ hinting likely cold or unfriendly attitudes.22 
Indeed, the conversation between Mao and Spano is quite revealing of 
how the Chinese considered and what they expected from their Italian 
comrade. Spano reported their meeting in a notebook,23 and these annota-
tions were the basis for a chapter of his book (Spano 1950, 49-57). Actually, 
his personal notes give some information about the talks with Mao that 
were not included in the published report, and help to understand how 
Spano’s role was considered by the Chinese Communists.
The meeting between Mao and Spano took place on 23rd September, 
ten days after his arrival in Beijing. Spano had already met Zhou Enlai, 
Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De. He had seen Mao at the Assembly of the Political 
Consultative Conference on 21st September. The day after, Hu Qiaomu 
came to his hotel to tell him that Mao was waiting for him. Mao was with 
Wang Jiaxiang and immediately told Spano that maybe not all the comrades 
had understood the relevance of his presence, and that he would explain it 
to everyone, making Spano understand that he had his personal approval. 
The President explained that the Chinese Communists’ victory had been 
made possible by the Chinese people’s struggle as well as the support of 
others, first of the Soviet Union, and then of the new democratic countries 
(i.e. Socialist brother countries) and the workers in capitalist countries. 
This aid had to be material as well as political.24 Once the importance of 
international support for the Chinese revolution was acknowledged, how-
ever, Mao reminded Spano immediately that the main goal of his trip was 
not to inform the outer world as a journalist but to study and understand 
China. “To send reports and articles is now secondary. You can do it, but it 
is not essential” he said. In actual fact, Mao emphasised, “a useful aspect 
of your trip is your participation in our activities, and we invite you to 
21 The manuscript of this book is preserved in the Archives of the Fondazione Gramsci. 
Fondo Velio Spano e Nadia Gallico. Serie 6: Esteri e Movimento per la Pace. FF. 92 “Origi-
nale libro sulla Cina. Inedito”, 1950, busta 14. 
22 Taccuino blu, 22nd September 1949.
23 Appunti presi in Cina, II, 23rd September 1949.
24 Appunti presi in Cina, II, 23rd September 1949. 
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speak out and share your experience with us”. Replying to this invitation, 
Spano courteously affirmed that he had nothing to teach. But Mao insisted, 
replying that “you must not think that in China everything is going well”.25 
During the conversation, Mao insisted that Spano study China, its modern 
history, and the history of the Party, in order to understand their past expe-
rience, their mistakes and the way they had been able to overcome them. 
Moreover, Spano was “not here only to eat from the others, but also to give 
them to eat. You cannot only take, you should also give. Do tell us what Italy 
is like”.26 So he presented the Italian situation to Mao, even drawing a small 
map of the country in the notebook to show where places were. Mao ordered 
that a great map of Italy should be ready for Spano’s lectures to the cadres. 
But again the President felt that it was important that the guest not 
focus too much on his role as a journalist. 
Do not hurry to publish. You can send your impressions to Italy, but 
what is essential is that you study the situation. You now have just some 
information for a couple of articles, but not to write an organic study. I 
will provide you with the material. Tonight you will have dinner at my 
place: you will find all the comrades of the Central Committee whom I 
told to help you in everything, here in Beijing and outside Beijing. Now, 
since every task needs someone who is in charge, Comrade Wang will 
be the responsible for your work.27
A second concern of Mao’s was to inform or rather, warn, Spano that he 
might come upon a number of difficulties in his work, in spite of Mao’s 
support and approval. Mao apparently apologised for the fact that Spano 
had not been received in a proper manner. But he reminded his guest that, 
as a Communist, he had to be ready for anything. 
Communists must prepare themselves to meet any event. And you who 
have come to China must be ready to find ‘a cold bench’, as we say. 
Maybe also when you go to the provinces, I believe it will be easy for you 
because we will help you, but at any rate you must be ready to sit on a 
‘cold bench’. The Chinese people do not like foreigners. And it is easy 
to understand. Italian missionaries in China do not treat the Chinese 
well. The worst are the American, then the British and the French, but 
also the Italians.28 
25 Appunti presi in Cina, II, 23rd September 1949.
26 Appunti presi in Cina, II, 23rd September 1949.
27 Appunti presi in Cina, II, 23rd September 1949.
28 Appunti presi in Cina, II, 23rd September 1949.
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When Spano replied that even in Italy the priests are bad to Italians, Mao 
reminded him that at any rate, 
missionaries had been very able at overcoming any difficulty: when the 
Chinese people had refused their ‘mercenary-religion’, they looked for ill 
people and they began to distribute presents for the New Year’s Festival. 
You should do as they did, overcome the difficulties. For everything, it 
is necessary to fight, without struggle you obtain nothing.29 
What did Mao actually mean by ‘cold bench’? Was he referring to the weak 
Party control and disorganisation in the provinces, and especially in the 
South, a reality that could influence Spano’s opinion of Chinese revolution 
and certainly hinder his work? Or was he hinting at the fact that Spano 
should be aware that his presence could in some cases be unwelcome, and 
he had to downsize his expectations in order to do his work, to win over 
their friendship and trust and offer something in exchange? 
Indeed, Spano was quite impressed by Mao’s words, and often referred to 
the ‘cold bench’ in his travel diary. He discovered that they were sitting on 
a cold bench during his long trip to Canton, when he became aware of the 
local disorganisation and maybe hostility of the local cadres. In Shaoguan, in 
his entry for 31st October he wrote: “At Shaoguan there is the cold bench of 
Mao. Comrades are like fish out of water. The last stop to Canton is clearly 
difficult”.30 Back in Shaoguan after two weeks, upon his return to North Chi-
na, he mentioned again the difficult situation writing “once again, the usual 
cold bench”.31 It is evident that disorganisation and insubordination delayed 
the travel and almost made work impossible, not only for Spano, but for all the 
comrades who had come with him to the recently-liberated South. According 
to Spano, more than himself, it was these revolutionary comrades who were 
sitting on a cold bench, unable to control the affairs on the field, actually 
without power and often not really aware of the challenges they have to face. 
But back in Beijing, in early December 1949, Spano experimented a dif-
ferent kind of ‘cold bench’, an unexpected sense of marginalization if not 
distrust from his hosts. It was not disorganisation. It looked more like politi-
cal isolation from the CCP comrades. The entries for these days in his travel 
journal suggest that he began to perceive that the climate around him was 
not positive, though it is not easy to catch the full meaning of his notes.
December, Friday 9th. Arrival in Beijing. Again the ‘cold bench’. C. [Kova-
lev?] and R. [Rogov?] are travelling to Moscow, who knows why? The im-
29 Appunti presi in Cina, II, 23rd September 1949. 
30 Taccuino blu, 31st October 1949. 
31 Taccuino blu, 14th November 1949.
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pressions of C. have been confirmed to me by P. [not identified]. “They do 
not like our help”, he/she said talking of the non c. [?] of the government.32 
In spite of the lack of detail, the overall impression is that he felt that his 
own relations with the Chinese comrades had became colder than he had 
expected. He spent the last days in Beijing mainly working alone in the 
hotel. He had meetings with Bo Yibo and Li Lisan. Spano’s records of these 
conversations hint at an increasing skepticism towards the Chinese revolu-
tionary strategy at this stage, for example regarding the CCP leaders’ trust 
in the capacity of the Army and Mao’s political leadership in addressing 
the menace of insurgent capitalism in rural areas;33 their ‘too schematic’ 
understanding of class struggle34 and their ability to build up the Party in 
the countryside, as demonstrated by their confusing information about the 
actual numbers of Party members.35 His initial enthusiasm for the Chinese 
revolution seems, according to these short comments, dampened by the 
feeling that too many questions were not fully addressed or understood. 
With Liu Shaoqi, he had the opportunity to discuss a possible Italian support 
to new China, as the dispatch of technicians. Liu was skeptikal about this, 
though he agreed to develop an exchange of ‘comrades’ between the two 
parties.36 It is hard to say if the Chinese political establishment was aware 
of his skepticism and doubts and but they did have some doubts about their 
Italian comrade. Spano’s travel journal testifies, at any rate, that his feeling 
of being marginalized in Beijing persisted for several days. In the Chinese 
capital he found himself isolated and kept at a distance. He recorded:
December, 20th. I leave for Tangshan and then Baoding where all, even the 
president of the government, Yan, who is ill, will receive us. In the evening, 
at Beijing, ‘cold bench’. Mao’s visit has not had the effect that I expected. 
December, 21st. There is an atmosphere of celebration, it is the an-
niversary of Stalin. Parade and speech of Zhou. They forgot to invite me 
to the meeting. Later they apologized a lot. 
December 22nd. I worked at home. Hu [Qiaomu] sent someone to in-
form me that he will answer the day after tomorrow about the last meet-
ings. He requires a letter. I do not understand this bureaucratic attitude.37 
32 Taccuino blu, 9th December 1949.
33 Taccuino blu, 12th December 1949. 
34 Taccuino blu, 13th December 1949.
35 Taccuino blu, 24th December 1949.
36 Appunti presi in Cina, IX, December 26th, 1949. 
37 Taccuino blu, 21st, 22nd, 23rd December 1949. 
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Spano recorded in his travel journal that he just worked at home, receiving 
some visits from his collaborators, but attracting no sign of interest from 
the Chinese authorities. He felt to all intents and purposes, practically 
ignored. The reasons for this cold attitude were not clear to him. Were 
maybe Spano’s close relations to the Soviets in China a problematic issue 
for his hosts? As we have seen in 20th December record, Spano seemed 
disappointed that Mao’s visit to Moscow was not facilitating the coopera-
tion between him, the Chinese and the Soviets, suggesting that he was 
aware that his own position was closely linked to the development of Sino-
Soviet relations. But he did not explicit his views about this in his notes. 
He just decided to go back to Italy: “December 23rd. Still at home. I be-
gin to prepare my baggage. We need to telegraph in order to guarantee the 
connection”.38 Apparently, his decision to leave China made his relationship 
with his hosts smoother. The Chinese comrades in the Central Committee 
again seemed eager to show their friendship in the last days of his stay 
in Beijing. On 26th December he was invited to a last official banquet at 
Zhongnanhai. There he met Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Li Lisan, Bo 
Yibo and several other leaders. According to Spano’s notes, they all were 
very eager in giving him advice about the Italian situation and the risks of 
an imperialist attack to both Italy and France.39 Liu insisted that the Italian 
Communists had to be ready for a clandestine struggle and military opera-
tions. On his side, Zhu De emphasised the need of a the party’s political 
work within the army. Lastly Zhou told Spano that according to his own 
view, Togliatti had to refuse the parliament and flee to an area where he 
could be protected by the support of the masses in the fight for revolu-
tion. Spano commented “they all mention Mao, the Chinese example, the 
Chinese experience, the Chinese victory”.40 Apparently propaganda had 
taken the place of discussion and confrontation with the foreign comrade. 
Later Spano laconically noticed that with the Chinese now “everything 
seems fine”.41 On 2nd January, he left Beijing. In his published reports he 
never mentioned the ‘cold bench’ as he had experienced it in China. 
38 Taccuino blu, 23rd December 1949.
39 Appunti presi in Cina, IX, 26th December 1949.
40 Appunti presi in Cina, IX, 26th December 1949.
41 Taccuino blu, 28th December 1949.
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4 Conclusions: Velio Spano in the Relations  
Between CCP and ICP 
The legacy of Spano’s long sojourn in China during those crucial months 
for the relations between Italy and China is still unexplored. On the public 
side, back in Italy Spano had several conferences introducing the Chinese 
Revolution to the Italian public, and wrote several articles and a book that 
was actually the first about the topic in Italy. Nevertheless, he did not pub-
lish another book he later worked on about the ideological and political 
problem of the Chinese revolution, and class struggle in China. His politi-
cal interests and activities, moreover, were mainly focused on other issues, 
and especially on the struggles of the miners in his province, Sardinia. 
Nevertheless, in 1956 he was put in charge of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs of the ICP, and two years later he became the Secretary of the Ital-
ian Congress for Peace (Cerrai 2011). This double role projected Spano 
again at the forefront of relations between Italy (especially the ICP) and 
the Socialist world, China included. Even a partial overview of Spano’s per-
sonal archives for that period, actually, shows that the network of contacts 
he had had the opportunity to create in China during those weeks in 1949 
were considered, at least in Italy, an important asset for the development 
of informal relations between the two countries. One example of this can 
be seen in his relationship with the Centro per le Relazioni Economiche 
e Culturali con la Cina (Centre for Economic and Cultural Relations with 
China) that since 1954 was in charge of organizing several exchanges and 
missions with People’s China (Samarani, Meneguzzi 2014, 93-118). 
Spano and Sergio Segre, the ICP member who was the secretary of the 
Centre, often exchanged opinions on the topic of Italian relations with 
China. Spano was consulted about all important issues, as the choice of 
Italian students to send to China,42 the Italian proposal of opening a branch 
of the Chinese News Agency Xinhua in Italy43 and the economic mission 
to China to be led by the Christian Democrat, Teresio Guglielmone,44 in 
view of a meeting that Spano was expected to have (and actually had) with 
42 “Lettera di Sergio Segre a Spano”, July 31st 1957, Archivio Fondazione Gramsci, Fondo 
Velio Spano e Nadia Gallico, Serie 6: Esteri e Movimento per la Pace, FF.108 Centro Cina, 
busta 17.
43 “Lettera di Velio Spano a Sergio Segre”, April 1st 1958, Archivio Fondazione Gramsci, 
Fondo Velio Spano e Nadia Gallico, Serie 6: Esteri e Movimento per la Pace, FF.108 Centro 
Cina, busta 17
44 “Lettera di Sergio Segre a Velio Spano”, June 12, 1958, Archivio Fondazione Gramsci, 
Fondo Velio Spano e Nadia Gallico, Serie 6: Esteri e Movimento per la Pace, FF.108 Centro 
Cina, busta 17.
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Chen Yi in Berne, in Summer 1958.45 This event, still unstudied, raised 
several expectations on the ICP side that they would again play a pivotal 
role in Sino-Italian relations, a role apparently weakened by the activism 
of other economic and political players, which may well have been more 
appreciated by the Chinese government looking for political recognition 
and economic aid beyond the Soviet umbrella. 
Spano’s role in the relations with China in the ’50s is also proven by a 
letter that Deng Xiaoping himself sent to Spano in 1957, as a reply to a 
previous letter that the Italian politician had addressed to Deng thanks 
to the help of the Communist economic expert Giuseppe Regis and the 
Chinese Embassy in Berne.46
In the history of relations between the People’s Republic and Italy, Velio 
Spano’s journey to China is often just mentioned as a significant, but not so 
determining episode. Conversely, a closer look at his experience in China 
and at its subsequent legacy reveals a much richer and more complex sig-
nificance of that experience, both in terms of the Italian Communist Party’s 
understanding of the Chinese revolution and the development of relations 
with the Chinese Communists within the Socialist camp and in terms of pros-
pects for Sino-Italian relations. Apparently, after this visit, Spano himself did 
not claim a specific public role in the ICP in relations with the Chinese side. 
But this role was a fact. Considered from a historical perspective, nobody, 
in Italy, shared the privilege that Spano had enjoyed: to be a witness – if not 
an actor – of those crucial months when much of the new China and of its 
relations to the outer world were effectively being shaped. 
45 The trip to Berne has been mentioned by Spano’s daughters who were with their father 
on that occasion. Personal communication to the Author. 
46 “Lettera di Deng Xiaoping”, January 30th, 1957. Archivio Fondazione Gramsci, Fondo 
Velio Spano e Nadia Gallico, Serie 6: Esteri e Movimento per la Pace, FF.110 Lettera di 
Deng Xiaoping, busta 17.
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Archival sources
Archivio Fondazione Gramsci, Roma, Fondo Velio Spano e Nadia Gallico. 
Archivio Fondazione Gramsci, Roma, Fondo Palmiro Togliatti. 
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Abstract This paper examines the role played by adult-led youth groups in providing avenues for 
early encounters between Italian and Chinese Communists in the ’50s. In particular, it focuses on the 
links built up within international organisations linked to the Soviet-sponsored peace movement at 
a time when direct exchange between the Italian and Chinese Communist parties had yet to start. 
Relying on a large variety of primary and secondary sources, some of which have never been used 
before, I provide evidence of how participation in Soviet-led international organisations made early 
political contacts and interactions possible. The focus is on Bruno Bernini, whose personal experi-
ence in China is examined within the context of the World Federation of Democratic Youth’s policies 
and initiatives in the early and mid-’50s.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 Communist Youth Groups and Early Opportunities for Sino-italian 
Exchange. – 3 Participation in the WFDY. – 4 The WFDY Initiatives in China. – 5 Encountering Maoist 
China: Bruno Bernini’s Experience and Memories. – 6 Conclusion.
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1 Introduction
In the ’50s the Italian Communist Party (ICP) played a crucial role in the 
unconventional party-to-party diplomacy between Italy and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). As the largest Communist party in Western Eu-
rope, the ICP had considerable influence in Italian society and thus could 
play an important role in forging public opinion, building up awareness in 
I wish to thank the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange for the 
Post-doc fellowship in 2012 and Catia Sonetti, Director of Istituto Storico della Resistenza e 
della Società Contemporanea (ISTORECO), for the kind support given to this research. 
198 Graziani. International Political Activism in the ’50s
Roads to Reconciliation, 197-220 
e-ISSN 2610-9042
ISSN 2610-9654 
civil society actors of the importance of the ‘New China’. As a matter of 
fact, it provided a privileged channel for unofficial Sino-Italian exchanges 
in the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Sama-
rani, De Giorgi 2011). 
Relations between the Italian and the Chinese Communist parties 
passed via Moscow and were inevitably shaped by the developments tak-
ing place within the world Communist movement. Indeed, positive rela-
tions developed up until 1957, largely based on solidarity and similarity of 
judgements. Beginning in the late ’50s, however, ideological differences 
between Italian and Chinese Communists slowly started to emerge: both 
parties began to develop clearly distinct positions, and – in the wake of 
the Sino-Soviet split – their relationship eventually fell apart (Samarani, 
Graziani 2015; see also Höbel 2005).
Exchange of delegations was one of the most important forms of direct 
interaction among party leaders. Yet, only in 1956 did the first bilateral 
exchange of delegations take place on the occasion of national party con-
gresses, thereby laying the foundations for subsequent contacts, the most 
prominent taking place in 1959 when the ICP sent its first high-level del-
egation to China to meet the leaders of the CCP (see Samarani’s chapter 
in this volume).
Until 1956, links had been created through other channels: mainly at 
an individual level, or through national organisations affiliated with, or 
somehow gravitating around the Communist parties. Contact among Com-
munist leaders arose also within international left-wing coordination bod-
ies, such as the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International 
Union of Students, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Women’s 
International Democratic Federation, and the World Peace Council.
In point of fact, since the early years of the PRC up to the early ’60s, at 
a time when China’s contacts with the outside world were limited by the 
logic of the Cold War and the PRC found itself isolated, these organisations 
provided a crucial window for China’s international exposure both within 
and beyond the Soviet bloc, representing privileged avenues of dialogue 
and exchange between the newly established PRC and various foreign 
political groups and individual representatives.
This article examines the role played by adult-led youth groups in pro-
viding avenues for early encounters between Italian and Chinese Commu-
nists, focusing on the links built up within international political organisa-
tions linked to the Soviet-sponsored peace movement at a time when direct 
exchange of delegations between the Italian and Chinese Communist par-
ties had yet to start. Elsewhere I have investigated ‘people-to-people’ di-
plomacy between the early PRC and different youth groups in Italy from 
both perspectives, providing a detailed narrative of the extent and type of 
contacts undertaken in this period (Graziani 2017). In this article, I provide 
evidence of how participation in Soviet-led international youth organisa-
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tions made early political contacts and interactions possible, by relying 
on a large variety of primary and secondary sources, some of which have 
never been used before. The focus is on Bruno Bernini, whose personal 
experience in China is examined within the context of the World Federa-
tion of Democratic Youth (WFDY)’s policies and initiatives in the early and 
mid-’50s.
2 Communist Youth Groups and Early Opportunities  
for Sino-Italian Exchange 
As far as it is known, the first time an Italian Communist representative 
visited China was in 1949 shortly before the proclamation of the PRC. The 
prominent Italian Communist Velio Spano (1905-1964), then a member of 
the ICP’s highest ruling body, travelled to China (from September 1949 to 
January 1950) as a correspondent of the official party newspaper L’Unità 
and witnessed the Communists’ seizure of power (Spano 1950; on Spano’s 
experience in China see De Giorgi’s chapter in this volume). Although this 
first visit was paid by a delegate in an individual capacity, it laid the founda-
tion for subsequent contact, and would be remembered by Chinese leaders 
as the first contact the victorious Chinese revolution had with a European 
Communist representative.1 In the following years, it was through the Cen-
tre for the Development of Economic and Cultural Relations with China (or 
‘Centro Cina’) especially that contacts between Italian and Chinese Com-
munists were developed. Created in 1953 as an autonomous institution 
aimed at promoting cultural and economic exchange and at pushing for 
Italy’s recognition of the PRC, it was nonetheless an organisation close to 
the Italian left and its members included a large number of ICP members 
(Samarani 2014). Early indirect contact was also made possible through 
a network of mass organisations that, despite being formally autonomous, 
were somehow ‘collateral’ to the ICP, and more generally to the political 
parties of the Italian left. Some of these organisations were able to send 
delegations to China at that time, especially on the occasion of annual 
celebrations. One such instance was the 1954 visit to China made by an 
Italian labour union delegation guided by Bruno Trentin, and composed of 
members of both the ICP and the Italian Socialist Party, which was invited 
to participate in the 1st May labour celebration.2
1 “Brevi note per la Segreteria del PCI della delegazione inviata a Pechino per assistere al-
la celebrazione del X anniversario della fondazione della RPC”, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, 
Archivi del Partito comunista italiano, Estero, mf. 0464, Cina, 1959, 2973-81 (2981).
2 “Comunicazione di Bruno Trentin alla Segreteria del PCI” 1/7/1954, Fondazione Istituto 
Gramsci, Archivi del Partito comunista italiano, Partiti esteri, mf. 0424, Cina, 1954, pagina 0429. 
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The ICP’s junior partner, the Italian Communist Youth Federation (ICYF) 
provided a direct channel for contacts since it was part and parcel of the 
Communist party’s organisational structure. In the early ’50s its political 
initiatives concerned, among other things, the struggle for peace and na-
tional independence (cf. Bruno Bernini and Renzo Trivelli’s contributions 
in Berlinguer et al. 1976, 51-68). A 1955 national document entitled The 
Youth Initiative for a Foreign Policy of Independence and Peace and issued 
by the ICYF’s highest leading organ, stated that when it came to Italy’s re-
lations with the socialist world, the national interest required a new basis 
of cooperation and friendship and that ties of friendship among the peoples 
should be strengthened and diplomatic relations with the PRC established 
(Federazione giovanile comunista italiana 1957, 49-52). By then, contacts 
between the ICYF and its Chinese counterpart, the Communist Youth Le-
ague (CYL), had already been established. In 1953 the 28-year-old, anti-
fascist partisan, Ugo Pecchioli, then member of the National Secretariat 
of the ICYF, was sent to Beijing to attend the 2nd National Congress of 
the New Democratic Youth League (the forerunner of the CYL), and spent 
almost a month in China (20th June-18th July) (Gongqingtuan zhongyang 
guoji lianluobu 2000, 9). Pecchioli travelled across the country, visiting 
important cities (i.e. Mukden [Shenyang], Fushun, Hangzhou, Nanjing and 
Shanghai), and having talks with Hu Yaobang who, by Pecchioli’s account, 
spoke frankly about the variety and complexity of the problems China was 
facing in the countryside in its march toward socialism. Pecchioli returned 
to Italy armed with a positive image of the New China. He praised both the 
land reform, which he called “a document of political wisdom and human-
ity”, and the extraordinary qualities of the Chinese people. “I think – he 
wrote in the Italian Communist Party’s official newspaper L’Unità – that 
one of the greatest [qualities] is their capacity to be forward-looking, to 
be patient, to carefully avoid rushed decisions that can lead to serious 
mistakes” (Pecchioli 1953, 3). In the same period, the All-China Youth Fed-
eration also held its 2nd National Congress, which was attended by Piero 
Pieralli, a young Italian Communist who was invited as a representative 
of the WFDY (Gongqingtuan zhongyang guoji lianluobu 2000, 8). 
In the very early days of the PRC, youth organisations played an impor-
tant role in the realm of China’s foreign relations, being responsible for 
“building good relations with foreign youth and students’ organizations 
and developing people’s diplomacy so as to break the imperialist blockade 
against China and let the whole world understand the New China, and 
sympathize with and support the righteous cause of the Chinese people” 
(Liu 2011, 2). The Communist Youth League through its International Li-
aison Department built up contacts with various national youth groups 
and individual representatives, including those from Western capitalist 
countries who had not recognised the PRC, thus becoming involved in 
China’s people diplomacy and political outreach in different parts of the 
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world. At that time, the main avenues for early exchanges between China 
and Western countries were offered through international ‘front organisa-
tions’, such as the WFDY and the International Union of Students (IUS) 
(Cao 1999, 1). International activities thus provided the framework upon 
which early links between Italian and Chinese Communist youth groups 
were established and developed.
3 Participation in the WFDY
Both the WFDY and the IUS were born out of the desire for peace soon 
after the end of World War II. The WFDY was founded in 1945 in London 
with the aim of establishing international youth cooperation for the cause 
of freedom, democracy and equality. However, with the outbreak of the Cold 
War, non-Communist groups withdrew from the WFDY, which soon devel-
oped into a Soviet-dependent ‘front organisation’ with a partisan character. 
The IUS, founded in 1946 in Prague, suffered a similar fate (Cornell 1965, 
73-95; Kotek 1996, 62-167). Both organisations ended up being dominated 
by Communists even though references to Communism – as Pia Koivunen 
(2011, 177) noted – were generally avoided in favour of new slogans call-
ing for democracy, peace and friendship that could appeal to many people 
who after the upheavals of World War II desired a peaceful world. Crucial 
in this respect was the organisation of the biannual World Festival of Youth 
and Students for Peace and Friendship, a key event in the Soviet-sponsored 
transnational campaign for peace (Koivunen 2011; Kotek 1996, 189-99). By 
the early ’50s the WFDY had become a large organisation with a transna-
tional character: its membership grew from 30 million young people repre-
senting 65 countries in 1945 to 83 million young people from 90 countries 
in 1953 (World Federation of Democratic Youth 1953, 291). Thus, despite 
being highly dependent on the Soviet Union, it did represent a place where 
young people from countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain could get 
together and also meet representatives of the Third World. 
Chinese youth were represented within both organizations up to the out-
break of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. While in 1945 groups as diverse 
as the Guomindang-affiliated Three Principles of the People Youth Corps, 
the youth association of the liberated areas, the Young Men’s Christian As-
sociation, the Young Women’s Christian Association and the Federation of 
Young Writers joined the WFDY (Gongqingtuan zhongyang guoji lianluobu 
2009, 281), following the Communist victory and the establishment of the 
PRC, the All-China Youth Federation was the sole Chinese organisation of-
ficially represented within the WFDY (302). The All-China Youth Federation 
was a national umbrella organisation whose membership included, among 
the others, the CYL, which had a key role in the Chinese political system as 
an ‘assistant’ and ‘reserve force’ of the CCP (Graziani 2013). As a matter 
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of fact, its national leaders often overlapped with those of the CYL.3 With 
the unfolding of the crisis of the world Communist movement, both the 
WFDY and the IUS developed into two of the main outposts of the politi-
cal struggle between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties. In 1966 
the PRC eventually withdrew its delegates (cf. Gongqingtuan zhongyang 
guoji lianluobu 2008, 2009). In those years, Italian Communists ended up 
taking on a prominent role within the organisation. In point of fact, with 
the outbreak of the Cold War, Italian non-Communist groups withdrew 
from the WFDY, leaving the FGCI and other extreme left-wing groups in 
the organisation.4 Italian Communists would soon assume a prominent 
position, holding the presidency for almost a decade: Enrico Berlinguer 
(1950-1953)5 was indeed followed by Bruno Bernini as president of the 
organization from 1953 up to 1959.6 Then, in August 1959 the Italian 
Communist Piero Pieralli replaced him (Pieralli eletto Presidente della 
FMGD 1959). 
By the early ’50s, the Italian Communist strategy had highlighted the 
struggle for peace and national independence as one of the main tasks 
assigned to young people post-World War II. Recognising that the wish 
for peace allowed the young to transcend class as well as religious and 
ideological differences and, moreover, as they saw the young as uncor-
rupted as yet by adult logic, Italian Communists searched for a strategy 
that could appeal to as many young people as possible in their political 
struggle for freedom and independence. As such, the Italian Communist 
Youth Federation soon took on a pivotal role in the partisans of peace move-
ment, organising and mobilising the young against the Atlantic treaty to 
which De Gasperi’s Italy adhered, against American weapons arriving in 
Italy, in favour of Korea in the early ’50s, and in the struggle for a foreign 
policy of peace, against Italy’s subordination to US policy. Yet, the propa-
ganda of peace was by no means neutral in the sense that it emphasised 
anti-Americanism and linked it with the defence of the USSR, celebrated 
3 For instance, in the second half of the ’50s, Liu Xiyuan was both a member of the Central 
Secretariat of the CYL and the President of the All-China Youth Federation. Liao Chengzhi, 
a well-known figure in the realm of Sino-Japanese relations, overseas Chinese affairs and 
peace movements, was also heavily engaged in the youth movement in the early and mid-
’50s, occupying a high position in the executive bodies of both the Youth League and the 
All-China Youth Federation (see Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, Zhonggong zhongyang 
dangshi yanjiushi and zhongyang dang’anguan 2000 and the following official website at 
http://www.cnpeople.com.cn/ql/sj/1167_20160303100015.html).
4 Such as for instance, the Italian Young Pioneers Association, the Italian Union for Popular 
Sport, Youth Commission of the CGIIL (Gongqingtuan zhongyang guoji lianluobu 2009, 320). 
5 On Berlinguer’s role in the youth movement see Barbagallo (2014, pp. 21-30).
6 “Relazione sulla partecipazione italiana al IV Festival e al III Congresso Mondiale della 
Gioventù”. Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Archivi del Partito comunista italiano, mf. 233, 
Commissione centrale giovanile e FGCI, Fondo Mosca 1948-1953.
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as a peaceful country by definition (Cerrai 2011, 135-52 and Bernini and 
Trivelli’s contributions in Berlinguer et al. 1976).
In January 1950 the Italian experience in, and contribution to, the inter-
national front of the partisans for peace was tabled for the WFDY executive 
committee meeting in Bucharest. It was the first time that the situation 
and experience of a national youth movement would be examined in detail 
by the executive committee. The young Enrico Berlinguer, then president 
of the Italian Youth Alliance of the Popular Democratic Front delivered 
a report entitled La lotta della gioventù democratica per la pace e per i 
suoi diritti politici ed economici, summarising the experience of the Ital-
ian youth in the struggle for peace and for their economic and political 
rights. In his report, Berlinguer celebrated the Soviet Union as the flag-
ship of world peace and democracy and emphasised the importance of 
popularising the achievements of the Soviet youth and of other people’s 
democracies as well as the victory of the Chinese people among the young 
masses (La gioventù italiana nel fronte mondiale della pace 1950, 24). The 
representative of the newly established PRC, Wu Xueqian,7 praised the 
Italian experience and initiatives as a model for other Communist parties 
in capitalist Europe but also stated that the task of Chinese youth at that 
time was ‘peaceful edification’, thus mainly underlying that their focus was 
inward, as young builders of the New China (La gioventù italiana nel fronte 
mondiale della pace 1950, 39-40). This statement brought the attention on 
the differences in the struggle of youth between Socialist China and the 
capitalist countries. In China the attention was on domestic reconstruc-
tion, given the dramatic socio-economic conditions and the emergencies 
facing the leaders of the newly founded PRC. 
The importance of China was recognised by the WFDY as early as 1950 
when a youth delegation – the largest ever organised since the establish-
ment of the Federation – was sent to the newly proclaimed PRC to honour 
the success of the Chinese revolution but also to show – as reported at that 
time – the solidarity of world youth not just in their work of constructing 
a New China but also in their struggle against American aggression and 
imperialism in East Asia (Boccara 1951). The Cold War had already turned 
hot on the Korean peninsula and the PRC would soon decide to intervene 
to aid Korea. CCP leaders attached extreme importance to this visit, in 
view of the situation, and warmly received the foreign guests, “believing 
that this initiative might be significant in strengthening the links and unity 
7 Wu Xueqian was the Chinese representative within the WFDY during 1949-1950 and 
would hold the position of deputy-director and then director of the CYL Central Committee 
International Liaison Department until 1958 when he entered the External Liaison Depart-
ment of the CCP Central Committee and was made responsible for the activities directed 
towards Southwest Asia and Africa (Gongqingtuan zhongyang guoji lianluobu 2009, 94; 
Zhu 2012, 123-5).
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of China’s youth with the young from every country of the world and in 
broadening the influence of the victory of the Chinese revolution, inspiring 
the young in their struggle and strengthening internationalist spirit among 
Chinese youth” (Gongqingtuan zhongyang guoji lianluobu 2009, 29).
The WFDY delegation was in the PRC for 40 days (10th September-
20th October), with 42 delegates from 32 countries (Soviet Union, Peo-
ple’s Democracies, capitalist countries and the colonial and semi-colonial 
countries) and led by Enrico Boccara, an Italian anti-fascist partisan who 
was secretary-general for the WFDY (Boccara 1951). It included leading 
members of the organisations as well as young journalists: among them 
the Italians Tutino Saverio, a journalist of the ICP newspaper L’Unità, and 
the young women’s representative Lidia Maiorelli (Gongqingtuan zhong-
yang guoji lianluobu 2009, 29; Young Buiders of New China 1951, 60).8 
In the words of He Zhenliang, a former cadre of the Youth League, “the 
political weight of this large-scale delegation was very great” (Liang 2007, 
22). The delegation travelled across the country (embarking on a 40-day 
tour), visiting 18 cities, addressing 13 mass meetings and 30 welcoming 
meetings, coming into contact with young workers, students, and young 
peasants (Boccara 1951). They were also received by Mao Zedong on 30th 
September and were invited to the ceremony for the first anniversary of 
the PRC (Gongqingtuan zhongyang guoji lianluobu 2009, 31). At the end 
of the journey, they addressed a message to the United Nations asking it 
to recognise the PRC as the only genuine representative of the Chinese 
people (Boccara 1951). At the same time, the delegation further promoted 
the peace movement that followed the launching of the Stockholm Appeal 
by the World Peace Council. The campaign for collecting signatures and 
popularising the Stockholm Appeal in China was launched on 1st May and 
the delegation would witness how the campaign for peace was gaining 
momentum in China against the backdrop of the Korean War and American 
raids on Chinese territory (Young Builders of New China 1951, 59-61). A 
year later, in summer 1951, the Youth League Central Committee sent a 
youth delegation to participate in the Third World Youth and Student Fes-
tival in Berlin: it was the largest delegation sent out since the founding of 
the People’s Republic and was headed by the first secretary of the Youth 
League Central Committee Feng Wenbin (Liang 2007, 24).
Yet, it was only after the end of the Korean war and following the crea-
tion of permanent state institutions at the domestic level that the PRC 
could assume a more prominent role within the WFDY, increasing its in-
ternational activism and presenting to the world the image of China as 
a peaceful country (Qian 2009). At the Third World Youth Congress held 
8 Tutino Saverio left a diary of his personal experience in China (ARCHIVIO Diaristico 
Nazionale, Pieve Santo Stefano, Arezzo). 
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in Bucharest in July 1953, Hu Yaobang, the newly elected First Secretary 
of the Youth League, delivered a speech on the same day the Korean War 
ended and the armistice agreement was signed (27th July), arguing that 
China was committed to peace, friendship and solidarity among the young 
of the whole world.
We hold that all countries of different social systems can coexist peace-
fully. The spirit of negotiation should and certainly will triumph over ag-
gression and intervention. […] We are convinced that the mutual under-
standing, friendship and solidarity between the peoples of all countries 
are the best means to realise the young people’s desire for peace. Thus, 
the development of cultural exchanges between the people and youth 
of all countries and the strengthening of friendship among world youth 
will break through all artificial barriers and help to further the cause of 
peace. […] it is indeed the most important problem in our work today to 
strengthen the solidarity of the peace-loving youth of the whole world 
and to win the thousands upon thousands youth of good-will who are still 
staying outside the peace movement to participate in the ranks for the 
defence of peace. We are convinced that it is completely possible for all 
young people, irrespective of nationality, social strata, religious belief, 
political opinion and affiliation, to find common language and common 
ideas in the common cause of defending peace. (World Federation of 
Democratic Youth 1953, 137-8)
The PRC’s weight within the WFDY increased after joining the Secretariat 
at the Bucharest meeting that voted in new leaders, with Hu Yaobang as 
vice-President and Qian Liren as Secretary (Qian 2009). Qian Liren’s re-
sponsibility as Secretary in the following three years (until August 1956) 
coincided with new developments in both China’s international attitude 
and the WFDY policies. Firstly, a new turn took place in both the internal 
politics and foreign policy of the Chinese government, which, with the end 
of the Korean war, began to move away from the antagonistically anti-im-
perialist approach to international relations, favouring a more conciliatory 
and peaceful line that allowed the expansion of the PRC’s relations beyond 
the Soviet bloc (that is, participation in the 1955 Asian-African Conference 
in Bandung) and the opening of a limited dialogue with Western Europe. 
Secondly, in the post-1953 period, following the death of Stalin, efforts 
were undertaken to make the WFDY more pluralistic and less isolated 
(Cornell 1965, 97-135). The formulation of a more moderate policy aimed 
at broadening its membership among non-Communist groups and expand-
ing its influence globally (especially among youth from non-bloc countries, 
that is from newly independent states in Asia, Africa and Latin America) 
coincided with profound international changes (decolonisation and emer-
gence of newly independent third world countries) and far-reaching events 
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that shook the Communist world (1956 repression of the Hungarian revolt, 
20th National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). 
Moreover, it should be noted that in the mid-’50s, especially after the 
20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – which sanc-
tioned the thesis of the plurality and diversity of the roads to socialism and 
opened up new opportunities for Communist party autonomy – the ICP’s 
leaders started to feel that “‘the strongest communist party in the capi-
talist world’ could become itself an international political subject” (Höbel 
2005, 516). With a perspective aimed at overcoming military blocs, and 
firmly anchored in the strategy of peaceful coexistence, Italian Commu-
nists tried to formulate their own political agenda. In particular, Palmiro 
Togliatti elaborated a new original conception based on ‘polycentrism’, 
which implied a re-assessment of the traditional leadership role of the 
Soviet Union within the Communist movement and also led to the ICP’s 
interest and action towards the extra-European world and what came to 
be known as the ‘non-aligned’ movement (Galeazzi 2011). Thus, in the 
mid-’50s the PRC’s search for a more autonomous role internationally 
intertwined with Italian Communists’ desire to carve out their own space 
of action vis-à-vis the USSR. 
It is in this context that Hu Yaobang and especially Qian Liren (who 
was based in Budapest) worked side by side with the President Bruno 
Bernini. Since his appointment as President of the WFDY in 1953, under 
the instruction of Togliatti himself, Bruno Bernini strove to make the WFDY 
representative of different political groups in the world (not necessarily 
Communist) with the ultimate aim of overcoming international tension and 
military blocs through the promotion of a dialogue with different forces 
(such as the non-aligned social democratic youth in Western Europe).9 
Bernini was well aware that such a dialogue and collaboration in the strug-
gle for peace against colonialism, aggression and violence, required the 
WFDY to overcome any ‘partisan’ political notion. As it will be further 
discussed below, these ideas were supported by the leaders of the PRC, 
whose international status was greatly enhanced at this time. 
9 For instance Bernini talked with Olof Palme, the future prime minister of Sweden, who 
at that time was the leader of the Swedish social democratic youth and favoured coopera-
tion among different youth organisations for the benefit of overcoming military divisions 
that threatened world peace. Bernini tried for an agreement on cooperation but Palme 
clearly stated to Bernini that there were still reservations that could be overcome only if 
the WFDY assumed a more autonomous position internationally and left behind its partisan 
character [Bruno Bernini autobiographical manuscript, Istituto Storico della Resistenza e 
della Società Contemporanea, Livorno (ISTORECO), Fondo Bernini, 81/1].
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4 The WFDY Initiatives in China
In 1954 the PRC hosted an important international meeting. In August 
263 people from 68 countries, including representatives of affiliated youth 
organisations as well as observers and guests of different political convic-
tions, gathered in Beijing to take part in the work of the WFDY Council.10 
This meeting called for peace and the easing of international tension, 
the strengthening of the world youth struggle and unity against colonial-
ism, as well as improvement of the living conditions of the young people 
of newly independent countries in the Third World (World Federation of 
Democratic Youth 1954).
It was the first time that a WFDY Council was held in Asia and it fo-
cused on the problems of the youth movement in colonial and dependent 
countries. That the choice fell on Beijing was mainly due to recent de-
velopments in national liberation movements in colonial countries and, 
especially, of the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, which had 
brought Asian countries to the centre of world attention and, at the same 
time, greatly enhanced the international prestige of the ‘new China’ (Gong-
qingtuan zhongyang guoji lianluobu 2009, 36-7). Moreover, the place and 
agenda of the meeting reflected a shift in WFDY work with greater at-
tention reserved for extra-European countries (Gongqingtuan zhongyang 
guoji lianluobu 2009, 6).
During the WFDY Council, Bernini stressed in his official speech that the 
establishment of the PRC had been a fact of historical importance – a ‘shock 
for the colonialist world’ (World Federation of Democratic Youth 1954, 8) –, 
and that the victory and constructive endeavours of the Chinese people 
provided an example and inspiration for colonial countries (Calamandrei 
1954, 6). Bernini’s analysis fell within the context of renewed attention for 
the struggle for national liberation in Third World Countries and reflected 
the views then shared by ICP leaders, who were looking at the victory of 
the Chinese revolution “not just as an ‘extension’ of the socialist experience 
[…] but also for the diversity of the process and results”, and thus for the 
intrinsic peculiarity of being “a colonial revolution, a great peasants’ rebel-
lion […] which suggested new experiments, new roads to be followed” and, 
in their opinion, “also seemed to offer new models for a Third World that 
was experiencing the moment of decolonization” (Pajetta 1976, 7).11
Bernini also addressed the question of the specific characteristics of 
youth in colonial and semi-colonial countries, a point then elaborated upon 
10 Among the Italian participants, there was Claudio Vecchi, the delegate of the Youth 
Commission of the CGIL (Word Federation of Democratic Youth 1954, 46).
11 This appreciation for the distinctive features of the Chinese revolution clearly reflected 
Italian communists’ (especially Palmiro Togliatti’s) attention for the plurality of the roads 
to socialism. 
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by the Chinese delegate Liu Daosheng who talked extensively about the 
national question in these countries, with reference also to the Chinese 
experience (World Federation of Democratic Youth 1954, 18-20). Liu Da-
osheng spoke of the need for the youth movement in these countries to be 
subordinated to the people’s struggle for national independence: 
The essential question confronting the broad masses of youth in colonial 
and semi-colonial countries is a question of oppression by foreign impe-
rialism, a question of national existence. […] the cause of their miserable 
life lies, first of all, in the lack of national independence and the cruel 
oppression and exploitation by imperialism. In our country, there were 
in the past also a number of patriotic youth who held that as long as they 
developed industry and promoted education, their wishes to make their 
country strong and prosperous and their people happy could be realized. 
But the living facts made them gradually realize that only by linking up 
their individual lot with the lot of the nation as a whole, and by actively 
participating in the movement for national independence could the na-
tion be saved from perishment and the bright and happy future of youth 
ensured. (World Federation of Democratic Youth 1954, 18)
Liu went on to stress that “in colonial and semi-colonial countries the strug-
gle against imperialism is inseparable from the struggle for democracy and 
against feudalism” which is based “on the feudal ownership of land and 
the oppression of peasants by landlords” (World Federation of Democratic 
Youth 1954, 18). As such he also touched upon the question of the peas-
ants with whom “all patriotic forces should sympathise” as well as upon 
the specific role of students within the youth movement: 
Without the peasants’ active participation and persistence in the strug-
gle, it would be impossible to win complete victory for the national 
liberation and democratic liberties of these countries…. The central 
theme of the youth movement in colonial and semicolonial countries 
is to organize the broad masses of youth into the struggle against im-
perialism and feudalism. At the same time, however, it is necessary to 
pay attention and attach importance to the young people’s everyday 
political, economic and cultural demands… in colonial countries, the 
young people’s most fundamental demands are related to the question 
of national existence, the question of the right to live, and the question 
of fundamental democratic rights. […]. It is necessary to pay attention 
to the position and the role of the student movement […] and to under-
stand the characteristics of the young students of these countries. […] 
They are comparatively more sensitive politically and are full of patriotic 
ardour, so they are an important force in the movement for national 
independence. The experiences of China show that the upsurge of the 
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broad patriotic student movement is combined with the workers’ and 
peasants’ movement, as the general aim of both is one and the same. 
(World Federation of Democratic Youth 1954, 18-19)
These issues were also addressed in an internal document drafted by 
the CYL Central Committee, entitled Suggestions and Opinions on Some 
Questions Related to the WFDY Work in Asian Colonial and Semi-colonial 
Countries, which for the first time presented in a systematic way China’s 
opinions regarding the WFDY’s work, underlying the importance of adopt-
ing methods and approaches that suited the specific conditions and fea-
tures of Asian countries (Gongqingtuan zhongyang guoji lianluobu 2009, 
7, 38-9). The question of the WFDY’s work among the peasants became a 
central theme. Not by chance, soon afterwards (December 1954), young 
representatives of forty countries (Italy, France, Soviet Union, India, Japan, 
China, among them) came together at an international gathering on rural 
youth in Vienna (Gongqingtuan zhongyang guoji lianluobu 2009, 40-2). 
Another major initiative was launched by the WFDY two years later. In 
autumn 1956, an international youth delegation arrived in China following 
an invitation from Chinese youth organisations. It was not the first time that 
the WFDY undertook such an initiative. Yet, compared to the 1950 one, the 
1956 initiative occurred in a very different context and consisted not only 
of young activists driven by political ideals but also involved non-affiliated 
youth and members of youth groups external to the WFDY. 
Invited to visit China in November, the delegation – led by Bruno Berni-
ni – was composed of 33 young delegates from different parts of the world 
(including African and Western European countries), the majority of whom 
were external to the WFDY. Among them there were representatives of 
youth organisations of Socialist parties in Belgium and Italy as well as 
members of Western and Japanese centre or right-wing organisations such 
as national and international Christian youth associations who despite be-
ing sceptical about WFDY intentions – tending to see it as “the tool of the 
Soviet group to infiltrate the West” – were curious to see the PRC. These 
invitations were made thanks to the collaboration of the WFDY, which  as 
mentioned above - was striving to come out of isolationism and broaden 
its membership and influence at that time (Gongqingtuan zhongyang guoji 
lianluobu 2009, 42-3). As Qian Liren put it in his memories, “without the 
mutual cooperation between China and the WFDY, it might have been very 
difficult to form such a largely representative delegation at that time” (Qian 
2005, 65-6). The British youth delegate Michael Croft, founder of the Na-
tional Youth Theatre, soon after his visit wrote that for the leaders of the 
WFDY, the initiative represented “a major prestige effort, […] to gather un-
der one roof ‘all shades of religious and political opinion’” (Croft 1958, 14). 
For China, the initiative was undoubtedly a great opportunity in its ef-
forts to impress Western delegates with its achievements in the construc-
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tion of socialism, to make them appreciate its weight and importance as 
a world power and to show – especially to those delegates who tended to 
equate communism with limited freedom – the human side of the Com-
munist regime. Visitors were thus allowed a certain degree of freedom 
in the travel plan (Gongqingtuan zhongyang guoji lianluobu 2009, 43). 
Not by chance, this initiative took place at a time of unfolding intellectual 
liberalization in China and in coincidence with the Hungarian crisis that 
shocked the world, projecting a negative image of the Soviet Union world-
wide. At the same time, it was part of China’s renewed openness to the 
outside world. In point of fact, the mid-’50s saw a spectacular increase in 
exchanges of delegations between Communist China and Western coun-
tries (including Italy) involving different sectors of society (on exchanges 
between China and Western Europe see De Giorgi 2014). 
During his stay in China, the young Michael Croft clearly got the impres-
sion that the delegation business was a major development in the Chinese 
campaign to win friends and influence public opinion in foreign countries. 
He defined it a ‘national advertising’ effort driven by China’s desire to be 
seen in the world as a respectable country: 
Respectability is the precursor to expanding trade, to a place in the 
United Nations, to the evacuation of American troops from Taiwan… […] 
So the delegate is a vital import, whether he comes to talk business, to 
examine churches, to investigate intellectual freedom or, like myself, 
merely to look around. He may be one of many, but he is one who mat-
ters. (Croft 1958, 38-9)
As such, in the ’50s the WFDY offered the newly established PRC a crucial 
avenue for contacts with the external world, not limited to the People’s 
Democracies and Communist groups in the West. At the same time, it of-
fered foreign youth the opportunity to develop links with Chinese youth 
and its leaders as well as to visit China at a time when travelling to the 
PRC was generally not possible, unless it occurred within the framework 
of formally organised delegations. It is within this framework and thanks 
to the WFDY initiatives in the PRC that Bruno Bernini had the chance to 
meet and talk to Chinese leaders such as Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and 
Deng Xiaoping, and to visit the PRC. It is to his experience and memoirs 
that we now turn our attention. 
5 Encountering Maoist China:  
Bruno Bernini’s Experience and Memories
As mentioned above, Italian Communists held a prominent position within 
the WFDY, holding the presidency for almost a decade: Bruno Bernini 
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followed Enrico Berlinguer as president of the organisation from 1953 to 
1959. As an antifascist partisan from Livorno, Bernini joined the ICP in 
1943. With World War II at an end, he became a member of the National 
Secretariat of the Youth Front, and in 1950, a leading member of the 
reorganised FGCI. In 1953, after the death of Stalin, he was appointed 
president of the WFDY and from that point until 1959, he lived in Buda-
pest where the organisation’s headquarters is located. Holding such a 
position, he developed a passion for international issues and worked side 
by side with the leaders of the youth of different countries, including the 
Chinese Qian Liren, who in the early 1950s served as director of China’s 
CYL International Liaison Department, as well as the national secretary 
of China’s Youth League, Hu Yaobang, who became vice-president of the 
WFDY in 1953 at the time when – as mentioned above – China joined the 
Secretariat. In addition, Bruno Bernini was to visit Mao’s China twice dur-
ing his mandate in the early and mid-1950s, first on the occasion of the 
WFDY Council in Beijing and then as part of the 1956 international youth 
delegation to the PRC.
Bernini could thus personally witness China’s assuming a more active 
role within the WFDY but also see disagreement emerging between Chi-
nese and Soviet representatives as early as 1954 over issues such as the 
priorities of the youth of the Third World. In his efforts towards making 
the WFDY more open and pluralistic, while encountering resistance from 
Soviet leaders, he got instead full support by CCP leaders with whom he 
was able to talk during his sojourns in China. In 1954, during a meeting 
he had with Zhou Enlai (then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Premier of 
the PRC) – a man he described as “extraordinarily affable” – Bernini was 
first reassured that China’s CYL fully supported the WFDY’s policy of 
openness.12 Later, in the autumn of 1956, when Bernini returned to China 
as part of the joint international youth delegation, he met Mao Zedong, 
who also expressed his support for the renewal of the WFDY, stating that 
a federation that was a rough copy of the Cominform had no reason to 
exist. Instead – as Bernini recalls – Mao expressed himself in favour of 
transforming the WFDY into an organisation that could unite Communist 
youth with all those youth forces in the capitalist world that, despite not 
aspiring to socialism, did not tolerate American domination and wanted to 
affirm the autonomy of their people and safeguard world peace.13
Conversations with Chinese leaders also covered the theme of the Ital-
ian Communists’ policy, albeit marginally. During the meeting with Zhou 
Enlai in 1954, Bernini discovered a profound interest in the ICP’s historical 
experience of the united front among the youth in Italy, as well as an ap-
12 Bruno Bernini autobiographical manuscript, ISTORECO, Fondo Bernini, 87.
13 Bruno Bernini autobiographical manuscript, ISTORECO, Fondo Bernini, 97. 
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preciation for Togliatti’s contribution to overcoming Communist isolation-
ism or sectarianism at the 7th Congress of the Communist International 
(summer 1935).14
The conversation also touched upon issues relating to the current politi-
cal debate at that time, including the theme of nuclear war and the end 
of civilisation, about which Togliatti had spoken only a few months earlier 
when addressing the ICP Central Committee. As it is known, this question 
would become a crucial point of divergence between Moscow and Beijing 
later in 1957 when, at the Moscow conference, which Shen Zhihua and Xia 
Yafeng defined as a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations, Mao expressed 
his reservations about the policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ being promoted 
by the new Soviet leadership, pointing instead to the possibility of war and 
stating that in case of a nuclear war the whole world would become social-
ist (Shen, Xia 2009).15 Mao’s attitude reflected a radical turn in Chinese 
politics. By the time of the Moscow conference, Mao’s awareness of the 
PRC’s newfound confidence and influence in the international Communist 
movement, and his determination to raise his ‘continuous revolution’ to a 
higher level within the country had, to a large extent been enhanced by 
Beijing‘s experience of both the Polish and Hungarian crises, which had a 
profound impact on the orientation of China’s domestic and international 
politics (Chen Jian 2001, 68-71, 145-62). Mao’s famous speech of 18 No-
vember 1957 in Moscow, especially his speculation about a nuclear war 
and its consequence, stirred confusion and caused strong reactions after 
the meeting (Shen, Xia 2009, 111). Disagreements on this theme would 
intensify over the next decade not just with the Soviet leadership, but 
also with important protagonists of other Communist parties in Europe. 
Of all the party leaders, Togliatti was certainly a strong supporter of the 
need for peace. In fact, having been persuaded of the need to appeal to 
Catholic masses, and to find a common ground that could unite the Com-
munist and Catholic groups within Italy, Togliatti had adopted the thesis 
that a thermonuclear war would lead to global destruction and mark the 
end of civilisation as early as April 1954, one month after it had first been 
discussed by Malenkov (Agosti 2003, 416-17; Pons 2012, 285-6).
Interestingly, according to Bernini’s memoirs, Zhou Enlai told him that 
the “safeguarding of peace assumed a new importance in the atomic era”, 
but also pointed out that such a war would not necessarily and inevitably 
14 Bruno Bernini autobiographical manuscript, ISTORECO, Fondo Bernini, 87. Indeed, 
Togliatti had played an important role in reorienting the communist movement in the mid-
’30s, pushing forward a new strategy based on ‘popular fronts’ against fascism and linking 
communism with anti-fascism (Agosti 2003, 191-7). 
15 For an annotated translation of the complete texts of Mao Zedong’s speeches at the 
Moscow Conference see Schoenhals (1986), in particular Mao’s remarks on the theme of a 
nuclear war (speech of 18 November) at the pages 118-19. 
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mark the end of humanity and of socialism, thus leaving the question 
open for further discussion.16 Bernini’s memoirs therefore suggest that 
the theme of war and peace was an issue over which divergences might 
have existed, albeit still hidden, well before 1957. 
Working side by side with Chinese representatives also gave Bernini the 
opportunity to gain more knowledge of China’s approach to and concep-
tion of international relations at a time when – as he wrote in his mem-
oirs – during meetings with different leaders of the Socialist countries 
he could perceive emerging drives towards national autonomy, despite 
the Soviet leaders’ continued rally-call for the USSR to take the leading 
role.17 It was during a visit to Korea where he went in 1954 as head of a 
youth delegation that he would learn from the Chinese Liu Xiyuan,18 who 
accompanied him, what he would define as “a conception of friendship 
and internationalism, heavily anchored to the respect for the principles 
of autonomy and national sovereignty”, a notion that Bernini appreciated 
and with which he could fully identify. 19 On 17th November 1956, at a 
time of both unfolding intellectual liberalization at the domestic level and 
renewed openness towards the outside world, Bernini was present when 
Deng Xiaoping, then Secretary General of the CCP, met and talked to the 
delegation members (Gongqingtuan zhongyang guoji lianluobu 2009, 43). 
According to the available Chinese transcript, the first topic covered by 
Deng concerned the meaning of being a Communist party member and 
the nexus between Marxist universal principles and the specific Chinese 
context (Deng 1956). The British delegate Michael Croft then asked two 
main questions that brought up disputable topics. Aside from the Chinese 
government policy towards Hungary and Egypt (both the Hungarian crisis 
and the Suez crisis broke out during the delegation’s visit), he enquired 
about the Chinese leaders’ conception of the freedom of the press (Croft 
1958, 251-6). Years later, Bernini would remember that Deng Xiaoping 
replied to the question by the British delegate on the lack of freedom of 
the press in China, stating that 
‘every country has its particular internal rule, related to current dif-
ficulties’ and ‘today the essential thing – internationally – was not the 
concern over internal limits of other countries but rather the coop-
eration based on mutual respect and interest, so as to overcome the 
backwardness and facilitate the progress of every people’: and ‘this is 
16 Bruno Bernini autobiographical manuscript, ISTORECO, Fondo Bernini, 87.
17 Bruno Bernini autobiographical manuscript, ISTORECO, Fondo Bernini, 84/3.
18 Liu Xiyuan in 1952 had been deputy head of the youth department of the political office 
of the People’s Liberation Army.
19 Bruno Bernini autobiographical manuscript, ISTORECO, Fondo Bernini, 85-6.
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the meaning of our government’s international commitment, aimed at 
developing relations of collaboration and exchange with every country, 
that, besides being of mutual interest – is also decisive to overcome 
prejudices and build world peace’.20
At the same time, Bernini’s travels to China also allowed him to appreciate 
the enormity of the task Chinese leaders had undertaken for the develop-
ment of the country, as well as their willingness to show foreigners not just 
the achievements in the construction of socialism but also the conditions 
of extreme poverty in which the population lived: 
For me, it was the first World Council in which I participated as President 
and it was the first time that an important meeting of the WFDY was held 
in the People’s Republic of China. I remember that we were received 
with large youth demonstrations; then, the unforgettable visits to Monu-
ments and historical sites in Beijing – in particular, the Imperial Palace 
and the Great Wall; and at last, the tours in the most decayed areas of 
the city, with so many people, women and children, who lived in shanties 
in conditions of backwardness beyond words: this in order that we un-
derstood – Hu Yao Ban [Hu Yaobang] told me – the enormous endeavour 
of reconstruction and development ‘the New China was striving for’.21 
From his travels to China, Bernini clearly was left with a profoundly posi-
tive impression of the country and the potential of the PRC’s contribution 
to peaceful international change. As he put it, 
From those travels in China, from the unforgettable experiences I 
had – of an immense people, exhausted by backwardness and poverty 
from which it was determined to free itself – and from the relations I had 
with the leaders of the youth and the Party – Hu Yao Ban [Hu Yaobang], 
Ciu En Lay [Zhou Enlai] and Die Xiao Pin [Deng Xiaoping] – I became 
convinced not only of the importance of the contribution that would 
come for the WFDY renewal, but also of the important contribution 
that the New China would make to the development of new relations of 
international collaboration and, especially, between the industrialised 
North and the Countries of the Third World, crucial for both the progress 
of the peoples and of world peace.22
20 Bruno Bernini autobiographical manuscript, ISTORECO, Fondo Bernini, 88.
21 Bruno Bernini autobiographical manuscript, ISTORECO, Fondo Bernini, 86. 
22 Bruno Bernini autobiographical manuscript, ISTORECO, Fondo Bernini, 88. 
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6 Conclusion
In the ’50s Chinese and Italian Communists could rely on a wide network 
of national and international organisations that allowed the establishment 
and development of early contacts and exchanges. This article has shown 
that international political activism played an important role in this re-
spect: the WFDY provided a few Italian Communists with the opportunity 
to visit Mao’s China and gain direct insight into the approach and poli-
cies of Chinese leaders. These early experiences contributed to laying the 
groundwork for party-to-party bilateral exchanges in the mid and late-’50s. 
At the same time, left-wing international activities allowed China to create 
personal links with foreign leaders at the very early stage of their career 
that could eventually prove useful years later. This can be seen for example 
in the fact that at the beginning of 1979, when the CCP laid the basis for 
resuming its relations with the ICP after sixteen years, Wu Xueqian, then 
deputy-director of the CCP External Liaison Department, was chosen as 
the most suitable person to be sent to Rome for a secret meeting with ICP 
representatives because of his youthful experiences at the international 
level, which had allowed him to become acquainted with Enrico Berlinguer, 
who had since become the national secretary of the ICP (Wang, Zhu 1992, 
376-7). Early contacts among young representatives also turned into long-
lasting bonds of friendship. According to Antonio Rubbi’s memoirs, in the 
’80s – when relations among Communist parties had been resumed – Hu 
Yaobang never missed the opportunity to invite both Ugo Pecchioli and 
Bruno Bernini to China. At the end of every meeting of party representa-
tives, he would ask the Italians to tell Pecchioli and Bernini he wished to 
see them (Rubbi 1992, 299). 
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This volume include essays originally delivered  
at the international workshop Italy, Europe, China: 
Economic, Political and Cultural Relations During the 
Cold War Years (1949-1971) held at the Department of 
Asian and African Studies of Ca’ Foscari University of 
Venice on 13th-14th February 2014 as well as invited 
research papers by two international outstanding 
scholars who have made valuable contributions to 
the study of China’s foreign policy and engagement 
in the ’50s and ’60s. The book illustrates recent 
trends in international research on China-Western 
Europe relations in the years of intense Cold War, 
complicating the long-held image of Mao-era China  
as sealed off from the outside world.
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